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ABSTRACT
Attitudes to environmental and investment risk are examined to determine
whether they were a defining characteristic of middle-class behaviour in the period 1760
to 1850. Approximately 6,000 investors in eleven canal companies and seven railway
companies were investigated to determine whether evaluation and mitigation of
investment risk is determined by socio-economic background and gender. Investment
risk was defined as inadequate access to, and imperfect interpretation of, information.
The effectiveness of information transfer through public and private spheres was
examined and the effect of differential access to these information conduits, as a
consequence of gender or socio-economic background, was investigated. Investors'
response to the risk environment of early death, war and unpredictable economic cycles
was examined. Each canal company and the group of railway companies was ranked
according to the level of investment risk during both the construction and operating
period, using a mix of quantitative and qualitative tests. The risk preferences of
'economic' and 'financial' investors were compared. The strategies used by each group
of investor to mitigate risk were examined.
The study provides new evidence of the effective transmission of national
market sentiment by the 1770s, but reveals that the physical market in canal company
shares remained local and continued its separate existence long after the
institutionalised national market for railway shares was established. Perceptible
differences in the risk assessment and risk mitigation strategies of different groups of
investors were observed. This was attributed to differential access to information, which
in turn was attributed to gender and social, political and religious affiliation. The study
provides evidence that although differences in behaviour were observed amongst
groups within the sample population, it shared common investment strategies and that
attitudes to risk and risk mitigation should be considered as valid criteria for class
differentiation.
CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1.1 Research Objectives and Context
Risk assessment and the strategies used to mitigate risk are fundamental to the
understanding of the development of a financially sophisticated middle-class elite in the
mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries. During this period the middle class became
increasingly associated with a largely urban lifestyle which was differentiated from that of
the landed and the artisan and labouring classes in terms of economic and cultural
norms. 1 Dependence on income from business or investments left the middling sort
more exposed than those with landed wealth to environmental and investment risk. 2
 This
study is based on the premise that the skills involved in risk evaluation and attitudes to
risk-taking are defining characteristics of society.
Risk is a measure of the uncertainty arising from imperfect information or
differential access to and interpretation of information. 3 This research examines the
availability and quality of financial information and the importance of gender and socio-
economic status on an investor' s ability to access and interpret this information. The
study reviews a wide range of social, cultural and economic issues, using data from a
large, homogenous population. Whereas much previous research has been based on
smaller, heterogeneous populations, this study draws conclusions from the analysis of a
population of nearly 6,000 individuals. This population was selected from investors in
canal and railway companies and joint stock banks in the West Midlands between 1760
and 1850. The sample is broadly representative of the financially sophisticated,
increasingly wealthy and dynamic members of the middle classes, who came to
dominate commercial and economic life during this period.4
Canal and railway company investors were selected as the basis for this study
for two reasons. Firstly, canal companies were amongst the first truly private sector
enterprises to attract widespread investment 'by persons locally unconnected and,
therefore, unable to derive collateral advantages'. 5 These were commercially
disinterested rentiers or 'financial' investors. The early canals in particular also attracted
investment from 'economic' investors who derived additional commercial benefits from
their investment, such as improved transportation for their products or lower freight
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costs. 6 Railway promotions followed the same corporate structure as canal companies
but sought a wider constituency of investors. The study of individual canal and railway
companies, which operated exclusively or substantially in the West Midlands over a
period of ninety years, revealed fundamental differences in these two constituencies and
sheds new light on the development of a national capital market. Secondly, canal and
railway projects were based on new technology and required financial and legal
innovation. Investors participating in these new opportunities needed new skills to
assess and mitigate new types of risk. These skills included the ability to access,
evaluate and synthesise information about the project, the local environment and the
wider national economy.
The revolution in transportation infrastructure, which took place in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, was entirely driven by the private sector. The serendipitous
conjunction of political stability, growing private affluence, commercial and industrial
development, technological change and the emergence of a national capital market
contributed to, and was sustained by, the rapid growth of canals and later, railways.7
The first canals were developed by promoters, such as the Duke of Bridgewater and
Josiah Wedgwood, who were intent on sweeping aside vested interests in order to
achieve the economic benefits of lower transport costs for their businesses. 8 The
amount of capital required for these projects necessitated promoters raising finance
through the mechanism of joint stock companies, from a wider constituency of investors,
who were often disinterested rentiers. These 'financial' and 'economic' investors had
different objectives and risk thresholds, although certainly many investors in the earlier
canals may have combined both motivations. 9 Businessmen who wished to use canals
to transport their goods sought low tolls and even attempted to limit the level of
dividends paid to shareholders. Financial investors sought higher dividends and
supported higher tolls and successfully fought moves to restrict their income. 10 The
process was regulated by Parliament but the business of obtaining approval was dogged
by vested interests, such as landowners, or the promoters of rival schemes. 11 The
resulting canal system was a product of haphazard and piecemeal development by
private commercial interests, as can be seen from the Schematic Plan of Canals and
2
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Railways, overleaf. There was no unified government planning, as there was in some
European countries. 12
 As a consequence, the resulting system contained duplications
and inefficiencies. Investors in the early canals had to absorb a considerable amount of
investment risk. Construction costs were generally substantially underestimated, and the
length of the construction period meant economic conditions were often less favourable
when the companies needed to raise additional capital. 13 Nevertheless, the success of
some of the early canals led to speculation, as financial investors gambled on the
potential profits of new schemes. This reached a climax in the years 1792 to 1793.
Canals initiated at the beginning of this period of 'canal mania' were generally 'those,
which had a solid base in the increasing prosperity of the times'. 14 The financial crisis of
1793, at the outbreak of the French Revolutionary war, put an end to the boom in canal
shares. Nevertheless, canal building continued, albeit on a less frenetic scale. The
successful companies raised considerable amounts of capital from a broad constituency
of shareholders. By 1790, £2 to 3 million had been invested, and between 1788 and
1796 Parliament approved the raising ofafurther10 million. Itis estimated that by the
1830s about £20 million had been invested in canals. 15
 Investment in improvements and
extensions continued long after the development of railways. At first railways were seen
as feeders to the waterways, but soon canals came under increasing competition. Canal
companies responded by reducing tolls, but many canals continued to exist and trade
profitably until the 1840s.18
The first railway to compete directly with canals opened in 1830 with the
completion of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway. The development of the railway
system was also undertaken by the private sector and, as with canals, the process was
characterised by speculation and anomalies caused by vested interests, duplication and
redundancy. Nevertheless, railway investment, probably from the outset, represented a
lower risk than in the equivalent stage of canal development, since more consistent and
better quality information about the companies was available. The capital market was
more liquid and more accessible to investors and by 1842, seventy railway companies
comprised the most highly capitalised group of joint stock companies on the London
market, with a combined value of £57.4 million. 17
 The speculative mania in railway
3
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shares of 1844 owed as much to the success of established lines as to low interest rates
and favourable economic conditions. 18
 Even in the aftermath of the mania, contemporary
opinion saw value in investing in railway shares.19
The West Midlands was selected as the basis of this study for its distinctive
cultural and economic coherence rather than on its well-defined geographical
characteristics. The catchment area of Birmingham Gazette was considered to be a
more relevant criterion for the study area than a geographical construct, such as the
catchment area of the River Severn. The Birmingham Gazette was 'the channel for the
association between the merchants and manufacturers of Birmingham and the
landowners of the surrounding counties'. 2° By 1760, the paper's circulation extended to
Shrewsbury in Shropshire to the Severn at Worcester, to the Black Country, North
Staffordshire, into the Cotswolds as far as Stratford and the Vale of Evesham, and even
as far as London. This extensive cultural hegemony reflected the underlying economic
links between the core areas of the 'West Midlands', namely the counties of
Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Shropshire and Staffordshire, and its wider markets in
England and Wales. Birmingham was a hub of the canal system, as described in
Appendix VI, and early in the nineteenth century was linked to the major ports of
Manchester and Liverpool, Bristol and London by trunk routes. The canals linking
Birmingham to its hinterland and to wider markets were actively promoted and financed
by investors from the local area. Although Birmingham itself never became the hub of
the rail network to the same extent, the London & Birmingham and the Grand Junction
Railways were amongst the first to obtain parliamentary approval in the early I 830s.
The West Midlands industrial area, as defined by Court, was an area of
approximately 200 square miles and comprised parts of South Staffordshire, North
Warwickshire and East Worcestershire. This area was connected to a larger West
Midlands region, which embraced the coalfields of Shropshire, South Staffordshire and
Warwickshire, the engineering industries, iron works and diverse manufacturing and
service industries in the counties of Warwickshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire and
Worcestershire. 21
 The economy of the West Midlands in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was sufficiently diverse to be broadly representative of the country as a whole
4
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in its reaction to economic cycles and the effects of war. The present study used
evidence from the West Midlands area to investigate the transition from provincial capital
market to part of a national market. Earlier research is divided on when the national
capital market was established. The present study contributes evidence to this debate
using the correlation of the yield on a West Midland canal company stock with
government stock, traded in London.
Apart from the evidence of the wide circulation of the Birmingham Gazette there
does not appear to have been a strong sense of a West Midlands regional identity in the
eighteenth century. In fact there is considerable evidence of competition between
different towns and interests in the development of rival transportation schemes, as
discussed in Appendix VI. Nevertheless, it was the development of canals and railways,
which helped to define this area of the West Midlands, centred on Birmingham. The
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a period of intense urbanisation. The
population of Birmingham increased from 10,000 in 1714 to 60,000 in 1801 and to over
230,000 in 1851 . This was partially the result migration from the surrounding
agricultural areas as employment in agriculture was replaced by trade, manufacturing
and commerce.24
New professions and services developed to support the changing economic
environment? Over the ninety-year period of this study, the socio-economic
backgrounds of investors became more diverse. Investors in West Midland's
transportation companies were selected as a prima fade middle-class population. Earlier -
research has sought to define the middle class in terms of social, religious, political and
economic criteria, and Birmingham was the focus of a major study by Davidoff and
Hall 27 In the present study the effect of social, cultural, religious and political affiliation
on access to information and investment behaviour is investigated and the use of the
term 'financial investor as a criteria to define class is examined.
5
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Mapi: Schematic Plan of Canals and Railways in this Study
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1.2 Risk Environment and Attitudes to Gambling
The underlying risk environment is fundamental to an investigation of investor
behaviour. Improvements in environmental health, disease control and housing, together
with increasing wealth in the population as a whole during the eighteenth century
stimulated the search for the means to protect this newly gained prosperity. 28 New
opportunities arose for the moderately wealthy to invest surplus money, and the money
market and long-term government securities were regarded as relatively low-risk
investments during this period?9 Canal shares and later, in the mid-nineteenth century,
railway shares, provided the growing class of financial investors with alternative, but
arguably more risky investment opportunities. These new types of asset were more
liquid and ultimately more profitable investments than land or mortgages. Changes in the
risk environment affected the security and performance of specific investments and
individual investors in different ways.
This study evaluates the effect of the main environmental risks of disease and
early death, war and the adverse consequence of trade cycles on investor behaviour.
Earlier research has examined the behaviour of entrepreneurs and businessmen in the
light of general economic trends. Markham Lester, for example, attempted to correlate
the incidence of bankruptcy with phases in the economic cycle. He failed to find
statistically significant results, probably because business failure is the result of many
different factors. 3° This study simplifies the indicators of risk assessment to a single
invest/divest decision. The purchases and sales of stock in two canal companies were
examined over fifty-one and sixty-six year periods, respectively. The propensity of
investors to select high, moderate or low-risk canal and railway stocks was compared to
the peaks and troughs of the economic cycle. The present study also used the same
data to examine differences in the behaviour of investors in peace and wartime
conditions. The study attempted to explain differences in the behaviour of investors on
the basis of their socio-economic background, gender and age.
Whilst certain sectors of society sought to reduce their exposure to risk,
gambling and financial speculation were widespread. 31
 Clark argues that these
7
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seemingly contradictory tendencies were 'different manifestations of the same basic
aspiration for social security or financial advancement'. 32 Other researchers suggest that
aristocratic attitudes to gambling were an anathema to a middle class who espoused
prudence and credit-worthiness as a defining set of values. The sample population
was examined for evidence of involvement in financial speculation, share trading and
risk-seeking behaviour. However, the study was primarily structured as an investigation
of the long-term investment strategies rather than short-term speculative behaviour.
1.3 Investment Risk
Investors in the canal and railway companies had to accept an inherently high
level of risk, particularly in the early years of a company's existence. Investment risk can
be regarded as the uncertainty of both the income and capital value of the asset
acquired. Uncertainty arises from imperfect access to information. Certain investors may
have access to more or better quality information than others and different investors may
interpret this information in different ways. The present study quantifies the relative
levels of risk in each of the eleven canal companies and seven railway companies.
Measures of relative risk have been developed in studies of twentieth-century
stock markets, and the present study attempted to apply these techniques to the
evaluation of canal and railway company shares. Time series of share prices for both
canal and railway companies were compiled from the Course of the Exchange for the
period 1811 to 1846. The quality of the underlying data invalidated the exclusive use of
quantitative measures for comparing the risk of the selected stocks, so a number of
qualitative measures of risk were also used. Each stock, at different periods in the
company's life cycle, was classified into high, moderate or low risk. This classification
was used to assess whether risk-seeking or risk-averse behaviour amongst investors
was determined by their age, gender or socio- economic status.
The speed, accuracy and accessibility of information flow, and the degree of
conformity in how investors assess and act on information is a measure of market
efficiency. Some earlier research suggests that the eighteenth-century capital market
was inefficient. Later work maintains that all the elements of a modern efficient market
8
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were already present in the eighteenth century. However, this research was restricted to
work on government and quasi-government securities. Research on the correlation of
economic trends between the building sector and the yields on government stocks
produced more relevant evidence that regional capital markets were still segmented in
the mid-eighteenth century. 37 The market for securities of private sector companies in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was smaller in volume and less sophisticated
than the government stock market. The present study correlates fluctuations in the yield
of government stock and the shares of one of the canal companies for the period 1768
to 1840. This is new evidence that suggests capital market integration was well
established by 1770. The present study also compares the prices of canal shares
recorded in the London stock market to the transfer prices of stock in the local market to
test efficiency of information transfer.
1.4 Information Transfer
Most previous researchers suggest that the investing public in the eighteenth
century had access to relatively good information on the general economy, commodity
prices and trading conditions through public news media. In the absence of consistent,
independently audited published accounts, the dissemination of company-specific
information was far less reliable. Company promoters and officials had access to
privileged information, which was denied to other classes of investors on the basis of
gender or class. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries both company-specific and
market-sentiment information was transmitted through two principal media, the press
and word of mouth. The press included newspapers, more specialised publications,
such as the Course of the Exchange or the Railway Gazette, and pamphlets, often
written by brokers as thinly disguised advertisements for a particular type of
investment.40 Opportunities to pass information by word of mouth occurred in both public
and private spheres. Male investors had access to information in reading or newsrooms,
or in the course of philanthropic, social or political activities. Women did not have access
to many of these fora and have been deemed to have relied upon the advice of male
relatives or bankers or brokers. 41 Probably one of the most reliable information conduits
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for all investors was through informal family networks, which were often further
strengthened by religious affiliations.
This study attempts to evaluate the relative importance of different methods of
information transfer. The most effective way of testing the effectiveness of the
dissemination of information about the macro-economy was through correlation of the
fluctuations in yield between stocks traded in the local market and government stocks,
which comprised the national market. However, suitable information was only available
for one canal company. Dissemination of information from specific companies to a wider
investing public was examined through circumstantial evidence. For example, investors
were recognised as being potential disseminators of company information if they were
committee members or attended annual meetings of proprietors. The potential means of
communicating this information was through personal contact. This was further
examined by collecting a database of information on the membership of thirty-three
social, political, religious and philanthropic institutions that existed in Birmingham
between the years 1761 and 1842. In total 1,291, individuals, predominantly male, were
identified; of whom 318 were members of more than one institution. These individuals
were compared with the database of 5,913 canal and railway company investors. The
socio-economic status and risk-taking propensity of those investors, who were highly
connected through access to these public spheres of potential information transfer, was
examined.
Access to information and the ability to evaluate it reduced uncertainty and
hence nsk. Strategies for mitigating residual risk were already well developed by the late
eighteenth century.
1.5 Risk Mitigation
A number of risk mitigation strategies developed quite early: for example in the
twelfth century sellers at medieval fairs made contracts promising future delivery of
goods. Options were used in the Dutch tulip bulb bubble of the seventeenth century and
by the late-eighteenth century brokers in America were trading put and call options on
stocks.42
 Two main strategies of risk mitigation were examined in the present study,
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namely portfolio management and life insurance. Although the theory of portfolio
management was only articulated in studies of twentieth- and twenty-first-century
investors, it appears to have been used by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century canal and
railway company investors. The life insurance market developed in the eighteenth
century and its use was becoming widespread amongst the middle classes at the same
time that these individuals were actively investing in canal and railway stocks.
In the present study, the propensity of canal investors to hold portfolios of stocks
was compared with that of railway company investors. The number of canal investors
holding multiple canal company shares was found to be significantly greater than the
number of multiple railway company investors. The present study investigated whether
these differences in behaviour were the consequence of the perception of different
levels of risk between canal and railway companies.
These multiple investors were then examined to determine whether they were
more likely than other investors in the sample population to hold portfolios of other
assets, such as life insurance, government stocks or land. The policy registers of the
London Life Assurance Company for the years 1823 to 1850 were examined to
determine the level of usage of life insurance amongst the population of investors in the
present study. Similarly, the Bank of England's registers of holders of 3 per cent Consols
between the years 1817 and 1827 were checked for the presence of canal and railway
investors. The canal and railway investors were also compared with the records of
substantial landowners identified by Bateman. Some earlier researchers suggest there -
is little evidence that wealthy middle-class businessmen invested substantially in land.
Thompson disputed this conclusion, although his research appears to be based on
evidence of second-generation investment in landed estates. 47
 Evidence of the mix of
assets held by canal and railway investors was used to contribute to this debate. The
case for regarding land as one of a spectrum of potential investments, ranging from
government stocks to shares in joint stock companies, to life insurance and mortgages,
each with different risk/return parameters was examined. Thompson concedes,
however, that investment in land for economic reasons declined from the late-
seventeenth century and during the period of the present study land was acquired for
11
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non-economic reasons. The social and cultural imperatives, which moulded middle-
class aspirations, also determined membership of different spheres of social interaction.
The present study investigates the effects of differential access to information and
whether this explains varying attitudes to risk amongst different socio-economic groups.
Evaluation and mitigation of investment risk is determined by many different factors. The
present study attempted to identify some of the most important social and cultural
influences.
1.6 Social and Cultural Inferences
The sample population of canal and railway company investors was prima fade
financially sophisticated and relatively wealthy. By self-selection, individuals without
sufficient surplus wealth to invest in shares were excluded. Sample selection was
intended to be independent of cultural, political, religious or gender bias. Inferences
drawn from the investors' political, religious and social affiliations, their attitudes to risk
and their strategies to preserve or enhance their lifestyle were used to inform the debate
on the development of the middle class. Earlier research has sought to define the middle
classes in terms of cultural, political or economic factors. The Ricardian factors of
production, namely land, labour and capital, have been used to differentiate sources of
income in terms of class. Thus, rent, wages and profits have been attributed to a three-
class social structure of landowners, labourers and capitalists. 50 Morris suggests that
this differentiation fails to cope with the existence of groups who derived income from a
variety of sources. He also questions the four mutually exclusive ideals of class
behaviour suggested by Perkins, namely aristocratic paternalism, entrepreneurial
middle-class competitiveness, working-class co-operation and professionalism. 51 Neale
proposed a model of nineteenth-century society, defined in terms of sources of income
and attitudes to authority, based on five rather than three class. Although Neale appears
to subscribe to the view that class-consciousness is defined by conflict he also suggests
that social mobility occurs between his five classes through a 'middling class'. 52 Hunt
holds similar views on the existence of a distinct middling sort, comprising shopkeepers,
manufacturers, better-off independent artisans, civil servant, professionals and lesser
12
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merchants. The distinction between this group and Neale's middle class, which
comprised industrial and commercial property owners, senior ranks of the armed forces
and professionals or Davidoff and Hall's separation of the higher and lower ranks of
the middle class could be challenged as counting angels on the head of a pin. The
population used in the present study was selected on the basis of economic criteria
defined by its common source of at least some of its income, namely that based on the
employment of capital.
Nevertheless, the socio-economic background of the investors covered a wide
spectrum of occupations and levels of wealth. Comparison of these groups with those
identified by Colquhoun's occupational analysis of the population of Great Britain and
Ireland in 1812, reveals the existence of a middle class comprising not only 'eminent'
merchants, bankers and manufacturers but also more modest employers of capital such
as shopkeepers and artisans and professionals. The period of this study, 1760 to
1850, saw a rapid growth of these occupational groups. In 1812 nearly 46 per cent of the
population of Great Britain and Ireland were from those socio-economic groups whose
wealthier members made investments in canal and railway companies.
Middling sort or middle class, can these investors then be exemplars of a broad
class identity based on common attitudes to wealth and investment? The definition of
financial investor or rentier distinguishes this group from the labouring classes but does
not, perhaps, adequately distinguish them from the landed aristocracy and the gentry.
Stone and Stone suggest that class-consciousness did not solely depend on the
acquisition of landed assets. They note the existence of an 'homogenized culture of
gentility' where wealthy businessmen adopted the education and manners of the landed
classes but retained their own preferences for investment in more liquid assets.
Other researchers suggest that the middle class adopted distinct social and
cultural behaviour, although Wahrman challenges the view that domestic ideology was
confined to the middle class. Religious affiliation has been suggested as a defining
characteristic of middle-class respectabiIity. Research has tended to concentrate on
the importance of dissent amongst the industrial and commercial business community.60
However Evangelical Anglicanism was also an important constituency amongst the
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wealthy middle class. 61 Seed notes that although membership of an urban congregation
was the insignia of middle-class status', the secular public sphere of exclusive voluntary
associations were more important badge of class. The present study investigates the
religious affiliations of the sample population and attempts to link membership of
particular religious congregations to membership of voluntary societies and to political
activities.
Religious sectarianism has been seen as the precursor of political division. An
Anglican/Tory and NonconformistlWhig divide has been suggested as a factor in the
differentiation of the landed and middle classes. However, Morris notes that the middle
class, prior to 1832 tended to operate through extra-Parliamentary pressure groups on
single issues. Although the middle-class appear to have made common cause with
working-class Radicals in the pursuit of Reform, this was only in towns such as
Birmingham, where a system of small workshops rather than factories blurred the
divisions of masters and men. Elsewhere, in the towns of Lancashire and the West
Riding, Reform was seen as a measure which would only benefit middle-class
employers.
The present study investigated the political affiliations of investors and
compared their voting record to that of the population as a whole for elections in the
North Warwickshire constituency between 1774 and 1841. There is evidence that during
times of economic hardship in the 1830s these middle-class investors joined with the
working-class agitators of Birmingham to press for Radical political reform. On the other
hand, analysis of religious and political affiliation amongst the investor group revealed
evidence that with increasing wealth some individuals with dissenting backgrounds
espoused Anglicanism and establishment political views.
The selection of the study population and the definition of a middle-class elite of
financial investors was gender neutral. The present study assesses the importance of
female rentiers in the capital market. Earlier research on canal and railway investors has
noted the presence of female investors, but not attempted to investigate their motivation
and processes of risk assessment. This study examines the extent to which attitudes
to investment risk were determined by gender. Davidoff and Hall characterise female
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investment as passive and suggest that women were often only entitled to a life interest
in the income from assets. This appears to have been the case for married women,
who were legally prevented from owning shares, except through a trust. Spinsters and
widows were able to own and manage their investments. Thomas Mortimer expressed a
jaundiced contemporary view of female investors in 1761, blaming the instability of the
stock market on their use of brokers. Although the numbers of female investors
increased in the nineteenth century, earlier research suggests that economically and
socially, they retreated into the private sphere of activity. 70 Whereas women from the
aristocracy had frequented a coffee house in the City of London and openly participated
in the market for South Sea Company shares, after the collapse of the Bubble women
lost this freedom. 71 This study tests these assumptions by observing the behaviour of
over 800 female investors (14 per cent of the total investors in the study) over a ninety-
year period. For the first time, a large population of female investors was selected and
their behaviour examined on the same basis as their male counterparts.
The present research addresses a wide range of issues, many of which have
been explored previously using small, independent populations. Research in the I 970s
examined the geographical location and soclo-economic classification of canal and
railway company investors, but was largely confined to the analysis of initial
subscribers.72 The present research extends this analysis throughout the life cycle of
these companies, using a database of 6,528 separate shareholdings made by 5,913
individual investors. For the first time, the behaviour of individual investors has been
followed, not only in both the canal and railway share market, but also in the market of
other securities and assets. The following Chapters analyse information from this large
and homogenous population, allowing for the first time conclusions to be drawn on the
behaviour of a comprehensive cross section of eighteenth and nineteenth century
members of a middle-class elite.
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2.1 Introduction
The substance of the present study of investor behaviour and attitudes to risk is
derived from the analysis of 6,528 separate shareholdings made by 5,913 shareholders
in eleven canal and seven railway companies. These companies operated either wholly
or substantially in the West Midlands between 1766 and 1850. Canal and railway
companies were selected as the potential source of a large, homogeneous population of
financially sophisticated individuals with at least some surplus wealth to invest. Following
the collapse of the South Sea bubble, Parliament took measures to prevent the
formation of companies without its approval. 1 The quickening of interest in the
development of inland waterways in the I 760s led to a reappraisal of the joint stock
company as the preferred vehicle for raising the large amounts of finance required for
the construction of canals.2 Ward estimates that the total capital raised by 'First
Generation' canals, that is those completed in the period 1755 to 1780, was £2,149,000
and that of the 'Second Generation' of commercial canals, completed between 1780 to
1815, was £1 3,049,000. The obvious success of the canal companies in raising finance
from a broad constituency of investors, and the popularity of their shares, ensured that
the same corporate model was selected in the late I 820s to finance the first railways.
Canal and railway companies in the West Midlands were selected as the basis
of the present study in order to provide access to a large, geographically and functionally
homogenous population. The eleven canal and seven railway companies used in the
present study were the total number of companies operating in the West Midlands for
which investor information was available. Investor behaviour was analysed over a period
of nearly ninety years. This Chapter outlines the data sources, the sample selection
criteria and the classification methodology used to construct a database of investors in
canal and railway companies, the Canal and Railway Database (CARD). In addition,
data were collected on shareholders in two joint stock banks established in the West
Midlands in the I 830s. Information on 618 shareholdings in these banks by 597
individual investors was collected on a separate database, the Bank Database (BARD).
In order to examine potential methods of information transfer and risk assessment
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amongst these investors in the canal, railway and bank companies, two further
databases were constructed. The first of these subsidiary databases comprised 1,291
entries in respect to 973 individuals, who were members of 33 philanthropic, religious,
political or social institutions based in Birmingham over the period 1761 to 1849, the
Birmingham Database. The second subsidiary database contained information on
monthly share prices and annual dividends of eleven canal companies and twelve
railway companies operating in the West Midlands between 1811 and I 846.The
methodology used to collect and analyse the share price data is described in detail in
Chapter 4.5.2. The collection and analysis of data on investors in the canal, railway and
bank companies are outlined below and described in detail in Appendix I. The
methodology used to address specific research issues is described in the relevant
chapters.
2.1.1 Canal Companies
Canal companies operating in the West Midlands in the period from 1766 to
I 85O were identified using contemporary sources such as Phillips5
 and lists prepared
by other researchers such as Hadfield. 6 Eleven of these companies had suitable
shareholder records in the form of shareholder registers, share transfer registers or
minutes of annual general meetings of proprietors. These companies are listed in Table
2.1. The development of the canal system is outlined in Appendix VI.
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Table 2.1: Canal Companies Included in the CARD Database
	Code	 Date	 Original Share
	 Final Share
	
Authorised	 Capin £s	 Capital in £s
Birmingham Canal	 BCN	 1768	 70,000	 112,000
Navigations
Birmingham & Liverpool 	 BLC	 1826	 400,000	 800,000
Junction
Coventry	 CCC	 1768	 50,000	 87,500
Dudley	 DUD	 1776	 7,000	 206,325
Grand Junction	 GJC	 1793	 500,000	 1,800,000
Stourbridge Navigation	 SN	 1776	 30,000	 43,000
Stourbridge Extension	 SEC	 1837	 na.	 49,000
Warwick & Birmingham	 WCB	 1793	 69,300	 160,000
Warwick & Napton	 WBRC	 1794	 79,500	 79,500
Worcester & Birmingham	 WOBC	 1791	 180,000	 610,000
Gloucester & Berkley	 GBC	 1793	 112,000	 440000
Total	 1,497,800	 4,387,325
Source: Original share capital from Ward. 7 Final share capita! from
Course of the Exchange, Date Authorised from Hadfield.8
Hadfield estimates that the total amount of capital raised by canal companies operating
in the West Midlands amounted to £4,497,000. As can be seen from Table 2.1, the
capital of the eleven companies in the present study amounted to £4,387,000, or 98 per
cent of the total capital raised. However, it was not possible to identify all of the investors
holding this capital. On average, shareholders were identified for only 50 per cent of the
share capital of the eleven canal companies. Nevertheless, the number of canal
investors included in this study was sufficient to provide the basis for a substantive
analysis of their social and economic characteristics.
2.1.2 Railway Companies
Since railways often took the form of trunk routes serving an extended geographical
area, the railway companies included in the present study were selected on the basis
that they operated substantially within the West Midlands and that at least one of their
termini was within this area. The Great Western Railway Company was included since it
acquired a number of railways operating in the area during the period under review, as
discussed in Appendix VI. The seven railway companies included in this study are given
in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Railway Companies Included in CARD Database
	Code	 Authorised	 Total Shares in
	
Share Capital	 Issue in 1849
in £s
Birmingham & Gloucester	 BGR	 950,000	 9,500
Birmingham & Oxford	 BOR	 1,000,000	 50,000
Cheltenham and Great Western	 CGWR	 750,000	 7,500
Grand Junction	 GJR	 4,823,797	 66,943
Great Western	 GWR	 2,500,000	 25,000
Manchester & Birmingham	 MBR	 2,100,000	 30,000
Oxford, Worcester & Wolverhampton 	 OWR	 1,500,000	 30,000
Total	 13,623,797	 218,943
Source: Authorised share capital from Course of the Exchange; Total
shares issued in 1849 from Scrivenor.1°
The seven companies listed in Table 2.2 above were the only companies in the West
Midlands for which shareholder information was available. They account for 68 per cent
of the £21.6 million of share capital authorised by Act of Parliament, listed in Table 2 in
Appendix I. It was possible to identify the socio-economic groups of investors who held
56 per cent of the total share capital of the seven railway companies included in Table
2.2. This is a sufficiently large population of railway investors on which to base the
analysis in the present study. The potential bias in the identification of investors and its
effect on the analysis are discussed below.
2.1.3 Joint Stock Banks
Data were collected on the shareholders in two joint stock banks, which were
established in the West Midlands in the I 830s. No attempt was made to produce a
comprehensive database of investors in all the West Midland banks. As set out in Table
2.3, a total of 618 investors, holding £430,000 of the issued capital in the Coventry
Union Bank and Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank, were identified.
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Table 2.3: Investors Included in the BARD Database
	Code Date Issued	 BARD Database Investors Holdings
Share
Capital
	
Number of Percentage	 No. of
	
Shares	 of Total	 Investors
	
Coventry Union Bank CUB 1836 200,000
	 200,000	 100	 262
Stourbridge &	 SKB 1834 250,000	 230,375	 92	 356
Kidderminster Bank
Total	 450,000	 430,375	 96	 618
Source: Coventry Union Bank data from Deed of Settlement and List of
Shareholders 1836,11 Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank data from Deed
of Settlement.12
2.2 Data Sources
2.2.1 Distinguishing Between Speculators and Shareholders
This research investigates the behaviour of individuals who bought and held
shares as part of a lifetime investment strategy. The procedures for promoting the initial
offering of shares in both canal and later railway companies were broadly similar and
provided considerable opportunities for speculation. 13 Promoters of a scheme were
required to advertise in local newspapers. For example, on 6 February 1792, the
Birmingham Gazette carried advertisements for a special meeting for a new canal from
Wyrley and Essington to Wolverhampton and for a proposed canal at Stratford. On 11
June it carried notices of meetings for the Monmouth Canal and the Basingstoke Canal
and on 25 June, for a canal from Hampton Gay to London. In the issue of 10 September -
1792, at the height of the mania, the Gazette carried notices for meetings regarding the
Dudley Canal, extensions to the Birmingham Canal, the Manchester, Bury & Bolton
Canal and for a canal from Ashby de Ia Zouch to Coventry.
After the initial meeting, subsequent meetings were held by promoters at which
a subscription contract was signed, shares were allotted and the subscriber given a
letter of allotment. As soon as a deposit was paid, the subscriber was given a scrip
certificate. Both letters of allotment and scrip certificates could be traded. Julius Hardy, a
buttonmaker described travelling to Gloucester from Birmingham on 5 November 1792
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for a meeting to promote a canal from Gloucester to Bristol. Hardy noted that no fresh
subscribers were permitted to enter into the Gloster (sic) & Berkley scheme, but another
was projected primarily by people from Birmingham and Worcester for a canal from
Worcester to Bristol. Hardy subscribed one guinea towards a survey, which entitled him
to ten shares. Fourteen days later, these shares 'bore a premium of £20 each share'.
Regrettably, he did not take the opportunity to sell, since 'no sooner had the Bristol
people resolved at a meeting in their town to take the whole into their own hands, and
opened a subscription for that purpose, than our shares ... fell to twenty guineas the
whole ten, and many considered them worth nothing. All this happened in less than six
weeks'. 14 In spite of this set back, in December 1792 Hardy travelled as far as Devizes
to subscribe for shares in the Devizes to Southampton canal.
Following the initial meeting, the route of a proposed canal had to be surveyed
and costs estimated. Before a petition could be presented to Parliament, a substantial
proportion of the shares had to be subscribed. 15 There was a natural tendency for
subscription lists to be padded with individuals who were nominees or were even
fictitious. In times of mania, speculators in the shares might be unable to fund calls and
would seek to sell their shares prior to incorporation. For these reasons, in the present
study, the subscription lists accompanying the Act of Incorporation have not in general
been used as source material for identifying the initial shareholders in a company. In all
but one case, the companies' own share registers or records of proprietors have been
used to extract shareholder information. Earlier research into canal finance has been
based on the earliest available list of shareholdings, that is, those made at the time of
incorporation. Ward was confident that the issue of the high levels of trading in scrip and
the problems of fictitious names which he suggests invalidate the use of railway
subscription contracts do not apply to canal companies. 16 In the light of Julius Hardy's
experience, Ward's view may be over-optimistic. Reed, in his study of railway shares
acknowledges the problems of speculators appearing in subscription lists and has used
both subscription contracts and company records in his analyses.17
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2.2.2 Source Documents and Completeness of Information
The source documentation used to extract shareholder information comprised
inter a/ia, the Register of Proprietors, Transfer Ledger or Minutes of General Meetings
for each of the eleven canal and seven railway companies in the present study. The
source material for each company and each year is given in Appendix Ill. The source
document for the two banks was the Deed of Settlement. In both cases, however, these
Deeds were signed by each shareholder and sealed by the company, which provides
reasonable assurance that these shareholders were bona tide individuals.
The source documents have varying degrees of completeness. Most reliable
were the shareholder ledgers, however even these had pages missing or some entries
were illegible. Least reliable were the Minutes of General Meetings of Proprietors, which
contained only the names of those who attended the meetings in person or by proxy.
The proportion of shares for which shareholder information was available varies
considerably between years and between companies. The overall coverage was 50 per
cent for the canal companies and 56 per cent for the railway companies. The detailed
analysis of coverage is given in Appendix I.
2.3 Classification
Information on the gender, occupations and addresses of individual investors in
the eleven canal companies and seven railway companies was extracted from the
source material and entered in a Lotusm Approach Database, (the CARD Database).
Where available, shareholder data were extracted for initial shareholders and those on
the register at regular intervals throughout the fifteen socio-economic groups and one of
twelve geographical areas for further analysis. Details of the type of information
collected and the classification system are given in Appendix I.
Each individual was allocated a Personal Identification Number, which was used
when carrying out multi-company analyses. In many cases, particularly in the canal
companies, the records did not show either the investor's occupation or address.
Investor names were checked against local directories in order to try to determine
occupations. Where addresses were not indicated in the company records, it was
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virtually impossible to identify individuals with any certainty from directories. Where
towns were specified and the investor's name was reasonably distinctive, it was
sometimes possible to identify the investor from the directory. Directories did not include
all individuals living in an area. Tradesmen appeared to be well represented, some
professionals were included but gentlemen often did not appear. The investors in the
canal companies were most often from the wealthier sections of society and proved
elusive in the pages of most directories. The Victoria County Histories provided a means
of identifying some of these individuals, 18 but where identification was doubtful the
investor was classed as Unknown.
Another problem of classification arose when an investor was not described
consistently in each record. In the CARD Database as a whole there were 49
individuals, who owned shares in more than one company and who described
themselves differently in each register. This problem was recognised by Morton who
noted that 'members of this urban middle-class population tended to claim different
occupational titles depending on the message they wished to convey'. 19 For example, in
the present study, Francis Rufford described himself as a clay merchant in the share
register of the Stourbridge Extension canal in 1837.20 By 1845, however, Rufford is
describing himself as an esquire in the books of the Oxford, Worcester &
Wolverhampton railway. 21
 In the present study, the Rentier category ('esquires' or
'gentlemen' with urban addresses) may be overstated towards the end of the period
under review as a result of this creeping gentrification. Where shareholder information in -
the CARD Database is compiled into global statistics, information in respect of
shareholders that held shares in more than one company (multiple shareholders) is
included only once. In these circumstances, multiple shareholders are classified
according to their description in their earliest appearance in a share register. In the
example above, Rufford is included in the Merchant category.
A number of shares were held in the name of more than one individual. For
example, fourteen per cent of the entries in the Birmingham Canal Navigation share
register for 1840 were in joint names. In the CARD Database, joint shareholdings are
recorded under the name, occupation and address of the first named individual. Scrutiny
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of the data relating to these names suggests that excluding them has not biased the
information against any one social class, region or female shareholders. Where the
shares are administered by a trustee or executor, the information relating to the original
owner of the shares was entered on the CARD Database.
In the canal company records, socio-economic information was not available for
46 per cent of investors and addresses were missing for 59 per cent of entries. For the
rail companies, the total percentage of unknown occupations and addresses was lower
but this masks the fact that reasonably comprehensive information was only obtained for
three rail companies. Nevertheless, socio-economic and address data were available for
over 4,000 entries in the CARD Database. The size of these datasets means that
analysis of the Database as a whole can be relied upon to produce reliable information
on the socio-economic and geographical location of investors. Comparison of one
company with another or one year with another however, may not produce such reliable
conclusions.
The type of source document and the level of coverage give rise to the issue of
bias. Many of the source documents are lists of proprietors who attended the annual
general meetings either in person or by proxy. It is likely that those attending these
meetings would have been those of higher social status, with the money and leisure to
devote to this activity. Thus the CARD Database may contain bias towards such
individuals. It might also be expected that women would be less well represented from
data taken from these types of source documents. However, this does not appear to
have been the case. Analysis of the investors in the BCN in 1790, 1800 and 1810 was
based on records relating to shareholders of 40 per cent or less of the shares in issue,
who attended the general meeting of proprietors. On the other hand, the records for
1840 were taken from the definitive list of proprietors and represent shareholders of 90
per cent of the shares in issue. In all four years, the levels of female shareholdings were
broadly similar, suggesting that although women did not attend general meetings they
were well represented by their proxies. Thus, the proportion of women investors in this
study is unlikely to be significantly understated. On the other hand, it is more likely that
selecting shareholder data from those who attended meetings has led to understatement
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of the proportion of shareholders who lived outside the local area. These investors may
not have been so likely to travel to the meetings and may not have had local
representatives to attend as proxies. It is thus quite possible that in the case of the canal
companies, particularly, where the general meetings were usually held in the West
Midlands, the proportion of local investors is overstated. Investors who were difficult to
identify were more likely to have belonged to lower socio-economic groups and/or may
have lived outside the West Midlands area. Consequently, in all analyses the proportion
of investors in lower socio-economic groups is likely to be understated. The gender of
investors was identifiable in almost all cases and reliance can be placed on conclusions
drawn from the analysis of gender-specific behaviour.
2.4 The Birmingham Database
In order to investigate the social, cultural, political and religious backgrounds of
the canal, railway and bank investors, data on the membership of 33 Birmingham
societies or institutions were compiled on a Database, (the Birmingham Database).
Table 2.4 lists the institutions included in the Birmingham Database and the years for
which membership data were collected.
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Table 2.4: Institutions Included in the Birmingham Database
Date	 No. of Members
Abolition of Slavery	 1790	 8
Anacreontic Society	 1793	 105
Association against Republicans and Levellers	 1792	 18
Bean Club	 1761	 67
Birmingham Political Union	 1817	 48
Birmingham Political Union 	 1829	 18
Birmingham Political Union
	 1830	 36
Churchwardens	 1790	 19
Commercial Committee
	 1790	 51
Conservative Association 	 1832	 12
Deaf and Dumb Institution
	 1812	 43
Eye Hospital	 1823	 17
Fever Hospital	 1825	 15
Friends Book Club	 1840-1	 24
General Dispensary	 1793	 16
General Dispensary 	 1840	 15
General Hospital	 1765	 117
General Hospital 	 1839	 61
Infant Schools	 1825	 20
Library	 1799	 159
Manufacturers Petition 	 1775	 10
News Room	 1822	 9
Orthopaedic Hospital	 1825	 26
Poor Relief	 1794	 41
Protestant Dissenting Schools	 1761	 15
Society of Arts	 1821	 43
Street Commissioners 	 1769	 50
Suffrage Union
	
1842	 37
Unitarian Brotherly Society 	 1796	 153
Water Works	 1808	 38
Total	 1,291
Source: Details of the source documents for members of each of the
above institutions are given in Appendix III.
Of the 1,291 individual members of the Birmingham Database, 318 were subscribers to -
or members of more than one institution. These individuals are only included once when
comparisons are made with investors on the CARD Database.
2.5 Multiple Shareholders
The 6528 individual entries in the CARD Database include investors who held
shares in more than one company. Multiple investors were only included once in
analysis of information from the CARD Database as a whole. These multiple
shareholders were classified according to their socio-economic status in their first
appearance in any share register. When the characteristics of investors in one company
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were analysed and compared to those in other companies or years the total number of
investors, including multiple shareholders, was included. The total number of investor
entries for each company including and excluding multiple shareholders is given in
Appendix I. In total, 616 investors in the CARD Database held shares in more than one
company, comprising 560 multiple canal investors and 56 multiple railway investors. In
addition, 30 investors held shares in both canal and railway companies. These
individuals are discussed in Chapter 4.4.5. In the present study, where the different
characteristics of canal and railway company investors are being compared, the 30
investors who hold shares in both canal and railway companies are included in both sets
of data.
The criteria for selecting the sample population were designed to be neutral in
terms of socio-economic status and gender. The population was selected on economic
criteria and was intended to be representative of the class of financial investors.
Common classification criteria were used throughout the analysis of investors in the
canal and railway companies and banks, and members of the Birmingham voluntary
societies. For the first time, the behaviour of specific individuals has been investigated
across a wide spectrum of social and economic activity.
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3.1 Introduction
The underlying risk environment affects the lives of all individuals, but it may
influence the behaviour of different groups in particular ways. An understanding of how
gender and socio-economic background determine responses to environmental risk is
fundamental to the analysis of investment risk. Individuals in the present study by
definition had surplus wealth to invest. They belonged to a section of society, which was
in the process of differentiating itself from the landed and labouring classes. The
possession of property and the generation and employment of capital were amongst the
defining characteristics of this affluent middle class. 1 The prospect of 'sinking' from this
elysium was a pressing preoccupation. Langford suggests that 'bankruptcy was the
nightmare of the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie'. 2 In some respects those
environmental risks, which most acutely affected the owners of businesses and property,
were declining by the beginning of the eighteenth century and the quality of life for many
sectors of the population in Great Britain improved significantly. Political stability, arising
from the peaceful Hanoverian succession in 1714 increased public confidence. As a
result, interest rates on government stocks fell. 3 Cheaper credit, the growth in trade
consequent upon success in war, and burgeoning colonial markets resulted in increased
wealth amongst those engaged in trade and manufacturing. The growing affluence of
the middle classes contributed to an urban renaissance. 4 Generally improved public
health had reduced the risks of disease and mortality, although contemporary research
highlighted the risks of urbanisation. 5 The middle classes now had growing levels of
surplus wealth and some expectation of being able to survive to enjoy or employ it.6
Nevertheless, the middle class of the eighteenth century was still beset by
almost constant threats to their new-found affluence. For forty-six of the years between
1700 and 1800 England was at war. The American colonies were lost and the French
Revolution, at first welcomed by middle-class radicals, was soon seen as a potential
model for working-class revolution at home. Trade was disrupted and the effects of
urbanisatiori and industrialisation, which most acutely affected the welfare of the
labouring classes, led to civil disturbance. This was the environment of risk surrounding
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middle-class investors.
An individual's attitude to risk is informed both by that individual's personal
circumstances and by the environment. Investment decisions may be driven by the
relative wealth, age, or family circumstances of the investor, 7 but the overall state of the
economy or political situation may be a more important factor. This Chapter considers
these environmental risks which informed the decisions made by eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century investors. The three most significant risks were those of early death,
war arid unpredictable business cycles.
3.2 Life Expectancy
Life expectancy had an important influence on attitudes to risk. In the period
1750 to 1799, the average life expectancy at birth for males and females was estimated
to be between 36.5 and 45 years. 8 Mortality rates did improve in the nineteenth century
but on average were still below 40 years in 1851. Perhaps a more useful indicator was
the expectation of life at the age of 30, which, for the latter half of the eighteenth century
was for a further 32.1 years for men and 32.4 years for women. 1 ° There was a very real
prospect that a father might die before his daughters were sufficiently provided for by
marriage or his sons had sufficient capital to enter their chosen professions or business.
Members of the professional middle class must have been particularly anxious, if the
family had to rely upon the salary of the breadwinner and had no income from land,
businesses or other investments.
Perceptible differences in the life expectancy of different social classes became
apparent with the use of actuarial life tables for life insurance. The life tables used in the
eighteenth century were based on work by Johann de Witt and Edmond Halley, who
produced the first mortality table derived from statistics of births and deaths. Abraham
de Moivre later applied these principles to the calculation of annuities. 11 By 1756, James
Dodson had developed the use of mortality data for calculating life insurance premiums.
The first company to apply this idea was the Society for Equitable Assurances on Lives
and Survivorships, (the Equitable). By the 1780s, the Equitable started to use the
Northampton mortality data. The Northampton data, taken from a single urban parish,
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tended to over-estimate mortality, particularly among younger people and those in more
affluent social groups. Premiums calculated in accordance with this data tended to be
too high. On the other hand, the government used the Northampton Tables to calculate
annuity rates. As the data overstated the rate of mortality, the annuity rate was too
generous and the government paid out too much money. The Northampton data were
later replaced by data from Carlisle, which were more representative of the mortality
rates in the country as a whole. 12
 It is reasonable to suppose that educated and wealthy
people, who used life insurance and who bought annuities, would have been familiar
with the contemporary calculations of mortality. The Gentleman's Magazine published
London Bills of Mortality from the 1740s. 13 The life expectancy based on the
Northampton and Carlisle data has been calculated and is given in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Probability of Death in Any Year Using Data from Carlisle and
Northampton Mortality Tables
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Source: Society of Actuaries.14
Figure 3.1 shows that the Carlisle data predicted mortality levels below that for
Northampton for all years. Its predictions were found to be more accurate, particularly for
the middle class. By the mid-nineteenth century the differences in life expectancy
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between individuals living in rural and urban areas and from different social groups were
well documented. The work of Chadwick, published in 1842, revealed significant
variations in mortality. For example, the average age at death of labourers in
Manchester was 17 years, compared with that of professionals or gentry in Rutland, who
survived to the age of 52. Professionals living in Manchester, however, had an average
age at death of 38 years.15 Even without the bald data in life tables and statistics,
middle-class investors in the canal and railway companies would have been well aware
of the probability of early death. The need to provide for wives and families in an
uncertain future must have been a major determinant of behaviour. This is illustrated in
the investment decisions of Robert Hale, a young attorney from Bristol. In June 1763 he
approached his uncle in London for a £4,000 loan to finance the purchase of a
partnership in the Bristol Exchange Bank. His uncle agreed to provide the money at 4.5
per cent for four years maturity or for 4.25 per cent for five years. Robert Hale was
concerned that he might die and declined the offer of a longer maturity loan, which might
burden his estate and be 'disadvantageous to me in making a Proposal to any Woman
of Fortune'.16
As late as 1841, 46 per cent of the population were under twenty years old.17
For the middle class, provision for this group of dependants was of critical importance.
The support of family, prudent investment and use of life insurance were key strategies
to mitigate the risks relating to early death. At the same time, gambling was firmly
entrenched in the national psyche. 18 Jane Austen permits the genteel Bennett sisters to
participate in a noisy game of lottery tickets, 19 and gambling was the ruination of cohorts
of fictional younger sons. As will be discussed in Chapter 5.3, the use of life insurance
grew out wagering on the probabilities of death. During the manias of canal investment
in the I 790s and railway investment in the I 840s prudence was abandoned. The
willingness to indulge in speculation may have been a consequence of the high-risk
environment of early death, war or economic disruption, or it may be an essential and
inevitable component of a viable stock market. 2° Nevertheless, gambling was an
important part of the risk environment, which affected government policy and private
behaviour, as discussed below.
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3.3 Attitudes to Gambling
Speculation was embraced by all social groups. Subscribers to railway bills in
1845 were 'a combination of peers and printers, vicars and vice-admirals, spinsters and
half-pay officers, MPs and special pleaders, professors and cotton spinners,
gentleman's cooks and QCs, attorney's clerks and college scouts, waiters at Lloyd's,
relieving officers and excisemen, barristers and butchers, Catholic priests and
coachmen, editors and engineers, dairymen and dyers, braziers, bankers, beer sellers
and butlers, domestic servants, footmen and mail guards, and almost any calling under
the sun'. 21 Railway mania was 'the most wonderful era of gambling in modern times'?
Shiller observed in relation to more recent examples of mania that 'investing in
speculative assets is a social activit/. In the eighteenth century 'playing with chance
went far beyond the card table and into the coffee houses, insurance offices, and other
abodes of business'. 24 Borsay suggests that gaming permitted competition for prestige
without incurring unacceptable levels of social conflict; it enabled women to enhance
their status and to engage in monetary transactions where they could compete on equal
terms with men. 25 Certainly the aristocratic ladies of the Court who speculated in South
Sea Company securities were exercising a freedom to gamble and speculate which
disappeared when the Bubble burst. Even the respectable middle class shared the
view that speculation was 'the means of repairing . .capital, now sadly reduced by the
increase in ... family and the expenses of their education.'27
Even the government exploited potential investors' gambling instincts by issuing -
debt in the form of a lottery, and tontines were a common method of raising finance for a
variety of projects, including the Birmingham Library. 28 The enthusiasm with which
certain individuals embraced investment in the new technology of canals and railways
certainly owes something to contemporary obsessions with speculation and gambling.
The investors in the CARD Database were deliberately selected from sources which
excluded speculators in scrip. Nevertheless, those investors who were original
subscribers to a project or held shares during the construction period were often taking a
significant gamble on the potential success of the enterprise. Certainly the potential for
rapid capital gain for a small initial outlay on successful shares may have seemed a
36
CHAPTER 3: RIsK ENVIRONMENT
better gamble than the odds offered by government lotteries 2 For example, in the
course of fourteen days in November 1792, Julius Hardy saw his 10 shares in the
proposed Bristol to Worcester canal make a notional gain of £200 on his initial
investment of one guinea. This compares with the average annual salary of
professionals in 1812 of £300 to £400 (see Chapter 7, Table 7.1).
3.3.1 Lotteries
The return on eighteenth-century lotteries was substantially better than those
offered by their modern equivalents. In effect they were more akin to modern Premium
Bonds where the participant does not lose his stake and the government undertakes to
pay out an expected return in line with prevailing interest rates. The first English public
lottery was in 1566, backed by recommendations of the Lord Mayor of London and the
Crown. Lotteries continued to be used to finance public projects and in 1694, the
government issued the Million Adventure to raise £1 million, divided into 100,000 £10
tickets. 3° Parliament provided an annual sum of £140,000, £100,000 of which was to
pay interest at 10 per cent on each ticket for 16 years. The remaining £40,000 was
divided amongst the prizewinners. After 16 years all payments ceased and the capital
was not repaid. 31 Clearly this formula was successful since the government raised a
further lottery loan for £1.4 million in 1697. Lotteries did, however, engender the same
queasiness in feelings of public morality, as did the use of life insurance for purely
speculative purposes. In 1699 lotteries were suppressed by Act of Parliament but state
lotteries began again in 1710 when a loan of £1.5 million was raised through a lottery of
£10 tickets. In this case, 9 per cent was paid on the money raised for 32 years and the
prizes were annuities ranging from 14 shillings a year, paid on the 'blanks' or non prize-
winning tickets, to a top prize of £1,000.32 This lottery was also quickly subscribed. This
mechanism was so useful to the government that even thjough private lotteries were
again banned in 1721, public lotteries continued to be sanctioned by Parliament on an
annual basis until I 826.
Lotteries were a mechanism for issuing stock at a disccunt. Most of the
government loans raised between 1720 and 1784 were associated with a lottery.
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Sometimes the lottery tickets were given free to the purchasers of stock, and sometimes
they were in the form of a rights issue with the purchaser gaining the right to buy the
tickets on favourable terms. The prizes were usually in the form of stock of the same
kind as the loan. As early as 1755 the cash subscriptions exceeded the sum distributed
as prizes, with the surplus going to the Treasury. From 1769 these were a regular
feature of government finance and remained so until 1826. Lotteries were not used in
conjunction with long-term loans after 1784, but other techniques were used, such as
annuities to provide sweeteners. The loans raised during the American War commonly
took the form of an offer of Consols, an annuity and a lottery. For example, subscribers
of £100 to the loan of 1779 received £100 of 3 per cent Consols and either an annuity of
£3.75 per cent for 29 years or a life annuity. For every £1,000 advanced the subscriber
gained the right to buy 7 lottery tickets at £10 per ticket. After 1784 the sale of lottery
tickets was a considerable source of revenue to members of the Stock Exchange.
Brokers underwrote the whole issue and retailed it to the public at a profit to
themselves. Advertisements for lottery tickets regularly appeared in the pages of the
Birmingham Gazette in the late I 760s. Tickets were retailed in fractions to make them
more affordable. For example, on 6 October 1766, A. and C. Corbett, booksellers of
London, were advertising the sale of one sixty-fourth of a ticket for 4 shillings or up to
half a ticket for £6. On 6 April 1767 the annual lottery for 60,000 tickets at £10 each was
advertised. Prizes were allocated as follows:
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Table 3.1: Lottery Prizes in the 1767 State Lottery
Number of tickets	 Prize
1	 20,000
3	 10,000
4	 5,000
10	 2,000
18	 1,000
42	 500
200	 100
610	 50
20,950	 20
First drawn	 1,000
Last drawn	 500
Total	 600,000
Source: Birmingham Gazette, 6 April 1767.
The lottery was one and a half blanks to a prize. The odds for lotteries were explained in
an editorial in the Birmingham Gazette on 2 November 1767. It notes that the odds on
winning the lottery were 66:1 against winning £50 or better, down to 14,999:1 against
winning £10,000. The editorial concludes that 'now is it not very strange the Public
should be so infatuated, when the Chance is so small, to give 12E 18s for a Ticket,
which, as the stocks now are, is not worth more than 8 I 8s? That is to say, to give 4
to game for 8 18s? So that by winning a person gains only 5 whereas, if he loses, his
Loss is 12f 18s'.
Since lotteries were ephemeral, it is unlikely that any record of an investor's
participation in them would have survived in any tangible form. So it is not surprising that
no evidence was discovered as to the extent, if any, that the CARD Database investors -
were involved in lotteries. There is, however, evidence that these investors participated
in tontines, which were another form of investment where participants gambled on the
amount, if any, of the potential return.
3.3.2 Tontines
Tontines were a form of betting based on life expectancy. They were the
invention of Lorenzo Tonti, who in 1652 proposed that the French crown should raise
money by selling annuities. A fixed sum of annual interest was paid out to subscribers
based on the survival of a named nominee or on the subscriber's own life. Survivors
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would benefit from a successively higher and higher share of the interest. 37 By 1674
Thomas Wagstaffe was proposing a similar scheme to provide finance for the City of
London. The first English State tontine was in 1692-3, when £1 million was raised
through a tontine and sale of annuities. The tontine provides for a fixed annual sum to
be divided between the lenders in proportion to their subscriptions for the duration of any
life they should nominate. All subscribers received 10 per cent per annum until 1700,
then a fixed sum of £70,000, representing 7 per cent per annum on £1 million, which
was to be divided amongst those with surviving nominees until there were only 7
survivors. The subscribers with survivors continued to receive £10,000 apportioned
between them until the death of the last nominee when the state's liability would cease.
The alternative was a generous 14 per cent single life annuity. This tontine did not prove
to be very popular since only £108,000 was subscribed. Not surprisingly, the majority of
investors opted for annuities.
The development of the life insurance companies in the early-eighteenth century
saw a renewed interest in tontines. The mortuary tontine was developed to provide
payments to beneficiaries on the death of members subscribing to a life insurance fund.
The beneficiaries of all those members who died in any one year received an equal
share of the contributions made to the fund over the preceding year. 4° As a result, the
level of payout fluctuated depending on mortality levels each year. This became the
model for new life insurance schemes, such as the Amicable Society for a Perpetual
Assurance office, which was founded in 1706.41
Tontines never became a popular method for raising government finance, but
they appear to have been used to raise money for philanthropic purposes. For example,
when the sponsors of the Birmingham Library wanted to raise money for the Union
Street Building in 1799, they used a tontine. The Library tontine comprised 158
subscribers of whom 48 (30 per cent) were found to be investors in the CARD
Database.42 This was a very high proportion; the average proportion of CARD and
BARD Database investors in the Birmingham Database as a whole was only 20 per
cent. The Library tontine was purely for charitable purposes. Nevertheless, the fact that
a tontine was selected to raise finance and was well subscribed indicates familiarity with
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this form of investment and a wide spread acceptance of this form of gambling. The only
other record of a tontine held by a CARD Database investor was that for Elizabeth
Lovatt, a widow from Birmingham who died in 1827. She had an interest in two lives in
the Royal Hotel, Birmingham tontine.
The use of lotteries and tontines as financial instruments indicates that gambling
and speculation was an accepted part of investment activity. Nevertheless, there is little
evidence that the sample population indulged in speculative activities. Analysis of the
two sources of evidence of share transfers for the canal companies in the study revealed
that there was little additional activity during the peak of the mania in 1792 to 1793. In
the case of the BCN, a total of 663 shares, excluding those disposed of as a result of the
owner's death, were transferred between 1768 and I 834. Only 27 of these were
transferred during the period of mania (4 per cent), which is only slightly higher than that
to be expected in any two-year period (3 per cent). In the Stourbridge Navigation there is
some evidence that a greater than expected number of shares were transferred during
the period of mania. The transfer ledger shows 55 shares changed hands between 1792
and 1793 (10 per cent) out of a total of 540 in the period 1776 to I 827. The expected
number of transfers in a two-year period would have been 4 per cent. This raised level of
activity may have been the result of share trading by Matthias Mogridge, a Birmingham
attorney, who speculated in the shares of number of canal companies during the
I 790s. Between March 1792 and March 1798 he bought and sold twelve Stourbridge
shares in nine separate transactions and made a total profit of £1,800. On average he -
held them for just under a month, although in most cases it was only seven days.
Mogridge is the only investor to be positively identified as a trader.
Over the period 1776 to 1827, seven other individuals were identified who
actively bought and sold Stourbridge Navigation shares but they held them for relatively
long periods of time and rarely made much of a profit. 47
 A similar picture emerges from
the BCN transfer ledger. The lack of evidence of speculative behaviour suggests that the
sample population conformed to Davidoff and Hall's vision of prudence and
respectability defining the emerging middle class. However, contemporary opinion
suggests that all classes indulged in specuIation. Canal mania was mainly confined to
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speculation in new projects in the process of gaining parliamentary approval, rather than
in established shares. This was probably due to the lack of a national market in canal
shares at that time. Nevertheless, speculation in railway shares was also largely a
function of the new issues market. Although during the I 840s there were provincial stock
exchanges as well as a national exchange in London, speculative actively was mainly
confined to London and Lancashire.5°
Even though the sample population of investors appear to have eschewed
speculative activities, they would have been unlikely to have avoided the increasing
levels of risk associated with unstable financial markets. In times of mania, positive
feedback must have substantially contributed to levels of risk in the financial
environment. Governments sought to reduce the risk of speculative bubbles but were
largely ineffectual in managing the economy. Economic cycles were not only a
consequence of the business-related factors of supply and demand and investment
cycles but also political disruption, such as war.
3.4 War
3.4.1 Effect of War on the National Capital Market
Contemporary economists, commentators and investors were aware of the
disruption that wars caused to debt and capital markets This is evidenced by the
increase in government borrowing and taxation to fund wars between 1750 to 1850.
Spackman illustrates this in a table showing additions to the National Debt and taxation
that he compiled in 1843. An extract of Spackman's table is shown below in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Additions to National Debt and Taxation (In £ millions)
Started Number of Years
	 End	 Taxes Loans Total
Seven years war	 1756	 7 1763	 52	 60	 112
American War
	 1775	 8 1783	 32	 104	 136
French Revolution	 1793	 9 1802	 263.5	 200.5	 464
Against Napoleon	 1803	 12 1815	 770.5	 388.5	 1,159
Source: Spackman. 51
 Table shows the year the war started and finished and its
duration in years. Spackman distinguishes taxation and loans. Taxation was the
cash paid in duties and taxes, loans refer to the creation of national debt.
Playford produced a similar table in 1855, and although his numbers for increased debt
are slightly higher than those of Spackman due to timing differences, the same effect is
evident, as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Increases in the National Debt of Great Britain 1727 - 1854 (In £ millions)
	Additions to and
	
Total National
	
(Repayments) of
	 Debt
National Debt
Accession of George II in 1727
	 52
Additional to Peace of Paris 1763
	 87	 139
Paid off Peace 1763-75
	 (10)
Debt at Start of American War
	 129
Additional During War 1778-84
	 121
Debt at End of War
	 250
Paid off During Peace 1784-93
	 (11)
Debt at Start of French War
	 239
Additional During War 1793-1815
	 602
Total on Consolidation of English and Irish Debt in
	 841
February 1817
Cancelled 1817 - January 1854
	 (67)
National Debt at 5 January 1854
	 774
Source: Playford.52
Table 3.3 shows the accelerating cost of war. The American War increased debt by
approximately £20 million a year, and by the time of the French Wars this had risen to
£27 million per year. Julius Hardy, a button maker from Birmingham, was in no doubt of
the ruinous effects of a 'continental' war. The value of his holding of £100 of 3 per cent
Consols fell from £97 before the start of the French War to £73 by February 1793. He
noted that 'war must necessarily be ruinous to England. Loans there must be, to enable
Ministry to carry it on; by this means the nation will be drained of its circulating cash, the
very sinews of trade'. Hoppit suggested that war was the most important risk factor in
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the incidence of bankruptcies in the eighteenth century, citing closed markets, increased
the level of risk to business, changed the pattern of demand, and increased uncertainty
and distortion of the government finance market. Taxation, as well as government
borrowing, generally increased in wartime, putting more stress on entrepreneurs.
Other researchers have found little evidence that business investment was adversely
affected by increased yields on government stock, suggesting that capital markets were
segmented and that government borrowing did not compete with private investment.
However, as discussed below, this was probably not the case in the market for
competing financial investments, such as canal company shares. As the yield on
Government stocks rose to attract investment in new issues of debt, private sector
attempts to raise debt and equity for projects may have been 'crowded out'. This may
have increased the risk of both new schemes and those in the course of construction, as
discussed in Chapter 4.5.3.1.
3.4.2 Effect of War on Canal and Railway Investor Behaviour
Contemporary opinion varied on the effect of political events on investment in
non-government securities. Whereas Playford was a staunch advocate of investment in
Funds57, Whitehead argued that guaranteed railway stock had, 'security of that which is
tangible'. He suggested that in times of violent political upheaval a holder of
government stocks would suffer to the extent of the change, whilst an investor in railway
stock would feel, 'the blighting effects for a period comparatively brief: the reality of
Railways would be his safety; their necessity under all states of society his security'. In
the present study it was not possible to extract a sufficiently long and complete series of
railway company stock prices to test Whitehead's premise. Earlier research on the
behaviour of securities on the Boston stock exchange between 1835 and 1897 indicated
that 'risk-free' government and quasi-government stocks such as the Massachusetts and
New England Municipal securities provided a better return than railway stocks. 6° The
period examined included that of the American Civil War. In the present study,
comparison of the yield on Consols and a leading canal company share between 1770
and 1830 revealed a significant correlation. Figure 3.2 shows the yield on Consols and
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BCN shares during this period, which includes the French Wars.
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Yield on Consols and BCN
7
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3
2
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1770	 1780	 1790	 1800	 1810
	
1820	 1830 I
- BCN yield	 Consols yield
Source: BCN share price and dividend in formation from Income and
Expenditure Summary used to calculated annual yield. 61 Annual Consols yield
from Mitchell.62
As can be seen from Figure 3.2, the yield on Consols from the start of the war was over
3 per cent and therefore the price would have been below par. This continued until the
end of the war in 1815 when the price started to improve. During this period, the
fluctuation in the BCN yield closely mirrored that of Consols, suggesting that the canal
shares were affected by the same market sentiment as that for Consols.
Gayer et al. suggest that the business cycle of 1788-93, with its peak in 1792,
and the cycles with peaks in 1825, 1836 and 1845 were essentially the same in nature,
but those in the war years were distorted. During the war years new investment was
channelled into government securities and heavy capital exports in the form of loans,
subsidies and military expenditure were made at the expense of domestic investment.
The collapse of the new issues market for canal companies at the outbreak of the
French Wars is well documented. This was sustained until hostilities ceased and a new
wave of canal building began. It also appears that those canals which were initiated
during the mania of 1792-3 and were uncompleted by the outbreak of hostilities were at
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the higher end of the risk spectrum as shown in Chapter 4, Table 4.6. In the present
study, there is evidence that the disruption caused to the economy by war had an effect
on the behaviour of investors. The data were examined to see whether the behaviour of
shareholders during periods of war was affected by gender or soclo-economic
background. The inertia of investors, due in part to the cumbersome procedures for
buying and selling shares, and in part to the generally high income derived from holding
the shares blurred evidence of trends in the analysis of changes in existing
shareholdings over the period of the study. Examination of the socio-economic mix of
new purchasers of stocks from data taken from transfer ledgers produced clearer
results, as set out on Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Socio-economic Status of Buyers of BCN Shares
Pre-war American	 Inter-	 French	 Post-	 Total
________________________ 	 War	 war	 War	 war
Number of Investors
Landed
Rentiers
Clergy
Professional and
Bankers
Manufacturers
Merchants
Artisans and
Shopkeepers
Women
Unknown
Total
	
3	 0
	
39	 3
	
7	 1
	
18	 4
	
15	 3
	
23	 8
	
30	 4
23	 5
30	 7
188	 35
0	 0
1	 2
0	 1
4	 3
1	 7
5	 4
3	 3
10	 9
22	 25
46	 54
0	 3
2	 47
2	 11
2	 31
1	 27
0	 40
0	 40
	
9	 56
	
12	 96
	
28	 351
Normal ised
Landed	 1.87	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1
Rentiers	 1.55	 0.64	 0.16	 0.28	 0.53	 1
Clergy	 1.19	 0.91	 0.00	 0.59	 2.28	 1
Professional and	 1.08	 1.29	 0.98	 0.63	 0.81	 1
Bankers
Manufacturers	 1.04	 1.11	 0.28	 1.69	 0.46	 1
Merchants	 1.07	 2.01	 0.95	 0.65	 0.00	 1
Artisans and
	 1.40	 1.00	 0.57	 0.49	 0.00	 1
Shopkeepers
Women	 0.77	 0.90	 1.36	 1.04	 2.01	 1
Unknown	 0.58	 0.73	 1.75	 1.69	 1.57	 1
Total	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1
Source: Data set of socio-economic groups of the holders of 934 shares sold by
102 onpinal subscribers to the BCN to 351 buyers over the period 1768 to
1834.6 Transfers allocated to Pre-war (1768-1777), American War (1778-1784),
Inter-war (1785-1793), French War (1794-1815) and Post-war (18 16-1834).
Data normailsed to account for the different number of transfers in each period.
Normailsed data show the relative propensity of different socio-economic groups
to buy shares in each period. A score of I means the number of investors
buying shares in the socio-economic group is the expected/eve!. A score of less
than I means this socio-economic group made less than the expected number
of transfers. A score of more than I means this socio-economic group made
more than the expected number of transfers in the period. Thus the normailsed
score for Merchants buying shares during the American War is 2.01, i.e. twice
the expected leveL
The analysis set out in Table 3.4 shows the effect of sectoral change as well as the
effect of war on the behaviour of different socio-economic groups. The American War
appears to have had less affect on the behaviour of investors than the French War.
This is not surprising since the French War lasted more than three times as long and
closed the important European markets to British merchants and manufacturers.
Financial investors, most particularly Rentiers, bought fewer shares than expected
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during the American War and substantially less than expected during the French War.
This may reflect the increase in yields on government stocks during wartime, making
them relatively more attractive to financial investors who were reliant on interest income.
The Clergy exhibited risk-averse behaviour showing a much greater propensity to buy in
Pre- and Post-war periods. Economic investors such as Manufacturers and Merchants
were affected differently by wartime conditions. Both groups continued to be relatively
more active buyers during the American War. Merchants, in particular, seem to have
been active buyers of stock during the American War, although this group was severely
affected during the French War. As trade was disrupted Merchants presumably had to
liquidate investments and apply all their credit and cash to maintaining their businesses.
Manufacturers, on the other hand, were more active purchasers than expected,
reflecting the boom conditions which many manufacturers experienced in wartime. The
reduction in the proportion of Landed investors buying shares from the pre-war period
could be the result of sectoral changes which are discussed in Chapter 4.2.1 .The
increasing yields on Consols may also explain the slight reduction in the number of
female buyers in wartime, although the reduction is so slight that it is unlikely to be
significant. Merchants do not feature at all among the post-war transferees, so their
decline may be a secular trend. Both Manufacturers and Rentiers and Landed return to
pre-war levels of activity in the post-war years.
This analysis of BCN transfers suggests that investment activity of certain socio-
economic groups was affected by wartime conditions. The direct economic effects of war -
seem to have been the key influence on investor behaviour. General risk factors appear
to have been less important since it would be expected that this sentiment would have
particularly affected female investors and clergy, who have been identified as being
particularly risk averse. Transfers of 540 Stourbridge canal shares in 300 separate
transactions between 1776 to 1827 was analysed in a similar way. The number of
transfers and the number of years in each of the periods of war and peace between
1776 and 1827 are compared in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5: Stourbndge Navigation Share Transfers in each Period of War and
Peace 1776-1827
	Pro-war	 American Inter-war French Post- war Total
	
War	 War
Number of Transfers	 48	 10	 54	 122	 66	 300
Number of Years	 9	 6	 8	 21	 18	 62
% of total purchases	 16	 3	 18	 41	 22	 100
% of total years
	 15	 10	 13	 34	 29	 100
Source: Transfers of 540 Stourbridge Navigation shares in 300 transactions
between 1776 and 1827 from the Stourbridge Navigation Transfer Ledger.
The socio-economic groups of the 300 buyers and sellers of the shares were analysed
and the results were normalised to show which groups were proportionately more active
in each of the periods of peace and war. The results of this analysis are given in Tables
3.6.1 and 3.6.2.
Table 3.6.1: Socio-economic Status of Stourbridge Navigation Sellers
	Pre war
	 American	 Inter-	 French	 Post Total
	
War War	 War War
Number of Investors
Landed	 6
	
I
	
9
	
10
	
9
	
35
Rentiers	 11
	
0
	
17
	
37
	
16
	
81
Clergy	 0
	
0
	
2
	
2
	
3
	
7
Professional and bankers 	 0
	
0
	
5
	
11
	
9
	
25
Manufacturers	 8
	
3	 4
	
11
	
2
	
28
Merchants	 14
	
2
	
4
	
10
	
4
	
34
Artisans and shopkeepers	 6
	 3	 6
	
18
	
6
	
39
Women	 3
	
0	 1
	
9
	
4
	
17
Unknown	 0
	
I	 6
	
14
	
13
	
34
Total
	
48
	
10
	
54
	
122
	 66
	
300
Normalised
Landed	 1.07	 0.86	 1.43
	
0.70	 1.17	 1
Rentiers	 0.85	 0.00	 1.17	 1.12	 0.90	 - I
Clergy	 0.00	 0.00	 1.59	 0.70	 1.95	 1
Professional and bankers
	
0.00	 0.00	 1.11	 1.08	 1.64	 1
Manufacturers	 1.79	 3.21	 0.79	 0.97	 0.32	 1
Merchants	 2.57	 1.76	 0.65	 0.72	 0.53	 1
Artisansandshopkeepers	 0.96	 2.31	 0.85	 1.13	 0.70	 1
Women	 1.10	 0.00	 0.33	 1.30	 1.07	 1
Unknown	 0.00	 0.88	 0.98	 1.01	 1.74	 1
Total	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1
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Table 3.6.2: Socio-economic Status of Stourbridge Navigation Buyers
	Pre-war American	 Inter-	 French	 Post- Total
__________	 -	 War	 war	 War	 war
Number of Investors
Landed
Rentiers
Clergy
Professional and
Bankers
Manufacturers
Merchants
Artisans and
Shopkeepers
Women
Unknown
Total
	
2	 1
	
5	 0
	
0	 1
	
1	 0
	
6	 1
	
17	 2
	
14	 4
	
3	 0
	
0	 1
	
48	 10
	
2	 5
	
9	 41
	
0	 8
	
12	 11
	
9	 7
	
2	 9
	
12	 19
	8 	 20
	
0	 2
	
54	 122
	
18	 28
	
11	 66
	
7	 16
	
0	 24
	
2	 25
	
2	 32
	
12	 61
	
11	 42
	
3	 6
	
66	 300
Normal ised
Landed	 0.45	 1.07	 0.40	 0.44	 2.92	 1
Rentiers	 0.47	 0.00	 0.76	 1.53	 0.76	 1
Clergy	 o.00	 1.88	 0.00	 1.23	 1.99	 1
Professional and
	 0.26	 0.00	 2.78	 1.13	 0.00	 1
Bankers
Manufacturers	 1.50	 1.20	 2.00	 0.69	 0.36	 1
Merchants	 3.32	 1.88	 0.35	 0.69	 0.28	 1
Ar-tisans and
	 1.43	 1.97	 1.09	 0.77	 0.89	 1
Shopkeepers
Women	 0.45	 0.00	 1.06	 1.17	 1.19	 1
Unknown	 0.00	 5.00	 0.00	 0.82	 2.27	 1
Total	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1
Source: Socio-economic groups of holders of 540 shares from 300 transfers of
Stourbridge Navigation stock between 1776 and 1827.68 Transfers allocated to
Pre-war (1768-1777), American War (1778-1784), Inter-war (1785-1793),
French War (1794-18 15) and Post-war (18 16-1834). Data normailsed to
account for the different number of transfers in each period. Normailsed data
show the relative propensity of different socio-economic groups to buy shares in
each period. A score of 1 means the number of investors buying shares in the
socio-economic group is the expected/eve!. A score of less than I means this
socio-economic group made less than the expected number of transfers. A
score of more than I means this socio-economic group made more than the
expected number of transfers in the period.
The Stourbridge data show that three groups bought more shares than they sold during
the period: Clergy, Woman and most significantly, Artisans and Shopkeepers. Over the
study period, these groups became more comfortable with the level of corporate risk in
owning these types of asset. They also became relatively more affluent as the result of
overall improvements in living standards over the period. The remaining socio-
economic groups of investors were either marginally net purchasers or sellers. For
example, the relative level of purchases and sales amongst the Merchant group was
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effectively neutral, namely 32 purchases and 34 sales. However, the pattern of
purchases and sales revealed that although both the Merchant and Manufacturer groups
were active purchasers of shares during the American War, they were greater than
expected net divestors of shares in wartime as a whole. The Landed group showed a
greater propensity to sell shares in peacetime but they were also active buyers in the
post-war period. As a whole, however, the Landed group were net sellers of shares,
which confirms other evidence, discussed in Chapter 4.2, that the Landed group owned
relatively and absolutely fewer shares throughout the period of the present study.
Rentiers were most active during the French Wars, with 41 of their 66 transfers (62 per
cent) taking place during this period, which only accounts for 34 per cent of the number
of years in the period 1776 to 1827. The period of the French Wars also saw Rentiers
actively selling shares, with 37 transfers out of a total of 66 (56 per cent) taking place
during that time. There is other evidence that Rentiers switched from private sector
investment to government stocks during the French Wars, but this group of financially
sophisticated individuals no doubt also took advantage of buying joint stock shares at
depressed prices. Women were also active buyers and sellers during the French Wars,
with approximately half of transfers involving female investors taking place during this
time. In this respect, their behaviour closely mirrors that of the Rentier group, probably
for the same reasons.
In conclusion, it seems that war did increase the perceived financial risk
environment, but it affected different sectors of the economy in different ways. In the
same way that the French Wars never ruffle the pages of Jane Austen, beyond the
orthogonal mention of 'officers', women's investment activities do not appear to have
been adversely affected by war. Empirical evidence of activity in the shares of the BCN
and the Stourbridge Navigations indicates that Merchants and Manufacturers were
active buyers and sellers during wartime. Wartime conditions affected different sectors in
different ways. Certainly, contemporary commentators report the disruption to trade
caused by the continental blockade. Manufacturers, on the other hand, if they were
involved in procurement for the armed forces may have benefited from war and have
suffered during the post-war return to peacetime conditions. Wartime disruption to the
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economy undoubtedly contributed to the pattern of business cycles, which are discussed
below.
3.5 Business Cycles
Although contemporary commentators were aware of the alternating cycles of
boom and depression, it is debatable whether the causes of business cycles were well
understood at the time. These cycles affected groups of investors differently. The
causes of the cycles were generally attributed to external factors such as war or
speculation. Modern economists recognise that business cycles, caused by economic
factors, were probably occurring in the nineteenth century. 7° They may have occurred
earlier, but statistical data on prices and capital inputs are scarce and unreliable.71
3.5.1 Economic Factors Affecting Business Cycles
Trade cycles, in the modern sense, are characterised by a sequence of
collective business optimism leading to investment, which results in over capacity and
falling prices, and unemployment, followed by collective business pessimism. This
causes investment to cease. In the fullness of time, demand begins to outstrip supply,
optimism returns and the cycle starts again. Deane suggested that trade cycles in this
modern sense were identifiable in the nineteenth century. She concluded that the trade
cycles, which had their peaks in 1825, 1836 and 1845, were modem in form. Gayer,
Rostow and Schwartz studied nineteenth-century business cycles between 1790 and
1850. They recognised six major cycles, namely 1797-1803, 1808-11, 1816-19, 1819-
26, 1832-7 and 1842-8 which demonstrated the characteristics of modern cycles where
the optimism or pessimism of entrepreneurs and industrialists in one industrial sector
quickly spread to all sectors of the economy. This characteristic depends on improved
communications and integration of national capital markets. Gayer et al. regarded
conditions in the money market as crucial for the spread of confidence or pessimism
after 1820. British business cycles are attributable to two main causes: the volume of
exports and the volume of domestic investment. 72
 In the eighteenth and early- to mid-
nineteenth centuries exports were primarily textiles. Cotton, woollens and linen,
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comprised 76 per cent of the value of total domestic goods exported in 181 57 Domestic
investment, defined as construction of fixed equipment, included investment in canals
which peaked in the canal building boom of 1791-3. Another major period of domestic
capital formation occurred as a consequence of the flotation of new joint stock
companies in 1824-5, the railway and joint stock flotations of 1835-6 and railway
flotations in 1844-5. Business cycle booms tended to be export led, with the domestic
investment taking place towards the end of the cycle. 74
 Nevertheless, Deane argued that
there were few eighteenth-century cycles, which were caused by economic rather than
political events, such as war. Gayer et al. suggest that at least in part, the troughs in
business cycles in 1793, 1803, 1807, 1811 were attributable to wars in which Britain was
a participant and those in 1823 and 1848 to fears of war on the continent or continental
revolutions.75
Jevons is regarded as the first economist to recognise the cyclicality of
economic prosperity and depression. He linked these to solar cycles. Beveridge, in his
study of wheat prices found evidence for cycles based on the weather. 76 The effect of
weather was an important economic factor in the eighteenth and early to mid-nineteenth
centuries. In 1750, half the country's labour force worked in agriculture. By 1812 this had
reduced to 35 per cent of the population of Great Britain and Ireland, 7" but even as late
as 1850 approximately 20 per cent worked in the agricultural sector and agricultural
products were an important export.75
Researchers have suggested that, superimposed on the weather-related cycle -
and the investment cycle, are 'long waves' of economic activity. In the I 920s, Kondratieff
developed a theory of long cycles in economic life. He identified two to three cycles,
since the development of capitalist economies in western countries, each of 50 to 60
years' duration. The first wave is identified as beginning in the I 780s; its crest was 1810-
17, with a trough in 1844-51. The second wave ended in the I 890s." 9
 Kondratieffs
analysis was purely statistical and it can be questioned, given the inadequacy of the
data and the lack of significance testing, whether the evidence of the long wave is
conclusive. Schumpeter attributes the long wave phenomena to the adoption of
significant innovations by industry. He believed the 1787 to 1842 long wave was set off
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by innovations in the cotton industry, which spilled over into the iron industry and
resulted in the widespread use of the steam engine. Initially fast industrial growth turned
down in the aftermath of the French Wars. During the I 820s and I 830s the cotton and
iron industries were large and grew more slowly, with economic activity rising again in
the rail boom of the I 840s. The next wave was triggered by the adoption of steam power
over the period I 84297.80
As the industrial and financial sectors became more closely integrated over the
period from 1750 to 1850 investors were exposed to greater risk. Further, as the
economy moved from dependency on agriculture to greater dependency on the life cycle
of man-made items, cyclicality became more pronounced. At the same time, the national
market became more integrated and the periodicity of regional cycles coalesced and
became more marked. 81
 As the economy became more national, the strategy of
mitigating risk by diversifying investment into different regions or industries could not
diminish the consequences of the increasing cyclicality of the economy as a whole. The
factors effecting the economy were poorly understood in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. The government was reluctant to intervene in the management of
the economy and the tools at its disposal were rudimentary. It was not until 1844 that the
Bank Charter Act attempted to regulate the money supply through restricting the level of
the fiduciary issue.82
 The lack of a public sector meant that there was no mechanism for
quickly stimulating the economy in times of recession through the provision of public
works.
Earlier research on the relationship between economic cycles and the risk of
bankruptcy has failed to find a significant correlation. Markham Lester compared the
incidence of bankruptcy amongst fifteen occupational groups with the pattern of trade
cycles between 1805 and 1913. He did not find a statistical relationship and concluded
that other factors specific to the particular trade or business were more important
determinants of business failure than the general economic environment. Hoppit also
investigated bankruptcy as a manifestation of risk. He estimated that 33,000 businesses
were declared bankrupt in the eighteenth century and suggested that bankruptcy
increased after 1760 because competition became more intense and businessmen had
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to take greater risks. Although Hoppit was not able to demonstrate a significant
correlation between different stages in the economic cycle and the rate of bankruptcy,
he suggested that there was a positive relationship between upturns in the cycle and
increases in business failure. In periods of growth, low capital requirements for starting
commercial or industrial enterprises allowed competition to increase. More credit was
available to more speculative businesses and the rates of failure increased. Conversely,
the rates of bankruptcy declined with stagnation of the economy. Businessmen were
generally not good at assessing risk, they had poor access to information and the track
record of these new firms was short.
Scrivenor was aware of the increasing interdependence of different sectors of the
capital market in the mid-nineteenth century. The collapse of railway shares after the
mania of 1845 was followed by the mercantile world suffering 'calamitous reverses'.
Stocks were liquidated to meet business commitments, so depressing prices even more.
At the same time, the pressure on the money market increased as credit tightened and
'convulsion after convulsion rent and shook the delicate fabric of commercial credit'. In
an early reference to the developing global market he notes that 'England's stability is
the key-stone in the arch of commerce', and the effects were felt 'more or less in every
market in the known world'.
Business cycles affected the ability of canal and railway companies to obtain
funding. As discussed in Chapter 4, those canals, which were authorised in the 1760s,
such as the BCN, and the Coventry canal, generally found it easier to raise funds.
Whereas, canals authorised in the height of the business boom of 1792 struggled to
attract investment in the succeeding trough. Once canal and railway companies were
operating they continued to be affected by cycles in economic activity but to a lesser
extent. Goods and passengers still required transport even if the level of economic
activity might have been reduced. Nevertheless, individual investors were affected by
business cycles and different socio-economic groups responded to risk in different ways
as discussed below.
55
CHAPTER 3: RIsK ENVIRONMENT
3.5.2 The Effect of Business Cycles on Canal and Railway Investors
Share transfer data from the BCN were used to investigate the behaviour of
investors during business cycles. Each year between 1790 and 1850 was designated as
a 'Peak', 'Trough' or 'Neutral' year in the business cycle based on the composite
economic indicators of Gayer et al. 87
 The resulting allocation is set out in detail in
Appendix IV and summarised in Table 3.7 below.
Table 3.7: Number of Years Designated as Peaks, Troughs and Neutral 1790-1850
Number of Years Per cent of Tot
Neutral	 30	 49
Peak	 15	 25
Trough	 16	 26
Total	 61	 100
Source: Years designated Peak, Trough and Neutral in accordance with Gayer,
Rostow and Schwartz88
The analysis set out in Table 3.7 suggests that on average the cycles were symmetrical,
with peaks and troughs of similar length and about half the period in the neutral phase. A
total of 120 shares belonging to original subscribers to the BCN were transferred in 47
separate transactions between 1790 and I 833. These transactions were allocated to
peak, trough and neutral periods according to the Gayer et al. classification. The results
are set out in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8: BCN Shares Transferred in Each Phase of the Business Cycle 1731-
1834 (Number of shares)
	Neutral	 Peak Trough Total
1791	 12	 12
1792	 9	 9
1793	 18	 18
1794	 8	 8
1795	 5	 5
1797	 2	 2
1802	 4	 4
1803	 8	 8
1804	 1	 1
1806	 2	 2
1808	 4	 4
1809	 3	 3
1823	 2	 2
1826	 24	 24
1833	 2	 2
1834	 16	 16
Total	 29	 27	 64	 120
Per cent of Total
	 24	 23	 54	 100
Average Number of Transfers p.a.
	 1.8	 2.25	 3.2	 2.5
Source: Data from 47 transfers by original subscribers to BCN of 120 shares in
the period 1791 to 1834, taken from the BCN Share Transfers Ledgers. 9° Years
allocated into Peak, Trough and Neutral in accordance with Gayer, Rostow and
Schwartz.91
Table 3.8 indicates that on average, a greater number of shares were transferred during
troughs in the business cycle. Although 26 per cent of years were designated as
Troughs, approximately double the expected number of transfers took place in those
years (54 per cent). Conversely, the number of transfers in the Neutral period was half
that of the expected level (24 per cent of transfers compared with 49 per cent of the
number of years). However, the proportion of transfers in Peak years was close to the
expected level. The results should be regarded with some caution since they are based
on a small number of transactions. The results are also affected by the crude
categorisation into peak, trough and neutral and do not take into account the intensity of
different cycles. Nevertheless, it seems that there was substantially more activity in the
low point of the economic cycle. The socio-economic groups of those selling and buying
BCN shares in different phases of the economic cycle are shown in Table 3.9. This
analysis was used to determine which groups might have been most vulnerable in times
of economic downturn.
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Table 3.9: BCN Shares Bought and Sold by Socio-economic Group in Each Phase
of the Business Cycle 1791 -1 834 (As a Percentage of total shares bought or sold
at each stage of the cycle)
Neutral	 Peak TrouQh Total
Sellers
Rentier	 0
	
15
	
0
	
3
Clergy	 0
	
0
	
0
	
0
Professional and Bankers 	 0
	
4
	
0
	
I
Manufacturers	 75
	
26
	
39
	
44
Merchants	 7
	
37
	
46	 35
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 0
	
7
	
0
	
2
Women	 14
	
0	 0	 3
Unknown	 4
	
11
	
15
	
12
Total Sellers	 100
	
100
	
100
	
100
Buyers
Rentier	 3	 11	 38	 23
Clergy	 14	 0	 0	 3
Professional and Bankers 	 0	 44	 3	 12
Manufacturers	 3	 4	 3	 3
Merchants	 7	 7	 8	 8
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 0	 0	 0	 0
Women	 35	 4	 13	 16
Unknown	 38	 30	 36	 35
Total Buyers	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Shares sold comprise socio-economic analysis of the sellers of 120
BCN shares in 48 different transactions between 1791 and 1834, excluding
transfers on death. Sellers are the original subscribers who acquired shares on
flotation in March 1768. Shares bought comprise purchases from the original
subscribers. Data taken from Share TransferLedgerof the BCN.92
Table 3.9 shows that sellers, regardless of the phase of the business cycle, were
overwhelmingly from the Manufacturer and Merthant groups. In total, 79 per cent of
sellers were from these two groups. This is partly a sectoral change as the constituency
of economic investors declined and was replaced by purely financial investors, as has
already been identified in Section 3.4.2 above. Amongst the initial subscribers to the
BCN were a number of economic investors. Later, these Manufacturers and Merchants
sold their shares to financial investors, such as Rentiers and Professionals, who made
up 35 per cent of the new purchasers. In addition, many members of the economic
investor groups may have retired to a rentier existence themselves. Women, who were
also financial investors, made up an important group of net buyers over the period. In
order to show more clearly the differences in behaviour of sellers over each phase of the
business cycle, the number of shares sold by each socio-economic group during each
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phase was expressed as a percentage of total shares sold by that group over the whole
period. The results of this analysis are set out in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Total Sales by Each Soclo-economic Group During Different Phases of
the Business Cycle 1791-1 834
	Neutral	 Peak	 Trough	 Total
	
%	 %	 %	 %
Rentier	 0	 100	 0	 100
Professional and Bankers
	 0	 100	 0	 100
Manufacturers	 40	 11	 48	 100
Merchants	 5	 23	 71	 100
Artisans and Shopkeepers
	 0	 100	 0	 100
Women	 100	 0	 0	 100
Unknown	 7	 21	 71	 100
Total	 23	 22	 54	 100
Source: Data comprise socio-economic analysis of the sellers of 120 BCN
shares in 48 different transactions between 1791 and 1834, excluding transfers
on death. Table entries show transfers as a percentage of total transfers for
each Group for the whole period. Data taken from Share Transfer Ledger of the
BCN. 93
 Shares sold by the original subscribers who acquired shares on flotation
in March 1768.
Table 3.10 shows that Merchants and the Manufacturers sold shares during the troughs
of the economic cycle. Since only 26 per cent of the years were trough years, Merchants
were three times more likely to sell at the bottom of the economic cycle (71 per cent of
sales by Merchants took place in troughs) than at the peak. Manufacturers were four
times as likely to sell in trough years than peaks. Daunton notes that the position of
manufacturers in the 'credit matrix' deteriorated significantly at the end of the eighteenth
century. Whereas at the beginning of the century they had been able to obtain raw
materials on six to eighteen months credit, this had reduced to two to four months by the
I 830s. Manufacturers were also having to grant credit to customers by the end of the
eighteenth century. As a consequence, they had to replace internal credit with funding
from banks, which was more likely to be withdrawn in times of economic downturn.
Thus, liquid investments were likely to be an important source of cash when the
availability of credit dried up. Merchants were also dependent on the availability of credit
and were affected by downturns in the economic cycle. As can be seen from Table 3.7,
trough years and peak years occurred with much the same frequency during the period
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of the analysis. Neutral years occurred with twice the frequency and it is thus significant
that only a small proportion of sales by Merchants took place in neutral years. Because
the Gayer et al. analysis of the economic cycle is a composite of many different
indicators, the arbitrary allocation of 'Peak', 'Trough' and 'Neutral' status to a particular
year probably masks differentials in the timing of economic trends, which would have
affected different socio-economic groups at different times. This might explain the slight
differences in behaviour between Merchants and Manufacturers. A more definitive
analysis would require the correlation of a larger sample of sales with a number of
discreet economic indicators. Nevertheless, the behaviour of the financial investor
groups of Rentiers, Professionals and Women differs significantly from that of Merchants
and Manufacturers, with all sales taking place in the Peak or Neutral periods. The
financial investors were less likely to have to liquidate their holdings to provide cash for
ailing businesses. They could probably afford to pick the most advantageous moment to
liquidate their holdings.
The behaviour of buyers, as can be seen from Table 3.9 is much less polarised
than that of sellers. The proportions of Unknowns is much higher than that in the Seller
group so some caution should be exercised when making comparisons between socio-
economic groups. Just over 50 per cent of the buyers were financial investors, namely,
Rentiers, Professionals, Bankers and Women. An analysis of the proportion of each
socio-economic group of buyers acquiring shares in each phase of the business cycle is
given in Table 3.11.
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Table 3.11: Total Purchases by Each Socio-economic Group During Different
Phases of the Business Cycle 1791 -1 834
	Neutral	 Peak Trough Total
	
%	 %	 % %
Landed and rentier 	 4	 11	 86	 100
Clergy	 100	 0	 0	 100
Professional and bankers 	 0	 86	 14	 100
Manufacturers	 25	 25	 50	 100
Merchants	 22	 22	 56	 100
Women	 53	 5	 42	 100
Unknown	 26	 19	 55	 100
Total	 24	 23	 53	 100
Source: Data comprise socio-economic analysis of the buyers of 120 BCN
shares in 47 different transactions between 1791 and 1834, excluding transfers
on death. Table entries show transfers as a percentage of total transfers for
each Group for the whole period. Data taken from Share Transfer Ledger of the
BCN. 95 Shares bought from the original subscribers who acquired shares on
flotation in March 1768.
Table 3.11 is based on the analysis of only 120 transfers so some caution in the
interpretation of the results from this small sample is necessary. The Rentier group
made 86 per cent of their purchases during the period in troughs, just as they managed
to make 100 per cent of their disposals in peaks. This suggests a level of sophistication
and freedom to maximise their returns. Interestingly, the Professional and Banker group
seems to exhibit less skill with 86 per cent of their purchases being made in peaks.
About half the shares bought by Manufacturers and Merchants were purchased during
troughs, but these groups bought nearly a quarter of their shares in peaks and at neutral
times in the cycle. The Merchant group experienced the greatest turnover of shares
during troughs. Women had a slight tendency to buy as well as sell in neutral periods but
also bought a substantial proportion of their total purchases in troughs.
In conclusion, it seems that business cycles did have a substantial influence on
investor behaviour, particularly in those socio-economic groups, which were most
vulnerable to economic downturns. Financial investors such as the Rentier group
seemed to manage their purchases and sales with some degree of sophistication.
Female investors tended to transact business during neutral periods when, it might be
argued, the risk of making a wrong decision might have been less.
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The underlying risk environment of early death, war and economic cycles had a
demonstrable effect on the behaviour of the investors in the study population. Investors
had also to assess the specific risks of a particular stock. This process of evaluation was
affected by the investors' own personal circumstances, including their socio-economic
background, gender and age. Although access to information was important in the
evaluation of environmental risk, it was arguably more important in the assessment of
new investment opportunities. The ability to control access to financial information and to
evaluate it efficiently was an important characteristic of the developing class of
sophisticated financial investors. In the next Chapter the evaluation of investment risk
and the effect of investors' socio-economic background and gender on the type and mix
of assets they held is discussed.
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4.1 Introduction
Risk, as discussed in the previous Chapter, was a very palpable part of the
environment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The worst effects of early death
or of disruptions caused by war or unforeseen economic fluctuations were mitigated
through mechanisms as diverse as inoculation and life insurance. On the other hand,
risk was also courted. Cards, wagers, lotteries, or share speculation were the diversions
of different sectors of society. Even some of Davidoff and Hall's models of middle-class
rectitude were amongst the canal and railway investors in the present study. 1
 The
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century canal and railway companies were relatively high-
risk projects, which attracted capital from a wide range of investors. A nineteenth-
century commentator on the earlier South Sea Bubble speculation remarked that 'men
were no longer satisfied with the slow but sure profits of cautious industry. The hope of
boundless wealth for the morrow made them heedless and extravagant for today'.2
Investment risk is the uncertainty of both the receipt of income, measured by dividends
or interest, and the maintenance of capital value. 3 Uncertainty arises from imperfect
access to information. For example, the transmission of information may be inefficient;
some investors may have access to more or better quality information than others; or
investors may interpret information in different ways, depending on their personal
circumstances. On this basis, investors make individual decisions on whether to buy or
sell a particular stock. The sum of these individual decisions results in collective market
sentiment. This Chapter investigates both the collective and individual interpretation of
investment risk. The canal and railway company investors in the present study were
exemplars of the growing class of financial investors. Since investment decisions are
made by weighing relative risk and reward, the alternative investment opportunities,
which were available to these investors, are also examined. For example, in addition to
investment in canal and railway companies, investors could place their money on
deposit with banks; buy land or lend money on mortgages; purchase government stocks,
or invest in other joint stock companies. The relative importance of these sectors of the
economy in 1799 and I 865 is shown in Table 4.1.
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Farming Capital
Houses
Mines, Canals, Timber, Tolls, etc.
Railways
Present Value of Income from Public Debt
Home Trade
Foreign Trade and Shipping
Total
Unproductive Assets
Total Private Capital
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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
Table 4.1: Present Value of the Capital of Great Britain in 1799 and 1865
Beeke 1799
£million %oflotal
	
795	 35
	
125	 5
	
200	 9
	
100	 4
	
0	 0
	
300	 13
	
120	 5
	
80	 3
	
1,720	 75
	
280	 12
	
2,000	 87
290	 13
Giffen 1865
£ million %ofTotal
	
1,864	 30
	
621	 10
	
1,031	 17
	
83	 1
	
414	 7
	
200	 3
	
789	 13
	
100	 2
	
5,102	 83
	
500	 8
	
5,602	 92
511	 8
Total of Public and Private Capital	 2,290	 100	 6,113	 100
Source: Based on Beeke and Giffen.4 Figures based on analysis of
Income Tax Returns. Taxes levied were used to extrapolate total income
from each class of asset and the capital value of that asset.
Beeke based his assessments of capital value, as set out in Table 4.1, on the present
value of income generated by different classes of asset. He considered his calculations
were correct to within plus or minus 10 per cent. He estimated the total capital
investment in Great Britain in 1799 to be between £2 and £2.5 billion. Table 4.1 shows
that 49 per cent of capital was invested in land and buildings and that agricultural
investment dominated this sector. Investment in commercial and industrial activities
such as 'Home and Foreign Trade' and 'Canals, Mines etc.' only amounted to only 12
per cent of total capital invested.
Colquhoun largely confirms Beeke's calculations, estimating that the total capital of
Great Britain and Ireland in 'Productive Private Property', was £2.25 billion in 1812.
Fifty-three years later, the size and structure of the economy had changed substantially.
In 1865, Giffen also estimated the capital of the United Kingdom based on Income Tax
Returns and calculated that the total capital investment in 1865 was £6.1 billion.6
Comparison of Beeke and Giffen's analysis must be viewed with caution since the
categories are unlikely to have been compiled in exactly the same way. Nevertheless,
Table 4.1 shows that although investment in 'and and buildings increased by nearly £2.4
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billion over the period from 1799 to 1865, the relative importance of agricultural land
decreased. The main investments in this sector were in farm improvements, which rose
from 5 per cent to 10 per cent and, most significantly, housing. The rise in investment in
'Houses' from 9 per cent to 17 per cent reflected the rapid growth of urbanisation over
the period. The proportion of the population of England and Wales living in towns with
more than 2,500 inhabitants rose from 23 per cent in 1750 to 48 per cent in 1841 .
Table 4.1 shows that investment in public debt was never a dominant sector of
the economy as a whole and declined over the period. On the other hand, investment in
private sector companies and trade assets increased substantially. An analysis of
employment patterns shows that by 1801 40 per cent of families were involved in trade,
commerce or manufacturing and only 36 per cent in agriculture. The vast majority of
these families were the middling sort. 8 The relative risk and return from investment in
different sectors of the economy: land, mortgages, government stocks and joint stock
companies are investigated in this Chapter. The socio-economic background and
gender of investors holding each type of asset were analysed and the propensity of
different classes of investor to take risks was examined.
4.2 Land, Real Property and Mortgages
The importance of land and buildings in the economy of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries is clearly illustrated in Table 4.1. Both Beeke and Giffen estimated
that around half of the capital investment in Great Britain was in land, farm
improvements and houses. The extent to which this accumulated capital was the result
of conscious investment decisions or the inertia of hereditary land holding and how
changes in social structure over the course of the nineteenth century were reflected in
the ownership of these assets was the subject of contemporary debate and of more
recent historical research.
Although Beeke and Giffen may have produced reasonably accurate estimates
of the size of different sectors of the economy, there was little evidence of which sectors
of the population owned land, buildings or houses. Contemporary opinion was based on
speculation, informed by different political agendas. The Radical view, exemplified by
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John Bright, held that ownership of land in the I 860s was becoming ever more
concentrated in the hands of a few men. The view of the Tory, Lord Derby, was that land
was increasingly being held in middle-sized estates.9 The argument was finally resolved
in the 1870s with the compilation of the Return of Owners of Land. Whilst the Return
does show that land ownership was highly concentrated in the hands of a very few
individuals, it also revealed nearly a million people outside London owned a freehold of
some description.10
Mingay suggests that the landed interest was at the height of its power in the
eighteenth century, when two-thirds of MPs were landowners and this declined over the
next century. 11 This view is confirmed by Stone and Stone who noted that it was not until
1886 that members of the landed elite held less than half the seats in Parliament. 12 This
view is modified by Corfield who suggests that Tory attempts to dominate Parliament
through the use of property qualifications were ineffectual and that between 1734 and
1832, 51 per cent of MPs had commercial and professional interests as well as land.13
The evidence from the Return of Owners of Land reveals that land ownership was still
concentrated in the hands of the 'Territorial Aristocracy' in the second half of the
nineteenth century.14
The extent to which the owners of this land regarded it an investment, or an
hereditary asset or an adjunct to a particular lifestyle has been the subject of
considerable research. Although land remained politically important, its value as a
secure, income-generating asset has been questioned. Mingay suggests that the landed -
elite saw increased incomes in the eighteenth century. 15 Dr. Johnson believed, like many
contemporaries, that 'it is better to have five per cent out of land, than out of money,
because it is more secure; but the readiness of transfer, and promptness of interest,
make many people rather choose the funds.' 16 Researchers point to the substantial fall
in land values during the American War, from 31 to 22 years purchase, which may have
weakened the previously held perception that land was a secure investment with a
stable capital value.17 Johnson died in I 784 and may well have been referring to the
period before the war. Stone and Stone suggest that the principle economic advantage
of holding land was not profit but security but by the eighteenth century, the security of
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government stock matched that of land.' 8 Dr. Johnson was also over optimistic in his
expectation of a yield of 5 per cent on land. Net yields on land between 1744 and 1814
were generally below 3 per cent. 19 Playford, writing in 1855, noted that the price of
Consols and price of 'good Freehold Land in England' moved pan passu, yielding nearly
the same, at 33 % years' purchase, as Consols at par. 2° Ward, writing in the mid I 850s,
recorded that the annual return on land was 3 per cent, a first mortgage on real property
yielded 4 per cent and ground rents yielded 4.5 per cent.
Although most researchers are agreed that landed estates were not generally
acquired as investments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the extent to which
land was acquired at all by the newly wealthy is the subject of conflicting opinions.
Although Perkin was convinced there was an influx of wealth into the landed elite from
the middle ranks, this view is challenged in research by Rubinstein and the Stones.21
Rubinstein used Bateman's Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland to calculate
the real property assets of the very wealthy. Using this information, together with
Probate Inventories and records of Inhabited House Duty, Rubinstein compiled lists of
the millionaires, half millionaires and the 'lesser wealthy', that is those leaving over
£160,000, in the period 1809 to 1858. Wealth was highly concentrated in this period,
with 50 per cent of the wealth held by less than 2 per cent of the population. The vast
majority of the wealthy inherited rather than acquired land. Rubinstein found little
evidence that middle-class businessmen invested in landed estates. As Colquhoun
confirms in his 1812 analysis of the family incomes, the majority of non-landed wealthy
in Great Britain and Ireland were employed in commerce or finance. The Stones
investigated 'the myth of upward social mobility' by examining the background of over
2,000 owners of substantial country houses and estates. They also found little
evidence of businessmen buying landed estates.
Thompson challenged these conclusions and suggested that there was
evidence of the wealthy industrialists and merchants buying estates and that their heirs
adopted an aristocratic lifestyle. 24 Thompson does concede, however, that land as a
safe investment for the savings of businessmen declined from the late-seventeenth
century onwards as other more liquid and higher yielding investments became available
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and that the only rationale for investment in land was the satisfaction of social
aspirations. Rubinstein's robust reappraisal of his earlier research in the face of
Thompson's critique failed to find evidence of even moderately wealth businessmen
acquiring land to any extent. He examined the estates, valued at between £50,000 and
£100,000, of businessmen who died in the years 1873 to 1875. The vast majority (96 per
cent) owned less than 300 acres and 65 per cent owned no land at all. The lower
threshold of £50,000 for Rubinstein's study can still be criticised since it still excludes all
but the wealthiest businessmen. The present study examines the propensity of a wide
range of socio-economic groups to invest in land, through analysis of the CARD
investors. The study also examines the extent to which the landed classes invested in
the shares of the joint stock transportation companies.
4.2.1 Investment in Land by CARD Investors
The study compared Bateman's list of the owners of estates of more than 3,000
acres and an income of over £3,000 per annum with the investors in the CARD
Database. Since Bateman's list was compiled from information collected in 1873, most
of the owners of the estates would have been from a subsequent generation to those
individuals who held shares in the period up to 1850. Thompson maintained it was these
subsequent generations, the descendants of wealthy businessmen, who actually
acquired estates. However, only 21 investors, or their descendants, out of a total of
nearly 6,000 investors in the CARD Database, were found to own estates. This number
may be understated by the omission of descendants with different family names, since
the present research did not attempt to trace the family trees of all the CARD investors.
Nevertheless, only a very small proportion of investors appeared to have owned
substantial estates of over 3,000 acres. Fifteen out of the 21 landed investors were from
the established landed aristocracy and their estates were inherited and not purchased
by new commercial wealth. Of the six estates, which appeared to be owned by newly
wealthy business interests, three were owned by bankers. These included members of
the extended Lloyd and Taylor families. For example, Osgood Hanbury, the son of
Osgood Hanbury and Mary Lloyd, and Joanna Winnington, daughter of James Taylor,
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were both owners of estates. The fortunes which were invested in these estates were
originally earned by a previous generation and in the case of Joanna Winnington her
estate was inherited from her husband, who was a member of the landed classes. Other
researchers have noted the greater propensity of bankers to form connections by
marriage to the landed elite and to invest in large landed estates in comparison to
manufacturing and trading families. 27 This may have been because bankers found it
easier to withdraw cash from the business and that ownership of an estate was a visible
enhancement of their banking credentials.28
This evidence from the analysis of the large population of CARD Database
investors confirms Rubinstein's conclusion that businessmen did not invest to any extent
in landed estates. Evidence may be missing, however, for the criterion for inclusion in
Bateman's Great Landowners, namely an income of at least £3,000 and over 3,000
acres was in his own admission one which was likely to exclude 'mill-owners .., all the
Cheshire soapboilers, Stafford potters, Durham and Northumberland coal-masters,
Warwick hardwaremen, Nottingham hosiers, Yorkshire clothiers, and Glamorgan iron-
masters'. These were occupations typical of a substantial proportion of the CARD
Database investors. It is possible that investors may have owned smailer estates.
Nevertheless, an examination of the will extracts of a sample of 96 testators who owned
shares in the BCN in the years 1787 to 1797 and 1820 to 1828 failed to reveal the
ownership of any landed estates.3°
It was not possible to establish the relative value of real estate investments
within the portfolio of total assets held by the CARD investors. A study by Earle of 375
individuals from the London middle class in the period 1660 to 1730 revealed that real
estate made up 21 per cent of the total value of their estates. Just under 50 per cent of
these real estate assets were London properties or suburban villas. 31 It is likely that the
CARD investors, drawn as they were from largely similar socio-economic groups would
have held a similar portfolio of assets.
Habakkuk suggests that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries only the very
wealthy could afford to buy an estate of the size which would yield a sufficient income to
maintain a life-style they would have enjoyed if they had continued to hold a portfolio of
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higher yielding paper assets. As a consequence, the wealthy began to hold a higher
proportion of their assets in government and other stocks. 32 Certainly the cost of
acquiring even a modest estate would have been beyond the means of most of the
CARD investors. The average gross annual value of estates over 1,000 acres in
Warwickshire was calculated to be £2.28 per acre. The cost of buying an estate of 500
acres at 33 Va years' purchase would thus have been around £35,000 1876. Although
this was within the capability of some of the CARD investors, for the vast majority t was
not an option. For example, as is shown in Table 7.4, only 108 investors left estates of
£10,000 or more and only 20 had estates of over £50,000, excluding the value of any
real property.
If wealthy businessmen chose to hold most of their assets in stocks and shares
rather than land, did the landed elite also hold a substantial portion of their wealth in
financial assets? The extent to which the landed held financial assets does not appear to
have been extensively investigated by earlier researchers. This study shows that very
few landed proprietors owned shares in the canal and railway companies in the present
sample and that the shares they owned in these companies were not an important part
of their total assets. For example, one of the 21 landed investors was the Earl of
Dartmouth. In 1768, the Earl was an active promoter of the BCN and later, in 1791, of
the Warwick & Birmingham canaI. On his death in 1802 his shares in the BCN were
sold. At this time, the value of his ten £100 shares, for which he subscribed at par, was
£7,300, an insignificant part of his total wealth, since the gross annual income from the
Dartmouth estates in 1883 was £58,000. The four landed proprietors who were among
the original subscribers to the BCN in March 1768 are listed in Table 4.2. Only the Earl
of Dartmouth retained his shares for any length of time. On death, neither his shares nor
those of Sir Lister Holte were transferred to family members.
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Table 4.2: Disposals of BCN Shares by Landed Proprietors
Shares Disposed of
Earl of Hertford	 10	 June 1772
Earl of Dartmouth	 10	 April 1802
Sir Lister Holte	 10	 July 1770
Francis Farguharson	 5	 May 1769
Source: Data from BCN Share Transfer Ledger. 37 Analysis of the
transfers of 495 shares of 102 original subscribers to the BCN.
Some proprietors, such as the Earl of Dartmouth were prepared to support new projects,
because they opened up mines on their estates to urban markets or they recognised
their general development potential. However, the present study shows that even
these landowners soon disposed of their holdings and did not pass them on to their
heirs. The landed class did not appear to take a dynastic view of share ownership. Very
wealthy landed proprietors may have had competing uses for their capital in developing
their estates. They may not have been interested in investing in companies largely
managed by middle-class entrepreneurs. Lord Calthorpe, for example, in 1883 was
earning £54 per acre gross annual value for his 2,073 acres in Warwickshire largely
through development of land in Edgbaston for housing. His distaste for industrial
development on his land may have extended to investment in canals and railways, 40
although his ancestor, Henry Gough was an initial subscriber to the Warwick &
Braunston, the Warwick & Birmingham and the Worcester & Birmingham canals.41
In total only 3.4 per cent of canal investors and 5.6 per cent of railway investors
were clearly identifiable as landed proprietors and the majority of these did not own
substantial landed estates. 42 The increasing wealth of the middle classes throughout the
period of this study did lead to wider investment, albeit on a modest scale, in real
property assets. By 1856, £6 million of the total £40 million annual capital expenditure
was invested in the construction of dwellings. Previous research suggests that the
lower middle classes preferred to invest in property for rental, where they could provide
personal supervision, rather than invest in what they perceived as more risky stocks and
shares. Modest purchases of land towards the end of a commercial career were a safe
and traditional hedge against the commercial failures of the nineteenth century and the
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more affluent would have acquired properties for their own use, often separate from their
places of work. However, the wealthy businessman was more likely to buy a suburban
villa than a country estate. Davidoff and Hall suggest that affluent middle-class
businessmen moved from the centre of Birmingham from the late-eighteenth century
onwards and adopted a suburban existence where they could still identify themselves as
part of the town's elite. As a consequence Edgbaston grew from a population of 1,000 in
1801 to around 16,500 in 184i. Certainly, the behaviour of the BCN investors confirms
this movement from the centre of Birmingham. In 1768, 60 out of the 105 shareholders
(57 per cent) came from Birmingham. Most of them had addresses in the city centre,
such as Bull Street, High Street or Colmore Row. No one lived in Edgbaston. By 1840,
the shareholders in the BCN were spread over a much wider geographical area. Of the
131 investors who lived in the Birmingham area, 19 (15 per cent) came from
Edgbaston. A typical example of professionals moving out from the centre of town and
living in houses separate from their place of business was Thomas Lee, an attorney. In
1768 he lived in Colmore Row but he died a resident of Edgbaston.
Mortgages were another mechanism whereby investors could participate in the
real estate market. This securitisation of real estate investment might have been
expected to prove attractive to the typical CARD investor, since it combined aspects of
lending money, which were familiar to many businessmen, on the security of a real
asset.
4.2.2 Investment in Mortgages
Previous research suggests that in the I 750s the mortgage market was
extremely important in the provinces, in comparison to investment in government
securities, which was largely a metropolitan habit. 5° Earle, in his analysis of the estates
of middle-class Londoners in the period 1660 to 1730 found that around 30 per cent of
their assets (real and financial) were held in mortgages and loans. Thus, even in London
mortgages were an important investment. Mortgages were considerably more risky than
investing in land or government stock. In the eighteenth century it was difficult to
foreclose on a mortgage. Allen, in his model of land prices, attributes a 75 basis point
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premium over the yield on government stocks to the yield on mortgages to compensate
for the increased risk. 51 Ward's observations in the I 850s, discussed above, reveal an
even larger risk premium between the 3 per cent yield on land and the 4 per cent yield
on a mortgage.
Examination of the wills of 98 CARD Database investors revealed little evidence
of investment in mortgages (see Chapter 5.2.2). Only two references to investors
holding mortgages were found. The first was Elizabeth Lovatt, a widow from Aston, who
held six shares in the BCN, and also owned at her death in 1827 a mortgage for £1,500
to Thomas Parry, a pawnbroker. 52 The mortgage constituted an important part of her
total estate of £4,000. The only other reference to mortgages was in the will of Samuel
Galton, the gunmaker from Birmingham, who died leaving £150,000 in 1799. It appears
he did not own any land, but he did own urban properties in the form of houses at
Duddeston and Birmingham and cottages in Somerset. There is also a reference to his
ownership of mortgages. However, the bulk of Galton's assets seem to have been held
in government stocks and canal company shares.
The evidence of the present study indicates that in the West Midlands, there
was an elite of financially sophisticated capitalists who aspired to an urban rather than a
rural, landed lifestyle. The investor population, particularly in the later years included
similar individuals based in London, suggesting there may have been a cohesive urban
elite of middle-class investors united by similar attitudes to risk and financial prudence.
These investors showed a preference for holding financial assets, whether they were
government stocks, canal and railway company shares or the shares of joint stock
banks, discussed below.
4.3 Bank Deposits and Shares
Most previous research has concentrated on the role of banks as providers of
credit, primarily to business, rather than as investment opportunities for personal
customers and shareholders. However, it was on the basis of funds provided by
customer deposits, Notes and, in the case of joint stock banks, shareholders' equity that
banks could provide those credit facilities. In the early-eighteenth century money
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markets were local. Intermediaries with specific skills, such as attorneys might arrange a
mortgage for a landowner, or a loan to a manufacturer. These loans were funded by
individuals with surplus cash to invest, who often knew the credit-worthiness of the
borrower. For example, on 20 July 1770, Mary Galton of Taunton, a spinster daughter of
Samuel Galton I, provided a loan of £400 to Joseph Barker, a Birmingham surgeon, on
the security of three shares in the BCN. Barker was also known to John Galton, Marys
uncle, who was a merchant in Bristol and who acted as adviser to Mary in the
transaction. The transfer ledger of the BCN for the I 770s revealed that Mary probably
made a series of such loans. She bought a further two shares from Joseph Barker for
£250 on 11 October 1770. She also bought five shares from Matthew Boulton for £600
on 15 March 1770 and resold them to him for the same value on 25 July 1772. Mary
provided the loan and in return the shares transferred into her name. The market value
of the shares was less than the amount of the loan, allowing Mary a margin should the
value of the stocks fall over the life of the loan. The borrower agreed to pay interest on
the amount borrowed and any calls on the shares during the life of the loan. Mary
agreed to sell the shares back to the borrower at the same price at which she acquired
them when the loan matured. For example, the market value of the shares which Mary
bought from Boulton was £715, giving Mary a margin of 16 per cent to cover any fall in
the value of the collateral. When the loan matured the shares were worth £1,230,
although they were transferred back to Boulton at the agreed price of £600.
This was a fairly typical transaction of this period where loans were made
between parties who were known to each other. As transportation and communication
improved, other mechanisms to link investors and borrowers were established. Country
banks were established and surplus funds could be moved over greater distances.
Investors and borrowers were no longer personally linked. Banking services for most of
the period 1750 to 1850 were carried out by thinly capitalised partnerships, relying upon
the personal credit of the individual partners. These country banks provided a
mechanism which enabled individuals and firms to remit funds to other parts of the
country. This cash generally flowed into and out of London through correspondent banks
in the City. The country banks provided a relatively safe repository for idle funds for their
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local customers and notes for paying wages and other cash transactions, in the absence
of available coinage. The early banking partnerships comprised merchants,
manufacturers, tax collectors, attorneys and landed proprietors. For example, Robert
Hale, a young attorney from Bristol bought a partnership in the Exchange Bank in Bristol
with £4,000 lent to him by an obliging uncle. 60 Cameron estimates that the average
capitelisation of the country banks by the end of the eighteenth century was £10,000.61
This low capital requirement and lack of regulation meant that the barriers to entering
the banking business were low, explaining the rapid expansion of the country banks.
From less than twelve country banks in England and Wales in 1750, the number rose to
more than 100 by 1780, over 300 by 1800 and 684 in 1825. The capital of country
banks alone increased from less than £1 million in 1775 to at least £6 million by 1825. If
the capital of the London banks is included, investment in the banking sector rose from
£2.5 million to £8.5 million in the same period. The West Midlands had the highest
density of banks, with one office for every 12,000 inhabitants. In Birmingham alone by
the I 820s there were at least eight banking partnerships. However, the banking crisis
1825 caused over sixty country banks to fail, including the partnership of Gibbins, Smith
& Goode of Birmingham. Elizabeth Anne Galton, the daughter of Samuel Tertius Galton,
who was a member of another Birmingham banking partnership, recalled in her memoirs
how her father's bank narrowly avoided the same fate. Samuel Tertius's experiences in
1825 persuaded him to run down the partnership and close the bank in 1831 .
4.3.1 Assessment of Bank Risk
Following the 1825 crisis, the government attempted to improve the capital
adequacy of the country banks, which were still limited to six partners. In 1826 joint
stock banking was permitted outside a sixty-five mile radius of London, enabling banks
to raise more adequate levels of capital. In 1833, joint stock banks were permitted within
this zone, provided they did not issue notes. By the early I 840s there were 600 joint
stock banks in England and Wales with capital of between £25,000 and £100,000. The
Bank Charter Act of I 844 required new joint stock banks to have a minimum
capitalisation of £1 00,000. This new generation of banks offered investors a less risky
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opportunity to place money on deposit than had been available with the under-
capitalised banking partnerships. For example, the partnership of Gillet & Gibbins in
Banbury had 175 depositors in 1822 with combined balances of £35,498, on average
just over £200 per customer. Joseph Gibbins, one of the partners, contributed the
£6,000 capital for himself and his brother-in-law, Joseph Ashby Gillett. Gillett was the
working partner, and although he started the partnership with no assets his personal net
worth in 18.40 was just under £30,000. Gibbins was a high net worth individual, whose
personal assets would have been available to creditors in the event of the partnership
failing. For example, he owned 150 shares in the Coventry Union Bank in I 836,° and he
died in 1870 with assets of £300,000.71 Nevertheless, in general, banking partnerships
such as Gillett and Gibbins's could not offer the same level of capital adequacy and
depositor security as a joint stock bank. Rae, writing in 1885, suggests the level of
prudent reserves should be based on a 'current ratio' of one-third of immediately
available resources (i.e. cash, money at call and short notice and Consols) to liabilities
to the public (i.e. deposits, current accounts, notes in circulation, drafts after date,
acceptances by the bank and bills for collection). 72 Analysis of the semi-annual Balance
Sheets of the Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank between 1838 and 1862 reveals that
current assets exceeded current liabilities by an average of two to one over the period.
Clearly, the Bank was managed on a very conservative basis. This is confirmed by
calculation of the more generally used Capital Adequacy Ratio, which was on average
69 per cent over the period 1838 to I 862. This compares to the Capital Adequacy
Ratio of the Gillett & Gibbins partnership of 16 per cent. Collins notes that the average
Capital Adequacy Ratio of banks in the period 1840 to 1849 was 35 per cent. A decade
later this had fallen to 20 per cent when the size of banks had increased substantially,
and were able to take a portfolio approach to risk asset management. 75 As a
consequence, the capital adequacy ratio could be reduced without necessarily
increasing risk. Although both the Coventry Union and the Stourbridge & Kidderminster
Banks survived and later were amalgamated into the Midland Bank, other joint stock
banks did not prove to be such a sound investment. In Elizabeth Gaskell's Cran ford,
published in 1853, the failure of the fictional Town and County joint stock bank, which
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had so reliably paid an over-generous eight per cent return, illustrated the spectre which
haunted many middle-class spinsters and widows.76
In general, banks paid a low interest rate for their funds. Richards noted that in
1832 banks were paying 3 per cent interest on time deposits of over 6 months. No
interest was paid on demand deposits or deposits of less than 6 monthsY Given that
even joint stock banks were not without risk, a 3 per cent yield might not seem to be very
attractive. However, the rapid growth of the banking sector after 1825 reflects the
demand for these services. Capital employed in banking at the end of 18 .49 was
estimated to be £190 million.78
4.3.2 Investment in Bank Shares
This growth demonstrates that bank shares were popular investments. In some
cases, the shares could only be purchased on the condition that a banking account was
opened at the same time.79 The Coventry Union Bank (CUB), which was established in
1836, had a share capital of £200,000 comprising 10,000 shares of £20 each. 8° Bank
shares were generally for lower denominations than those for the canal companies. By
the time joint stock banks were being established, proprietors had to compete for capital
with railway stocks. They appear to have adopted some of the techniques to encourage
investment from a broader, and perhaps less wealthy constituency. 81 However, the Bank
Charter Act of 1844 imposed a minimum nominal value of £100 on new issues of bank
shares. This was an attempt to ensure that in future bank capital would be provided by
substantial investors who were theoretically capable of paying the calls. 82 The soclo-
economic background of the investors in the CUB was compared to that of the investors
in the CARD Database. The results of the analysis are set out in Table 4.3 below.
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Table 43: Socio-economic Groups of Investors in the Coventry Union Bank and
the CARD Database
	Coventry Union Bank	 CARD Database
	
Number	 % of Total	 Number	 % of Total
Landed	 17	 6	 503	 9
Rentier	 52	 20	 1,502	 25
Clergy	 6	 2	 467	 8
Professional and Bankers	 31	 12	 849	 14
Manufacturers	 45	 17	 307	 5
Merchants	 23	 9	 509	 9
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 67	 25	 935	 16
Women	 21	 8	 841	 14
Total	 262	 100	 5,913	 100
Source: CUB investors comprise 262 investors holding 10,575 shares.
Table 4.3 shows that there was a higher proportion of investors from lower income
groups in the CUB, represented by the Artisan and Shopkeeper group, than amongst
CARD Database investors as a whole. The relatively low nominal value of the CUB
shares may have encouraged these groups to invest. Manufacturers are also better
represented amongst the bank shareholders than in the CARD Database. Many of the
Coventry ribbon manufacturers were initial investors in their local bank. Sixty of the 262
CUB investors (23 per cent) were also investor in the CARD Database. Not surprisingly,
these individuals belonged almost exclusively to the more wealthy Rentier and
Professional groups, which dominated the share registers of the canal and railway
companies.
The Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank, established in March 1834 with
£250,000 capital made up of £25 shares, also appears to have actively pursued less
wealthy investors. The promoters intended to issue £50 shares which would be 'highly
advantageous to the Manufacturing, Trading and Agricultural Interests ... as well as
beneficial to the Monied Interests'. By the time the bank was floated, the nominal value
of the shares had been halved, presumably to provide wider appeal. In addition, only
£10 per share was called in two instalments in the first year and the remaining £15 could
not be called until 21 months after the Deed of Settlement was signed. The occupations
of the Stourbridge & Kidderminster shareholders are not known but the proportion of
female shareholders was 16 per cent, which was very similar to that in the CARD
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Database. 011erenshaw also notes the importance of female shareholders in joint stock
banks with the observation that two-thirds of the 2,100 shareholders of the West of
England Bank were reported to be spinsters or widows. The requirement that the
potential investor should also open a bank account did not appear to rule out female
shareholders. There is also evidence that 22 out of the 228 customers of the Gillet and
Gibbins partnership were women.
The importance of preserving stability in the banking sector meant that banks
were subject to greater legislative control by the government and supervision by the
Bank of England than other sectors of the economy. In spite of a few spectacular
collapses, depositors and shareholders must have had a considerable degree of
confidence in the banking sector. This is evidenced by growth of banks as investment
opportunities. By 1843 banks were the second largest category of public companies
traded on the London Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalisation. The top four
groups, which had a total capitalisation of £106 million, were railway companies, joint
stock banks, canals and turnpike trusts. The turnpike trusts accounted for 20 per cent of
the total. Banks accounted for another 20 per cent and canal companies for 17 per cent,
although railway companies dominated the market with 54 per cent of total
capitalisation.87 Although investment in public companies was, of course, insignificant in
comparison to the market in government stocks.
4.4 Government Stocks
By the start of the eighteenth century there was a well-developed and well-
organised government debt market. This was due to the availability of largely
homogenous tranches of securities, which were familiar to the investing public. In spite
of the disruption caused by the South Sea Bubble early in the eighteenth century, the
market continued to grow and interest rates tended to fall, indicating growing economic
stability and confidence.
The government debt market developed from initially disorganised government
spending. Up to the end of the seventeenth century, many government departments
issued tallies or bills. These were short-term debts, which were gradually consolidated,
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and this process was accelerated by the stop on the Exchequer in 1672. The Treasury
ceased repayment of £1.3 million of fiduciary notes and converted the debt into an
irredeemable stock paying interest, first at 6 per cent, later reduced to 3 per cent. This
created substantial tranches of long-term debt. Another mechanism for raising long-term
government debt was demonstrated in 1694 when the Bank of England was established.
The Bank's share capital of £1.2 million was lent to the government in return for a,
'perpetual fund of interest' of £100,000 secured on excise duties. 9° This process of 'in-
grafting' the share capital of joint stock companies was commonly used to raise
government debt at this time. It reached its climax in the restructuring of the South Sea
Company debt in 1721. The concept of hypothecating specific taxes or excise duties for
the payment of interest was also a characteristic of issues of government stocks in the
early-eighteenth century. The 'funded' debt may have provided additional comfort to
stockholders seeking a low-risk investment. Public debt tended to grow rapidly in times
of war as can be seen in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Growth of the National Debt 1727-1854 (In £ millions)
Additions to and (Repayments) Total National
	
of National Debt 	 Debt
Accession of George II in 1727	 52
Additional to Peace of Paris 1763 	 87	 139
Paid off Peace 1763-75	 (10)
Debt at start of American War	 129
Additional during war 1778-84
	 121
Debt at end of War	 250
Paid off during peace 1784-93
	 (11)	 -
Debt at start of French War
	 239
Additional during War 1793-1815 	 602
Total on consolidation of English and 	 841
Irish debt in Feb 1817
Cancelled 1817 - Jan 1854
	 (67)
National Debt at 5 Jan 1854	 774
Source: Playford.91
Throughout the period, the process of consolidating issues and the reducing
interest continued. The bellwether 3 per cent Consolidated Bank Annuities (Consols)
were created in 1751 from a series of earlier issues, the oldest dating from 1731. The
total amount of Consols in issue in 1751 was only £9 million, but Consols became the
84
CHAPTER 4: ASSESsMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
main medium for government borrowing for the next century. By 1843 there were £369
million, 3 per cent Consols in issue, which comprised 50 per cent of the total Public
Funded Debt. Throughout the period 1750 to 1850, the government successfully
reduced the nominal interest rate on existing stocks. For example, after the end of the
War of the Austrian Succession, interest on 4 per cent annuities was renegotiated down
to 3.5 per cent until December 1757 and thereafter to 3 per cent. Although new issues
were at par, the yield was often enhanced with annuities and lotteries, to reflect the
prevailing market rate of interest. Various researchers have noted the downward trend in
long-term interest rates throughout the eighteenth century. Rates tended to rise during
wars when the government was issuing new debt, but overall the trend was downwards.
This trend continued for the first half of the nineteenth century and is shown below in
Figure 4.3. The decline in interest rates was the result of both economic factors and the
growing confidence of investors in the credit-worthiness of the government, as
evidenced by its management of the national debt and the efficiency of the government
stock market.
Today, British government debt is regarded as risk-free. This does not mean
that the investor is protected against changes in economic conditions, which may cause
the capital value of the stock to fall. Rather, risk-free means that the government can be
relied upon to repay the debt on maturity and pay the interest when it becomes due. The
concept of freedom from risk also encompasses the mechanism of a deep and active
market, which allows investors to sell the security when required. This is particularly
important in the case of holdings of perpetual or irredeemable securities. It could be
argued that by 1750 government stocks were regarded as risk-free investments within
the definition set out above. Certainly by 1855 the opinion of brokers was that 'Public
Funds [werel the safer means of employing spare money, particularly in small sums and
for uncertain periods' 94 It seems that a wide spectrum of investors bought government
stocks, including 'Duchesses, domestic servants, noble Dukes, livened flunkies, Bankers
and millionaires, humble shopkeepers or merchant clerk and warehouseman'. The
number of investors rose from 10,000 in the Reign of Queen Anne to 60,000 at the
accession of George III, and to over 500,000 by 1815. Investors were overwhelmingly
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from London. The contemporary view was that such investments were particularly
suited to widows and children, who held small amounts of stock. Playford analysed the
interest paid on funded debt in 1851 and concluded that nearly half of the investors in
government issues held stock with a total nominal value of less than £334. This view is
confirmed by Roseveare who calculated that only 2 to 3 per cent of government
stockholders held balances of more than £10,000. He also noted the existence of an
important group of male investors, who owned 40 to 50 per cent of the total government
debt in balances of between £1,000 and £4,999. The present study also found evidence
that government stocks were held by some of the wealthiest socio-economic groups
amongst the CARD investors.
The market in government securities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
was made up of private individuals and later firms of brokers and jobbers. The
government did attempt to regulate it, but these attempts were largely ineffectual. In
spite of the appointment of a government broker in 1786 to carry out the redemption of
securities under Pitt's sinking fund arrangements, there was little government
interference in the market. As a consequence, the yield on government stocks reflected
the prevailing economic conditions.
4.4.1 Investment in Government Stock
There is evidence that investors in the CARD and BARD Databases were also
active investors in government stocks. A small sample of holders of 3 per cent Consols
for the period 1817 to 1827 was checked against investors in the CARD and BARD
DatabasesY Although only three ledgers were examined for stockholders with
surnames beginning with the letters 'G' or 'L', 25 accounts for investors in the CARD and
BARD Databases were identified. This suggests widespread investment in government
stocks amongst the CARD and BARD Database investors. The sample was very small,
but all the account holders were from the wealthier socio-economic groups. The average
size of the 25 holdings was £5,500, which is substantial. Half of the accounts were held
by bankers, such as Samuel Galton and his son Samuel Tertius. These accounts were
often held jointly with other bankers, for example, Samuel Galton held one account with
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Charles Lloyd, another Birmingham banker and a further account with Robert Barclay, a
London banker. 1 °° This suggests that government stocks may have been held as assets
in banking partnerships or by bankers in their capacity as trustees, although there is no
direct evidence for this. Rae's advice to country bankers unequivocally recommends
investment of surplus funds in Consols because they, 'stand unrivalled and alone in the
supreme quality of convertibility. They are the one security, which you can, with absolute
certainty, turn into cash at any hour of any business day in the worst throes of panic'.101
Three of the 25 accounts were held by women. The diversified holdings of
financial assets owned by Christiana Geast, a widow from Moseley, are discussed in
detail in Chapter 5.2.2. Geast maintained a holding of over £4,000 of Consols between
1818 and 1827.102 The probate value of her estate, excluding real property, was
£1 4,000.103 In Geast's case, her holding of Consols comprised about 30 per cent of her
total financial assets. The holdings by the wealthy Galton banking family accounted for a
much smaller proportion of their total net worth. Geast's investment strategy conforms to
the norm that government stock was the investment of choice for risk-averse widows
and orphans. Strategies to mitigate investment risk through techniques such as portfolio
diversification are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.2.
The liquidity of the deep market for government stocks was undoubtedly
attractive to financial investors as well as businessmen who might be required to sell
their holdings at short notice. In the present study, Consols were selected as the
exemplar of a risk-free government stock. Cotterell's view, already discussed above in
Section 4.2.2, that investment in government stock was predominantly a metropolitan
habit cannot be challenged on the basis of the restricted investigation of investment in
government stocks in the present study. 1 °4 Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest
that relatively affluent middle-class investors from urban provincial environments were
just as likely to invest in government stocks as their counterparts in London.
The market for canal and railway shares was also relatively liquid in comparison
to that for land or mortgages. Railway companies in particular were traded on a national
market and had large numbers of shares in issue. However, investment in canal and
railway companies represented a considerably greater risk than that in government
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stock. The relative risk of investment in canal and railway companies is examined below.
45 Investment in Canal and Railway Shares
Investment in a fledgling canal or railway company, particularly before
construction was completed, was potentially nsky. The present study attempted to
discover how and on what criteria the CARD Database investors could distinguish
between different levels of risk. It has already been established that these investors
eschewed illiquid, low yielding investments in land and mortgages. Were these prudent
rentiers dazzled by the potential rewards of high dividends and spiralling share prices?
The CARD Database of 5,913 investors was analysed to provide socio-economic
profiles of investors for each of the eleven canal and seven railway companies in the
study. A number of methods were explored for ranking the individual companies in terms
of the relative levels of risk. The study reviewed the propensity of investors from different
soclo-economic groups to hold shares in companies with varying levels of risk.
4.5.1 Measures of Risk
The yield of an investment is determined both by its income and capital value.
Throughout this work, yield is defined as the annual income stream divided by the price
at the time of measurement (the Current Share Price Yield). The amount and variability
of the Current Share Price Yield on a particular stock can be used as a measure of its
relative risk. However, since yield is defined both by the income stream and the price of
a stock, yield alone cannot be used to evaluate relative risk. For example, newly
established companies often pay low dividends or none at all, but the expectation of
future dividends may result in demand for their shares driving up the share price. These
companies are characterised by a high Price/Earnings (P/E) Ratio. 105 Generally
companies with a high P/E ratio are higher-risk investments. In contrast, companies with
a predictable cash flow but little growth potential are likely to have a low P/E ratio, a high
yield and.to be generally regarded as low-risk investments. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries investors were just as keen as current investors to gamble on
investments in high-risk companies. 105 Then as now, government stock was regarded as
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a low-risk investment. 101 Investors expect a higher yield or 'risk premium' when investing
in non-government stocks. The higher the perceived risk, the greater the required
premium over government stock yields to compensate for that risk.
The second measure of risk is the variability of the yield on an investment. This
variability must be measured in comparison to the volatility of the market as a whole, or
to a sector of the market. This measurement is often referred to the stock's beta. 108 A
high beta indicates that a stock is more volatile than the market and Low beta means the
converse. For example, in today's stock market, utility companies are characterised by a
reliable cash flow but have little potential for growth. They tend to have relatively low
leverage and thus perform better than the market in times of recession and worse in
booms. This means that their share price rises more slowly in a bull market and falls less
in bear conditions. Their low beta reflects their relatively low risk. In contrast, companies
such as modern technology stocks, which are the equivalent in many ways of the
eighteenth-century canal companies, are highly geared and produce little or no positive
cash flow. They may enjoy high share prices in boom times but are vulnerable to market
downturns. These stocks have high betas reflecting the riskiness of shareholder returns.
Calculation of beta is predicated on the construction of a reliable index of share prices
from which to measure the variability of a particular stock in comparison to the market.
An index has already been attempted for nineteenth-century railway shares,109
although no index of canal shares seems to have been completed. In the present study,
an index of yields on canal shares for the period 1811 to 1846 was calculated using data -
from the Course of the Exchange, as described below. However, the unreliability of the
underlying data invalidated the calculation of the betas of individual canal company
stocks. Although canal share prices were quoted on the London Stock Exchange from
1811, the prices recorded in the Course of the Exchange were based on thin markets
and the series is not complete. For example, discrepancies were discovered in the
timing of prices recorded in the Course of the Exchange and actual transfer prices
recorded in the books of two of the companies in the series. Recorded prices often
remained suspiciously unchanged for significant lengths of time suggesting that no
trades had taken place. In addition, there was no data at all for the period before 1811,
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since prices were only recorded in the Course of the Exchange after that date. As a
consequence, quantitative assessment of canal company risk using betas was not
attempted. Instead, several qualitative measures were used to assess the relative risk of
each stock.
The overall risk assessment for each canal company was derived from a
combination of yield and volatility data, together with a series of qualitative measures of
the construction and operating risks for each company. Share price data for the railway
companies were also incomplete, although they were probably more reliable than that
for the canal companies. The railway share price index of Gayer et al. was based on
annual averages and was not sufficiently sensitive for use in quantitative analysis using
betas. Analysis of various performance indicators for each of the railway companies
revealed a high degree of homogeneity and it proved impossible to differentiate levels of
risk among the group of railway companies.
4.5.2 Data Sources
In the present study, share price data for eleven West Midland canal companies
were collected for the years 1811 to 1846. Data for twelve West Midland railway
companies were collected, where applicable, for the years 1826 to 1846. All data for the
years 1819 and 1820 were missing. The data were taken from the Course of the
Exchange, which records bona fide bargains made by members of the Stock
Exchange. 11 ° By 1811 it was published by James Wettenhall, 'by authority of the Stock
Exchange Committee'. 111 The recorded prices are those for current settlement, since the
Course of the Exchange did not publish prices of bargains made for time. 112 The price of
each of the eleven canal and twelve railway companies' shares were extracted on a
monthly basis from the edition of the Course of the Exchange published on the day
nearest to the middle of the month. 113 Values for months when no price was recorded
were left blank and not interpolated. The annual dividend rate was taken from the edition
of the Course of the Exchange selected for the month of March.
Previous research on eighteenth- and early- to mid-nineteenth-century stock
prices has used the Course of the Exchange as the source for share price dataY'4
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However, this earlier research, with the exception of Gayer et al.'s railway share price
index, analysed the behaviour of government and quasi-government stocks rather than
that of joint stock companies. Whilst the Course of the Exchange may probably be
regarded as a reasonably reliable source for data on prices of these stocks, or even that
of railway companies, where there was a relatively deep and active market, less reliance
can be placed on the quotes for shares of canal companies. Five of the canal companies
examined in the present research had less than one thousand shares in issue. The
majority of these canal shares appear to have been traded in the local market rather
than on the London Stock Exchange. The prices quoted for in the Course of the
Exchange may not therefore accurately reflect the market price of the shares. For some
companies, the same fixed price is quoted for long periods of time. For example, a
constant price of £800 per share is quoted for the Coventry Canal for the twelve months
between March 1813 and February 1814. In other instances, there are no quotes at all
for several months at a time. In order to check the accuracy of the quotes in the Course
of the Exchange, share prices for two of the canal companies were compared with the
actual prices of share transfers, which had been recorded in the books of those
companies.
There are continuous records of share transfers in the archives of the
Stourbridge Navigation for the years 1776 to 1827,115 and the BCN archive for the period
1768 to 1824.116 Three hundred separate share transactions were analysed for the
Stourbridge Navigation and 887 for the BCN. The Dudley Canal has a less complete
record covering 45 shares transferred between 1776 and 1779117 The transfer share
prices in the books of the companies were screened to remove all sales of stock at
nominal value. These prices were generally in relation to transfers on death by trustees
to legatees. The BCN share prices were adjusted to take into account scrip issues. All
share transfers had to be registered by the company concerned. In the present study,
the transfer information was extracted from bound ledgers or numbered transfer deeds,
providing a complete series for the periods examined. The transfer deeds had to be
signed by the parties to the transfer in the presence of officers of the company. Apart
from the administrative constraints of gathering the parties to the transaction together to
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sign the papers, there cannot appear to have been any advantage to delaying the formal
transfer process. There is no evidence to suggest that transfers were entered on the
ledgers at the next accounting dates or dates of meetings of the committee or assembly.
The date of transfer in the books of the company was thus assumed to be close to the
date the shares were sold. The share prices obtained from the Course of the Exchange
and the Stourbridge Navigation Transfer Ledger were plotted on Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Stourbridge Navigation Transfer Prices of Shares versus Course of
Exchange Prices
Source: Ledger price extracted from the Share Transfer Ledger.119
Course of Exchange Prices extracted from Course of the Exchange
nearest day to the middle of the month.
Figure 4.1 shows that although the prices quoted in the Course of the Exchange follow
the same cycle as those recorded by the company, they lag the price of the actual share
transfers by approximately twelve months. The lack of information in London about the
Stourbridge shares may be explained by the fact there were only 300 such shares in
issue. Analysis of shareholdings of the Stourbridge Navigation in 1809 indicates that
only 16 of these (5 per cent) were held by shareholders based in London.12° In contrast,
Figure 4.2 shows that the BCN share prices taken from the Course of the Exchange are
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closely correlated with those recorded in the company's own transfer ledger. This
suggests that information about the BCN was readily available in London. In Figures 4.1
and 4.2 the large gaps in the Course of the Exchange prices shows the poor quality of
the series reported in this source.
Figure 4. 2: BCN Transfer Prices of Shares versus Course of Exchange Prices
200 L__
1810
	
1815	 1820	 1825	 1830
Company Ledger
	 Course of Exchange Price
Source: Course of Exchange Prices extracted from Course of the
Exchange nearest day to the middle of the month. BCN share prices
from Memorandum of Income and Expenditure.121
Analysis of the BCN shareholdings in 1840 shows that fewer than 8 per cent of
the shares were held by Londoners. 1
 Assuming that London-based investors were
more likely to use London brokers to sell their shares, rather than seeking buyers in the
local Birmingham market, approximately 640 BCN shares were potentially available to
be traded in London. In general, however, share turn-over was low and in 1828, the last
year for which BCN company records exist, only six shares in total changed hands.
In the case of the BCN, the Course of the Exchange appears to have given an
accurate record of share prices. The disparity between Stourbridge share prices
recorded in the company books and those recorded in the Course of the Exchange casts
some doubt on the accuracy of price data taken from the Course of the Exchange for the
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remaining nine canal companies. Unlike the Stourbndge Navigation, however, all the
other companies for which data were available had larger issued share capitals of
between 500 and 11,500 shares. Inspection of the data confirms that the market in the
shares was very thin, with the possible exception of Grand Junction canal shares. This is
evidenced by the gaps in the series and the tendency for share prices to remain
constant over long periods of time. For example, the share price of the Coventry Canal
remained constant at £730 between January and December 1832. Although this was a
year with little price movement, the more actively traded Grand Junction Canal did show
evidence of some fluctuation between a high of £232.50 and a low of £224 over the
same period.
There were no railway company share transfer records against which to check
the accuracy of prices recorded in the Course of the Exchange. However, railway share
prices were probably more reliable than those for the canal companies as there were
more shares available for trading. With the exception of the Cheltenham Railway
Company, all the railway companies in the study had at least 5,000 shares in issue, up
to 25,000 in the case of both the London & Birmingham and the Great Western Railway.
In addition, railway company shares were actively traded on the London Stock
Exchange. Examination of the Course of the Exchange revealed a number of prices
recorded each month for each of the most actively traded railway companies.
An index of the relative investment risk of each of the eleven canal companies
and the group of seven railway companies for which investor information was available
was calculated using the share prices data and other measures. This study then
compared the propensity of investors with different socio-economic backgrounds to take
different levels of risk.
4.5.3 Investment Risk of Canal Shares
The share price and dividend data from the eleven canal companies were used
to construct an index of the yield on canal company shares over the period 1814 to
1846. The index is set out in Table I of Appendix II. The index was weighted by the
amount of nominal share capital in issue in 1834 to take account of the relative size of
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each of the companies. The Grand Junction Canal Company contributed 38 per cent of
the weighting. The weighting of each of the canal shares is given in Table 2 of Appendix
II. The canal index of yields was compared to the yield on Consols for the period 1814 to
1846 in order to determine whether the canal stocks exhibited a premium over the risk-
free rate of government stocks. The result of this analysis is given in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Canal Index Yield versus Consols Yield
Source: Monthly canal share price and annual dividend from Course of
the Exchange, Gulldhall Library. Consols quarterly prices from Weller
and MirowskL123
Figure 4.3 reveals that the yield on canal stocks only starts to diverge markedly from
Consols in the late I 820s. At this point, canal companies were starting to feel the effects
of competition with railways. Investors were probably not expecting much growth in
future earnings, perhaps even the reverse. As a consequence, the share price declined,
although dividends remained relatively high. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
there was no corporate taxation to distort the distribution policy of companies. It was
customary to distribute nearly all the surplus cash generated in a year rather than retain
it in the business. There was also no distinction between capital and revenue
expenditure. 124 In the period after 1820, canal companies still had surplus cash since the
rate of new building or improvement was much reduced. The canal companies were
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also, in many cases, scaling down their maintenance expenditure. Although tolls were
reduced, there was still surplus income for distribution to shareholders. This meant that
even when the canals were under strong competition, dividends were maintained at a
high level, as can be seen from Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Canal Company Dividends - Five year Average (In per cent per annum
on the nominal value of the shares)
U)	 0	 U)	 0	 U)	 0	 U)('1	 C')	 C')	 Cl)
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CD
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
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cc	 cc	 cc	 cc	 cc	 cc	 cc
Birmingham Canal 	 27.5	 36.0 47.0 50.0 50.0 40.8 40.0 41.6
Navigations
Coventry	 40.0 44.0 44.0 44.0 40.6 45.4 24.0 40.3
Staffordshire &
	
44.0 38.7 40.0 39.6 34.8 38.4 32.8 38.3
Worcestershire Canal
Warwick& Birmingham	 13.3	 11.5	 8.3	 11.6	 13.2	 15.8	 11.8	 12.2
Stourbridge Navigation 	 12.3	 15.0	 8.3	 13.0	 8.8	 9.2	 17.8	 12.1
Warwick& Napton	 13.7	 9.3	 8.0	 11.7	 11.6	 13.0	 9.8	 11.0
Grand Junction canal 	 7.0	 6.0	 9.5	 13.2	 12.4	 11.4 7.2
	
9.5
Dudley	 2.0	 1.3	 3.0	 3.9	 2.8	 4.0	 5.0	 3.1
Worcester & Birmingham	 0.0	 0.0	 0.3	 2.0	 3.6	 3.9	 4.0	 2.0
Canal
Stratford upon Avon Canal
	
0.0	 0.0	 0.3	 1.2	 1.4	 1.9	 1.7	 0.9
Birmingham & Liverpool	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 2.0	 0.3
Junction
Source: Dividends from Course of the Exchange as recorded in the
edition for the day in March nearest to the middle of the month.
Table 4.5 shows that for most of the companies dividends were declining slowly by 1841
to 1845. Whereas in modern stock markets, as risk increases, companies are under
pressure to maintain or increase dividends to bolster flagging stock prices and retain
shareholders, this seems not to be the case in for the companies in the present study.
Share prices did remain relatively high, but this was probably more attributable to
contemporary income distribution practices rather than the result of a conscious effort by
the company directors.
As discussed above, the quality of the share price data from the Course of the
Exchange was not considered to be adequate to make any quantitative assessment on
the relative risk of each canal company based on either the absolute or relative
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variability of yields from that of the canal yield index. In order to differentiate the risk
level of each canal company various qualitative measures were used. Qualitative risk
assessment needs to take into account both construction and operating risks. Since the
present study is confined to investors who were shareholders after the company had
obtained its parliamentary consents, the risks incurred by speculators in scrip are not
considered here.
4.5.3.1 Evaluation of Construction Risk
The main risks for investors during the construction period are those of failure to
complete the project and cost over-runs. All eleven canal companies suffered from over-
optimistic cost estimates and the initial amounts of share capital were insufficient to
complete construction. Companies used different methods to overcome this problem.
The Coventry Canal Company and Stratford-upon-Avon Canal Company decided to
curtail construction and only open sections of the proposed line. 1 Others, like the BCN,
raised additional money through borrowing, 1 or like the Grand Junction Canal
Company, through issuing additional share capital.IV The Stourbridge Canal made
additional calls on the existing shareholders. 126 Depending on the drafting of the original
Act of incorporation, the companies often had to reapply to Parliament for powers to
raise this additional finance. The risks to the investor during the construction period were
that the value of their shareholding could be diluted by the issue of new shares; existing
shareholders might be required to invest more money, or risk forfeiture of their shares. In
a worst case scenario, the project might be abandoned and the shares become
completely worthless. Although the risk of unlimited liability was tested in the courts and
found to be unlawful, additional calls could be made with the consent of the
shareholders under parliamentary approval.1
Construction periods were generally lengthy, not only as a result of technical
problems but because finance was usually inadequate and it was sometimes very
difficult to raise additional money in adverse economic conditions. 13° The canals
authorised during the 'mania' of 1792-3 typically fell foul of the recession during the
Napoleonic Wars and considerable time passed before they were completed. The Grand
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Junction Canal was an example. Approved in 1793, it was finally completed in 1815,
after successive Acts authorised the raising of new tranches of finance. An issue of half
shares was approved in 1796; loan notes, which were convertible in shares, were
approved in 1801 and 1803; further new shares were issued in 1803 and 1811, and
further loan notes in 18045.131
In order to compare the risks of each of the canal companies during the
construction period, two measures were devised. The degree of risk was assessed by
the length of time required to complete the canal and the amount of extra finance
required over the original share capital. The eleven canal companies were ranked by the
mileage completed per year as a measure of the time taken to complete the project and
the total duration of the construction period. The difference, in per cent, between the
fina' construction cost and the initial share capital, was used to measure the degree of
underfunding of the project. These risk factors are ranked in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Ranking of Canal Companies in Terms of Construction Risk
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Staffordshire &	 1766	 6	 7.69	 40	 2	 2	 4	 2.7
Worcestershire
BCN - Birmingham to
	 1768	 4	 5.66	 60	 3	 4	 2	 3.0
Aldersley
Stourbridge Navigation	 1776	 3	 2.38	 43	 7	 3	 1	 3.7
Warwick & Napton	 1794	 6	 2.50	 0	 6	 1	 4	 3.7
Birmingham & Liverpool	 1826	 9	 4.39	 100	 4	 6	 7	 5.7
Junction
Warwick & Birmingham	 1793	 7	 3.23	 131	 5	 7	 6	 6.0
Grand Junction	 1793	 12	 7.79	 260	 1	 10	 8	 6.3
Coventry	 1768	 22	 1.48	 75	 8	 5	 9	 7.3
Stratford upon Avon	 1793	 23	 1.13	 150	 10	 8	 11	 9.7
Worcester& Birmingham	 1791	 24	 1.27	 239	 9	 9	 12	 10.0
Dudley	 1776	 22	 0.73	 2,848	 11	 11	 9	 10.3
Source: Share capital taken from Course of the Exchange. Mileage and
dates authorised and completed from Ward, Hadfield and Phillips. 132
On the basis of the results of the analysis set out in Table 4.6 the eleven canals were
grouped into three levels of risk. Low-risk canals were those with a combined risk rating
of below 4, medium risk canals were those with a risk rating of 5.7 to 7.3 and high-risk
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canals were those with a risk rating of 9.7 to 10.3.
4.5.3.2 Evaluation of Operating Risk
Operating period risks are those, which reduce revenue or increase, cost. Such
risks include technical problems, such as lack of water, competition, litigation, over-
estimation of volume of traffic or mispricing of tolls. In an environment where additional
finance was often in the form of revolving short-term credit from banks, there was also
the additional financing risk that the lender, for reasons relating to its own liquidity
problems, might require repayment on demand. This was more likely to take place in
periods of economic downturn where obtaining alternative forms of finance was difficult.
Some of these operating risks were specific to particular canals; others relate to the
changing economic environment. For example, there was continuous competition
between the Warwick & Birmingham canal and the BCN. In 1816, the BCN reduced the
tolls on the transport of iron by almost half. The Warwick & Birmingham immediately lost
all its iron traffic and had to institute a system of rebates on both iron and salt traffic.1
The Warwick canals also suffered from early competition with the railways, particularly
the opening of the London & Birmingham railway, which caused tolls on the Warwick &
Napton canal to be reduced by two-thirds by 1844. Reduced profitability caused their
bankers to refuse the company an overdraft to pay the dividends in I 845. Technical
problems were also an operating risk. For example, the Dudley canal suffered from
mining subsidence in the Lappal tunnel and from traffic congestion in the Dudley
tunnel.1
It is difficult to find meaningful measures by which to rank the relative operating
risk of individual canal companies. Since canal companies tended to distribute nearly all
surplus income in the form of a dividend, the level of annual dividends is probably the
most accurate indicator of a company's performance. Companies paying consistently
high dividends would have been regarded by contemporary investors as lower risk
investments than those paying low dividends. The dividend was also arguably the most
important criterion for investors. The average dividends paid between 1813 and 1845
are shown in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Ranking of Canal Companies in Terms of Operating Risk (Based on
dividends paid in per cent p.a. on the nominal value of the shares)
Average Ranking
Birmingham Canal Navigations	 41.6	 1
Coventry	 40.3	 2
Staffordshire & Worcestershire	 38.3	 3
Warwick & Birmingham	 12.2	 4
Stourbridge Navigation	 12.1	 5
Warwick&Napton	 11.0	 6
Grand Junction	 9.5	 7
Dudley	 3.1	 8
Worcester & Birmingham	 2.0	 9
Stratford upon Avon	 0.9	 10
Birmingham & Liverpool Junction	 0.3	 11
Source: Annual dividends from Course of the Exchange, 1811 - 1845,
excluding 1819 and 1820.
Interestingly, the ranking shown in Table 4.7 largely mirrors the ranking of risk for the
construction period. The canals with low risk during the operating period were the BCN,
the Coventry and the Staffordshire & Worcestershire canal, which all averaged dividends
of over 30 per cent during the period. The medium risk canals averaged dividends of 9
to 13 per cent and comprised the Warwick & Napton, the Warwick & Birmingham, the
Stourbridge Navigation and the Grand Junction. The high-risk canals were the
Worcester & Birmingham, the Stratford upon Avon and the Dudley. The combined
results of the risk assessment are set out in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Combined Risk Assessment of Canal Companies
Construction Risk Operating Risk Combined Risk
Birmingham Canal Navigations 	 L	 L	 L
Staffordshire & Worcestershire	 L	 L	 L
Stourbridge Navigation 	 L	 M	 L
Warwick & Napton 	 L	 M	 L
Coventry	 M	 L	 L
Grand Junction	 M	 M	 M
Warwick & Birmingham	 M	 M	 M
Birmingham & Liverpool Junction 	 M	 H	 M
Dudley	 H	 H	 H
Stratford uponAvon	 H	 H	 H
Worcester & Birmingham	 H	 H	 H
Source: Ranking taken from Tables 4.6 and 4.7 above.
The combined ranking of risk in both the construction and operating period was
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used to allocate a risk rating to each of the eleven canal companies. The Dudley,
Stratford and Worcester & Birmingham canals were classified as high risk. The
Stourbridge, Warwick & Napton and Grand Junction canal together with the BCN and
the Staffordshire and Worcestershire were classified as low risk. The remaining canals
were placed in the medium risk group.
4.5.3.3 Canal Investor Behaviour in Different Risk Scenarios
The CARD Database of 2,980 canal investors who held shares in the eleven
West Midland canal companies was used to establish whether different socio-economic
groups had differing propensities to take risk. Previous research has distinguished
between 'economic' and 'financial' investors. 1 Financial investors expect a return purely
from the investment itself, whereas economic investors expect an additional benefit to
their businesses from the project. Given these distinctions, financial investors might be
expected to make their choice purely on their evaluation of the riskl return of the
investment. The Manufacturing, Merchant and Trade related categories of the socio-
economic classification used in the present study are prima fade economic investors.
The Landed, Rentier, Clergy, Professional and Woman categories are more likely to be
financial investors. It is likely, however, that some individuals in the economic investor
group would have made their investment decisions on the same basis as the financial
investors. The socio-economic profile of investors in each of the eleven canal companies
was analysed and each group's ownership of shares was categorised into high, medium
or low risk in accordance with the risk assessment set out in Table 4.8. The risk profile of
investors during the construction period was examined first. Table 4.9 shows the number
of investors in each socio-economic group holding shares during the construction period
for each of the companies in each of the risk categories. The Table includes the number
and percentage of investors in each socio-economic category.
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Table 4.9: Risk Characteristics of Soclo-economic Groups of Canal Company
Investors - Construction Period
	Low	 Medium	 High Total Construction Period
Number of Investors
Landed	 33	 82	 12	 129
Rentiers	 87	 380	 103	 551
Clergy	 17	 181	 7	 181
Professional and Bankers	 26	 98	 24	 144
Manufacturers	 46	 25	 22	 110
Merchants	 35	 10	 31	 92
Artisans and Shopkeepers
	 30	 32	 45	 118
Women	 32	 56	 28	 116
Total	 305	 864	 272	 1,441
% of Total Investors
Landed	 11	 10	 4	 9
Rentiers	 28	 44	 38	 38
Clergy	 5	 21	 3	 13
Professional and Bankers	 8	 11	 9	 10
Manufacturers	 15	 3	 8	 8
Merchants	 11	 1	 11	 6
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 10	 4	 17	 8
Women	 10	 6	 10	 8
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Data from eleven canal companies, in 14 different periods, from
CARD Database. Allocation of low, medium and high risk in accordance
with analysis in Table 4.8.
Table 4.9 shows that amongst the financial investors the Clergy and the Landed were
the only significantly risk-averse groups during the construction period. Only 3 per cent
of the investors in the highest risk companies were Clergy, compared to an average of
13 per cent across the whole of the company risk profiles during the construction period.
Similarly, the Landed group exhibited some tendency towards avoiding high-risk
companies. Conversely, amongst the economic investors, the Merchant and Artisan and
Shopkeeper groups appeared to have been risk seekers. Manufacturers, Merchants and
Shopkeepers and Artisans were more likely to be aware of commercial and economic
risks. These investors had their own businesses and were attuned to the economic
conditions prevailing in the local and national environment. These groups would have
been in the best position to evaluate these risks and make informed decisions. The
financial investors may have been equally well aware of the commercial environment but
might be expected to be less well equipped to evaluate risk and make informed
decisions. Interestingly, the analysis shows that Women, who are regarded as financial
102
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
investors tended to exhibit behaviour consistent with that of the economic investor
group.
In order to examine these trends more closely, the analysis was normalised to
take into account the differing number of investors in each of the risk categories. The
analysis was then ranked in order of the propensity of investors to take risk. The
methodology of this analysis is described in more detail in Appendix I. The results of the
analysis are set out in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Normalised Propensity of Canal Investors to Take Risk in Each Social
Group - Construction Period
Company Risk Category	 Combined Risk Propensity
	
Low Medium	 High
Clergy	 0.38	 1.47	 0.19	 3.89
Landed	 1.23	 1.08	 0.50	 4.87
Professional and bankers	 0.82	 1.11	 0.86	 5.61
Rentiers	 0.72	 1.11	 0.96	 5.81
Women	 1.30	 0.81	 1.28	 6.75
Manufacturers	 2.34	 0.45	 1.23	 6.93
Artisans and shopkeepers 	 1.31	 0.50	 2.26	 9.07
Merchants	 2.19	 0.21	 2.18	 9.14
Source: Data from eleven canal companies, in 14 different years, from
CARD Database. Allocation of/ow, medium and high risk in accordance
with analysis in Table 4.8. Methodology used to normailse the data and
rank the propensity to fake risk is described in Appendix I.
The analysis set out in Table 4.10 confirms that Clergy were highly reluctant to invest in
high-risk companies. This aversion to risk was shared with other financial investors in
the Landed, Professional and Rentier groups. Women are an anomaly in this analysis as
they exhibit an equal propensity to invest in high-risk and low-risk companies. The
economic categories of investors all rank higher than the financial investors in terms of
their propensity to take construction period risk.
The data for the operating periods for the eleven canal companies were
analysed in the same way to determine whether investors took a different view of
operating period risks. The data used to analyse the construction periods, with the
exception of that relating to the Birmingham & Liverpool Canal, are all from the last four
decades of the eighteenth century. The operating periods of the eleven companies
covers a much wider and later time period. Differences in the risk preferences of
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investors between the construction and operating periods may thus reflect to some
extent secular changes in soclo-economic conditions. Table 4.11 shows the number of
investors holding shares during the operating period for each of the companies in each
of the risk categories. The Table includes the number and percentage of investors in
each socio-economic category.
Table 4.11: Risk Characteristics of Socio-economic Groups of Canal Company
Investors - Operating Period
Company Risk Category
Number of Investors	 Low	 Medium	 High	 Total
Landed	 82	 20	 19	 122
Rentiers	 177	 120	 26	 323
Clergy	 84	 110	 14	 208
Professional and Bankers	 101	 67	 23	 191
Manufacturers	 48	 53	 9	 110
Merchants	 36	 27	 7	 70
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 41	 57	 4	 101
Women	 220	 185	 8	 413
Total	 790	 639	 110	 1,539
% of Total Investors
Landed	 10	 3	 18	 8
Rentiers	 22	 19	 24	 21
Clergy	 11	 17	 13	 14
Professional and Bankers	 13	 10	 21	 12
Manufacturers	 6	 8	 8	 7
Merchants	 5	 4	 6	 5
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 5	 9	 3	 7
Women	 28	 29	 7	 27
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Data from six canal companies, in 17 different years, from
CARD Database. Allocation of/ow, medium and high risk in accordance
with analysis in Table 4.8.
Table 4.11 shows markedly different investor behaviour in the operating period from that
during the construction period. Financial investors appear to have thrown caution to the
winds and exhibited risk-seeking behaviour, whilst the economic investors appear to
have become more conservative. Women in particular appear to have been highly risk
averse during the operating period. The indicator used to differentiate risk during the
operating period was dividend distribution. Low dividends indicated poor performance
and higher risk. Financial investors who relied on income might be expected to seek low-
risk investments, which paid a good return. This behaviour was further examined by
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normalising and ranking the data in terms of propensity to take risk. The methodology
used is described in Appendix I.
Table 4.12: Normalised Propensity of Canal Investors to Take Risk by Social
Group - Operating Period
Company Risk Category 	 Combined Risk Propensiy_
Low Medium	 High
Women	 1.04	 1.08	 0.27	 4.01
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 0.79	 1.35	 0.48	 4.94
Clergy	 0.79	 1.27	 0.94	 6.17
Rentiers	 1.07	 0.90	 1.14	 6.28
Manufacturers	 0.85	 1.17	 1.12	 6.53
Merchants	 1.01	 0.92	 1.41	 7.08
Professional and Bankers	 1.03	 0.84	 1.68	 7.74
Landed	 1.32	 0.40	 2.22	 8.78
Source: Data from eleven canal companies, in 17 different years, from
CARD Database. Allocation of low, medium and high risk in accordance
with analysis in Table 4.8. Methodology used to normalise the data and
rank the propensity to fake risk is described in Appendix I.
The ranking of the risk propensity of investors during the operating period reveals a less
clear cut differentiation of the behaviour of financial and economic investors. The
combined risk rating covers a smaller range than that of the construction period. This is
not surprising since once a canal was operating the overall level of risk was greatly
reduced. Women were confirmed as the most risk-averse group during the operating
period, with Artisans and Shopkeepers, Clergy and Rentiers also avoiding risk and
seeking higher yielding investments. Women, Clergy and Rentiers undoubtedly relied
more heavily on the income from their investments than Manufacturers, Merchants or
the Landed groups. Professionals appear to be an anomaly since although they would
have been reliant on their earned income, it was less reliable than the profits from a
family manufacturing or trading enterprise. Professionals might be expected to have
sought a low-risk, high-return investment.
The risk-seeking preference of the Landed group is somewhat surprising. A
possible explanation is that this group derived most of its income from land. Investment
in the canal companies was very peripheral to their main activities and expertise. In
addition, the Landed group may well have acquired shares as an inducement to support
the parliamentary approval process. There is some evidence that this group tended to
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dispose of their shares more quickly than other shareholders. For example, the Warwick
& Birmingham Canal Company allotted 134 shares to 53 landowners at the first General
Meeting in I 793137 After five years only 24 (45 per cent) of these landowners remained
on the register whereas, a total of 139 investors, 58 per cent of the original subscribers,
still remained shareholders in 1798. This suggests that Landed shareholders were
inclined not to retain shares for their future income potential but disposed of them as
soon as they could make a capital gain.
The distinction between the behaviour of financial and economic investors is
shown graphically in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Change in Risk Propensity of Investors
Financial Investors
	 Economic Investors
Source: Data from eleven canal companies, in 31 different years, from
CARD Database. Allocation of/ow, medium and high risk in accordance
with analysis in Table 4.6. Methodology used to normalise the data and
rank the propensity to take risk is described in Appendix I.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the difference in behaviour of financial and economic investors.
Investors in the Landed, Rentiers, Clergy and Professional groups are all risk averse in
the construction period and become less so in the operating period. The converse is true
of the economic investors. Interestingly, Women exhibit the same behaviour as
economic investors although they are generally regarded as financial investors. This
behaviour may be evidence that they were advised by male relatives from the economic
investor groups. However, as is discussed in Chapter 7.5.1, a significant number of
106
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
female investors were related to members of the Rentier, Professional and Banker
groups. The most reasonable explanation is that Women, more than any other group
were attracted by the potential for high yields since they were more likely than men to be
reliant upon the income from assets which might be held in trust for them. 1 This
preference manifested itself in the selection of high-risk investments with the potential
for capital growth during the construction period and low-risk investments, which
exhibited high dividends and often high capital growth, during the operating period. This
analysis shows interesting changes in attitudes to risk in the different soclo-economic
groups. However, the quality of the data and the semi-qualitative nature of the analysis
means that the conclusions cannot be subjected to the robust statistical tests which
might validate the findings.
4.5.4 Investment Risk of Railway Shares
The market for railway shares in the mid-nineteenth century was deeper than
that for canal company shares both in the number of shares and the number of buyers
and sellers. Nevertheless, attempts to apply quantitative methods to define the relative
level of risk were again found to be inapplicable. Share price data were available for 12
companies operating in the West Midlands in comparison to the 7 companies included in
the CARD Database for which investor information was available. The companies for
which share price data were available are listed in Table 2 in Appendix I.
Data series were collected for share prices of twelve companies, between 1826
and 1846 in the same way as that described for canal companies. The first quoted
railway share in the sample of twelve companies was that of the Liverpool & Manchester
Railway. 1 Both this company and the Cheltenham Railway were regularly quoted in the
Course of the Exchange from 1827, although it was not until 1833 that the London &
Birmingham and the Grand Junction were quoted. The Great Western Railway was first
quoted in 1834. Quotes for most companies are patchy until 1840. Thus there is only an
incomplete series for each of the twelve companies. Although Gayer et al. have
constructed an index of railway share prices, the data series for the above twelve
companies in the present study were not sufficiently comprehensive to allow the
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calculation of beta as a measure of risk of an individual stock. An attempt was made to
quantify the degree of variability of an individual railway share price from a price
predicted for the stock by contemporary commentators. This is intended to give an
indication of how contemporary investors viewed the risk of railway companies.
Scrivenor, commenting in 1849 on contemporary attitudes to railway investment
suggests that railways provide, 'a safe permanent investment for British capitalists,..
offering an haven of safety where the hard savings won by the sons of toil, by their
patient and enduring exertions, may rest in security, and yield to them at the same time
a reasonable return'. 14° This view was also held by 'A Successful Operator', writing in
1846. The author distinguishes three types of railway investment, namely, applications
for original shares in newly projected lines, purchase of shares or scrip in lines projected
or under construction and purchases of shares in lines already established. Each of
these categories is distinguished by different levels of investment risk and return
'notwithstanding the thousands which have been lost by the follies and deceptions of the
last twelve months [of 1846], investments may be made with advantage ... even in the
first two classes; but it is the third class, as the safest and most eligible'. 141
 Only
investors in that third category, namely lines under construction and already completed,
are included in the present study. The 'Successful Operator' maintained that investors
were primarily interested in the reliability of a return in excess of that from government
stocks and that railway dividends were more reliably maintained at higher levels than the
return on Funds. The 'Successful Operator' used the rate of railway dividends in
comparison to the Consols benchmark to derive a value for railway shares. This
calculation assumed the value of money to be equal to a return on Consols of 4 per cent
on the market value of the stock. On this basis, a railway share paying 4 per cent wou'd
be valued at par, whereas stocks paying 6 per cent would have a market value of £150.
Shares trading above or below their predicted price may be affected by expectations of
better or worse performance as a result of imperfections in the transfer of information
about the company. The 'Successful Operator's' method of valuation was applied to four
of the most actively traded railway stocks. Figure 4.5 shows the percentage deviation of
the actual from the projected market price of these companies.
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Figure 4.5: Percentage Deviation of Actual Price from Predicted Price at 4 per cent
Yield
Source: Market value of railway shares are mid-December prices. Prices
and annual dividend extracted from The Course of The Exchange, Gulldhall
Library. Predicted prices were calculated in accordance with assumptions
of The Successful Operator. 142 Annual yield 4 per cent equals valuation at
par. Percentage deviation from the Predicted Price compared to the Actual
Price plotted on x axis.
Figure 4.5 reveals that for the period up to 1845, the price of the stocks, with the
exception of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway, was below that predicted from the
level of dividend paid. This suggests that investors were discounting the current dividend
performance, perhaps because they believed it would not be sustained. This may
indicate that they considered railways to be relatively high-risk investments during that
period. In 1844-5, this view was replaced by an expectation of higher earnings and the
price of stocks rose as demand increased. 1844 was a year of railway mania as
investors in new lines sought to emulate the success of earlier authorised lines, many of
which were now completed and earning reasonable returns. Mania is generally applied
to the rush of investments in new lines. These were a 'source of loss and misery' to
many over the last six months of 1846.1 In 1845 there was a period of prosperity,
capital was in surplus and new investment opportunities were eagerly sought. Shares in
new schemes sold for more than those in completed lines. Figure 4.5 clearly shows,
however, that the share price of existing railway companies was also affected. The
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'Successful Operator hinted at insider dealing, not then illegal, where a buyer may 'have
some intelligent friend by whose information he will be guided or whose connection with
a particular line enables him to recommend it with confidence'. Even lines paying little or
no dividend might be a good investment if the reasons for the depressed price were
known, but 'such investments would be dangerous ground for the inexperienced
speculator'. Figure 4.5 indicates that in 1844-5 alL of the four companies became more
risky investments as the lower than predicted price was superseded by a price widely in
excess of the predicted price. It is difficult, however, to use this analysis to attribute
relative degrees of risk to the four companies. Both in the view of contemporary
commentators and in their actual behaviour, railway stocks appear to be a homogenous
group.
Earlier research has used an index of railway stock returns compared to risk-
free government stocks to establish the premium or discount associated with investing in
railways. An index of the railroad stocks quoted on the Boston Stock Exchange from
1835 to 1897 was compared to US government stocks and Massachusetts and New
England municipal securities. 1 This showed the average weighted mean return on
railway stock, including dividends, was 6 per cent, ranging from a low of minus 9 per
cent to high of 35 per cent. 1 These returns were on the whole less than that achieved
on the risk-free investments. Low yields on railway stock also pertained in the early
years of trading on the London Stock Exchange, although yields rose above that of
Consols in 1844-5, as can be seen from Figure 4.5.
Railway investments were subject to a greater degree of contemporary
commentary than those in canals and a measure of relative risk can be derived from this
source. Contemporary opinion regarded railway stocks as low-risk investments. 'One of
the Initiated,' writing in 1845, noted that 'railway investment has become a lottery. .in
which the chances are reversed, the prizes exceeding the blanks in number by as much
as the latter are usually more numerous than the former'. 1 The author goes on to list 87
English railway companies, which were in favour on the Stock Exchange. These lines
included a number of companies in the present study: the Birmingham & Gloucester, the
Birmingham & Oxford Junction, the Grand Junction, the Great Western, the London &
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Birmingham, and the Manchester & Birmingham. It is likely that these companies were
regarded as particularly low risk. Whitefield, writing in 1849, took an extreme view of the
reliability of railway investment. He argued that railway stocks offered a better
investment than government stock. 147
 This is echoed by Cochrane writing in 1846 that
'no wars with foreign countries can affect.. [the price of railway stock] in the same
manner they do the funded debt'. Whitefield based his opinion on the level and
reliability of railway dividends. Nevertheless, railway dividends were generally at a
consistently lower level than that of the canal companies. Chattaway, writing in 1856,
compiled a list of 95 railway companies, of which 15 declared no dividend and the
remainder declared dividends of between I and 10.5 per cent. 1 The declared annual
dividends of the railway companies in the present study are given in Table 4.13.
Table 4.13: Railway Company Dividends Paid - Five-Year Averages (In per cent per
annum)
1832-5 1836-40 1841-5
Birmingham and Oxford Junction 	 n.a.	 n.a.	 0
Birmingham & Derby Junction 	 n.a.	 0	 2.1
Birmingham & Gloucester*	 n.a.	 0	 2.3
Birmingham, Bristol and Thames Junction	 n.a.	 0	 n.a.
Cheltenham	 0	 n.a.	 n.a.
Cheltenham and Great Westem*	 n.a..	 0	 2.5
Grand Junction*	 0	 12.0	 10.2
Great Western*	 n.a.	 0	 3.4
Liverpool & Manchester	 8.7	 9.5	 8.9
London & Birmingham	 0	 8	 8.5
Manchester & Birmingharn* 	 n.a.	 0	 1.0
Oxford &Worcester	 n.a.	 n.a.	 0
Source: Course of the Exchange. Companies marked with
analysed in the CARD Database.
Table 4.13 shows that dividends were lower than those for most of the canal companies
analysed in Table 4.7. Premiums also tended to be less than those of the canal
companies. Cochrane notes that on 27 July 1846, 93 out of 160 railroad stocks quoted
on the London Stock Exchange were at an average premium of 20 per cent.15°
The present research confirms the perception held by contemporary
commentators that railway companies operating completed lines were, as a group,
regarded as low-risk investments. They were a much more homogenous group than that
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of the canal companies and consequently, the present study does not attempt to
differentiate between them in terms of investment risk. The study does, however,
compare the investment risk of the group of seven railway stocks to that of canal
companies and other investments.
4.5.5 Relative Risk of Canal and Railway Company Investment
For almost sixty years, from the I 770s to the I 830s, canal companies were the
most significant private sector investment opportunity available to investors. As shown in
Table 6.2 in Chapter 6, canals accounted for £12.2 million of a total of £33.1 mflhion of
paid up capital of joint stock companies established prior to 1824. As has been
discussed, they raised the majority of their capital from investors in local markets. These
investors appear to have been able to discriminate between high- and low-risk
investments. From the I 830s, railway company stock became increasingly available. As
Table 6.3 in Chapter 6 shows, by 1842, railway companies accounted for £57 million out
of a total of £183 million of paid up capital of joint stock companies listed on the London
Stock Exchange. The proportion was much the same as that of the canal companies two
decades earlier, but the total amount of stock available was nearly four times greater.
Railway stock was bought by a much more geographically and socially diverse group of
investors. Contemporary views of railway investment, in established lines, appear to
indicate they were regarded as very low risk. The soclo-economic composition of the
investors in the CARD Database is compared in Table 4.14. The most notable
differences are the higher proportion of less wealthy social groups and the lower
numbers of female and clerical investors in the railways.
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Table 4.14: Ownership of Canal and Railway Shares by Socio-economic Groups
Canal investors	 Railway Investors	 Investors in Both
Canals and
Railways
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Landed	 114	 4	 166	 6	 0	 0
Rentier	 364	 12	 471	 16	 5	 17
Clergy	 159	 5	 101	 3	 1	 3
Professional and Bankers	 147	 4	 325	 11	 4	 14
Manufacturers	 91	 3	 80	 3	 1	 3
Merchants	 68	 2	 215	 7	 0	 0
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 88	 3	 432	 15	 1	 3
Women	 529	 18	 312	 11	 5	 17
Unknown	 1,420	 48	 831	 28	 13	 43
Total	 2,980	 100	 2,933	 100	 30	 100
Source: Canal and railway investors from the CARD Database.
The differences between canal and railway in investor structure shown in Table 4.14
reflect the changes in social structure that occurred over the late-eighteenth to mid-
nineteenth centuries. Most noticeable is the growth of the Artisan and Shopkeeper
group, which includes small traders and service providers. To some extent it was a
deliberate strategy by the railway companies to attract a broader shareholder
constituency. Cochrane, writing in 1846, suggests a number of ways in which railway
shares could be made more affordable by the 'more humble classes'. 151 Some of his
recommendations, such as making available shares with lower nominal values, were
adopted by the companies in this study. For example, the Grand Junction Railway (GJR)
issued a series of shares at nominal values of £1 00, £50, £25, and £12.50.152 It seems
that this strategy was successful. Analysis of the socio-economic composition of the
GJR investors who only held £12.50 shares compared to that of the total shareholders
reveals a substantially higher proportion of the Artisans and Shopkeeper group held
shares of the lower nominal value. This analysis is set out in Table 4.15.
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Table 4.15: Socio-economic Groups of GJR Shareholders Holding Low
Denomination Shares Compared with All GJR Shareholders
	Total GJR Shareholders	 £12.50 Shareholders
	
Number	 % of Total	 Number	 % of Total
Landed and rentier	 147	 30	 11	 30
Clergy	 35	 7	 3	 8
Professional and bankers	 58	 12	 4	 11
Manufacturers	 11	 2	 1	 3
Merchants	 61	 12	 2	 5
Artisans and shopkeepers	 30	 6	 5	 14
Women	 141	 29	 8	 22
Unknown	 10	 2	 3	 8
Total	 493	 100	 37	 100
Source: GJR shareholder in formation extracted from Register of
Proprietors.153
Table 4.15 shows the extent of the success of this strategy with the Artisans and
Shopkeepers group more than twice as likely to hold shares of the lowest available
denomination than they were in the share capital as a whole.
4.6 Conclusions
The number and sophistication of investment opportunities increased over the
period examined in the present study. Apart from the increasing amount of commercial
and industrial development, which attracted investment by entrepreneurs and
businessmen, the range of financial investments also increased. Whereas, real property,
mortgages and government stock was the most common form of financial investment in
the mid-eighteenth century, the development of canals from the I 760s onwards opened
up a new capital market Although there had been joint stock companies prior to the
development of canals, these had been for the most part quasi-government stocks.
Canal and later the railway companies represented a more risky but potentially lucrative
source of investment. They were more risky because investors had to rely upon
imperfect information. Whereas a mortgage or the purchase of land and buildings could
be readily assessed by the investor or his representative, the new private sector
companies were much more complex undertakings. Investors could no longer rely on
their opinion of the credit standing of a potential borrower or the likely income from a
property. They had to weigh the merits of innovative technology, the unpredictability of
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parliamentary approvals, the potential demand, quality of management and a host of
other factors. If the investor wanted to realise his holding, the market, certainly in the
period up to the I 830s, was relatively illiquid. By the mid-nineteenth century a national
market had developed with professional brokers and many specialised publications to
disseminate information. Nevertheless, these markets were convulsed by mania and
were far from efficient. In this Chapter the risks of investing in canal and railway
companies have been examined and an attempt has been made to quantify the relative
risk of each company. The quality of the share price data has precluded any very
precise quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, some indication of the relative risk of each
company has been derived through a combination of quantitative and qualitative
measures. In the light of this information, the behaviour of investors in each of the canal
companies and in the group of railway companies has been examined to determine
whether different investor groups had different propensities to take risk. Some general
observations can be made. Contemporary opinion regarded railways as generally low-
risk investments. In this study, it proved virtually impossible to differentiate between the
selected railway companies. The investor profiles of each of the companies was also
very similar. The risk in railway investment was in the speculation in the scrip of lines not
built or even authorised. Since the seven companies selected were all authorised and
eventually built it is not surprising that they appear to be a largely homogenous group.
The canals companies are much more differentiated in terms of risk. PIE ratios varied
considerably and the investor profiles also differed widely. In spite of the lack of formal
channels of information transfer, investors seem to have been able to differentiate
successfully between the companies. Canal company investors seem to conform to the
characteristics of 'financial' and 'economic' investors. Financial investors tended to be
more risk averse, although the behaviour of female investors appears to have been
anomalous. The propensity of women to exhibit the behaviour characteristics of the
more risk-seeking economic investors may be evidence of the source of their investment
advice. It might also be expected that those groups which had less access to financial
and economic information, such as women but also clergy may have made less
advantageous investment decisions. How investors accessed information, mitigated the
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perceived risks and determined their personal risk strategies are discussed in the
following Chapters.
L. Davidoff and C. Hall, Family Fortunes. Men and Women of the English Middle Class,
1780-1850 (London, 1987), pp. 14-15. James Luckcock, who the authors give as an
exemplar of middle-class lifestyle was, for example, also an investor in the Warwick and
Birmingham canal in 1808.
2 C. Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (London,
1841), P. 71.
H. M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments ( New York,
1959), p. 4 and W. F. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (New York, 1970),
pp. 282-3.
' H. Beeke, Observations on the Produce of Income Tax (London, 1799), pp. 183-4 and
R. Giffen, Recent Accumulations of Capital in the United Kingdom (London, 1878),
reproduced in B. L. Anderson, Capital Accumulation in the Industrial Revolution
London, 1974), p. 194.
P. Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire
London, 1814), Table No. 2.
Giffen, Recent Accumulations of Capital reproduced in Anderson, Capital
Accumulation, p. 194.
' J. Seed, 'From "Middling Sort" to Middle Class in Late Eighteenth- and Early
Nineteenth-century England', in M. L. Bush (ed.), Social Orders and Social C/asses in
Europe Since 1500. Studies in Social Stratification (Harlow, 1992), p. 116.
Seed, 'From "Middling Sort" to Middle Class', p. 117 and H. Perkin, The Origins of
Modern English Society, 1780-1880 (London, 1969), pp. 171-8.
D. Spring, Introduction to the 1971 reprint of J. Bateman, The Great Landowners of
Great Britain and Ireland ( London, 4th edition, 1883), p. (7). The Return of Owners of
Land included information from 15,000 parishes and 5 million parochial assessments.
10 Spring, Introduction to the 1971 reprint of Bateman, Great Landowners, p. (7).
G. E. Mingay, English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1963), p.10,
cuoting the statistics of Gregory King.
L. Stone and J. C. Fawtier Stone, An Open Elite. England 1540-1880 (Oxford, 1986),
. 25.
P. J. Corfield, 'The Rivals: Landed and Other Gentlemen', in N. Harte and R. Quinault
(eds.), Land and Society in Britain, 1700-1914. Essays in Honour of F. M. L. Thompson
Manchester, 1996), pp. 9-10.
' Spectator, February 1876, as reported by Spring, Introduction to the 1971 reprint of J.
Bateman, Great Landowners, p. (7).
15 Mingay, English Landed Society, pp. 22-3.
16 j Boswell, The Ufe of Samuel Johnson LL.D (London, 1791), Chapter XXI.
17 J. Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System. English Landownership 1650-
1950 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 520-1.
18 Stone and Stone, An Open Elite, p. 12.
19 Allen 'Price of Freehold Land', p. 34.
20 Playford, Practical Hints.
21 Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society, p. 61, W. D. Rubinstein, Men of
Property, the Very Wealthy in Britain since the Industrial Revolution (London, 1981) and
F. M. L. Thompson, 'Business and Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century' in F. M. L.
Thompson (ed.), Landowners, Capitalists and Entrepreneurs. Essays for Sir John
Habakkuk (Oxford, 1994), pp. 139-70.
Coiquhoun, Treatise on the Wealth, Table No. 2.
Stone and Stone, An Open Elite, p. 283.
24 ThOmPSOn 'Business and Landed Elites', Pp. 146-65.
25 Thompson, 'Business and Landed Elites', pp. 139-40.
116
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
W. D. Rubinstein, 'Businessmen into Landowners. The Question Revisited', in N.
Harte and R. Quinault (eds.), Land and Society in Britain, 1700-1914. Essays in Honour
ofF. M. L. Thompson (Manchester, 1996), p 109.
27 H. L. Malchow, Gentleman Capitalists: The Social and Political World of the Victorian
Businessman (Stanford, 1992), p. 369.
28 Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, p. 552.
Bateman, Great Landowners, p. xvi.
3° PRO RAIL 810/178, BCN, Register of Transfers by Death 1787-1832.
31 P. Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class. Business, Society and Family Life
in London, 1660-1 730 (London, 1989), PP. 154-5.
32 Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, p. 575.
Data on all estates in Warwickshire over 1,000 acres taken from Bateman, Great
Landowners, pp. 501-11.
PRO RAIL 810 /1, BCN, Committee Minutes and Reports, Original Subscribers, 25
March 1768.
3° PRO RAIL 881/1, Warwick & Birmingham Canal, Minutes of General Assembly, 1793-
1812.
3° Batemar,, Great Landowners, pp. 501-11.
PRO RAJL 810/159 and 169, Share Transfer Ledgers.
3° in the case of the Duke of Bridgewater and his sponsorship of the Bridgewater
Navigations, quoted by J. R. Ward, Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Century
England (Oxford, 1974), p. 26.3° Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 72.4° D. N. Cannadine, 'The Aristocracy and the Towns in the Nineteenth Century; a Case
Study of the Calthorpes and Birmingham 1807 - 1910' (PhD thesis, University of Oxford,
1975).
41 PRO RAIL 881/1, Warwick & Birmingham Canal, Minutes of General Assembly, 1793-
1812, PRO RAIL 882/1, Warwick & Braunston Canal, Minutes of Annual General
Meeting, Proprietors Named in the Act, 27 May 1794 and PRO RAIL 886/1, Worcester &
Birmingham Canal, Minutes of General Assembly of Proprietors, First General Meeting,
5 July 1791.
42	 of 2,967 canal and 2,917 railway company investors. Those identified as
Landed were peers and gentlemen with country addresses denoting estates. This
analysis probably understates the proportion of investors who owned land as it excludes
those investors with urban addresses who may have owned a small country estate.
R. Floud, The People and the British Economy 1830 -1914 (Oxford, 1997), p. 59.
Fioud, Peop/e and the British Economy, p. 66.
R. J. Morris, 'The Middle-Class and the Property Cycle during the Industrial
Revolution', in T.C. Smout (ad.), The Search for Wealth and Stability. Essays in
Economic and Social History Presented to M. W. Flinn (London, 1979), pp. 91-113.
Stone and Stone, An Open Elite, p. 285 and Earle, The Making of the English Middle
Class, p. 155.
Davidoff and Hafl, Family Fortunes, p. 369.
PRO RAIL 810/1, BCN, Committee Minutes and Reports, Original Subscribers, 25
March 1768.
PRO RAIL 81 0/1 82, BCN, List of Proprietors, 8 May 1840.
5° P. L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914. The Finance and Organisation of English
Manufacturing lndustiy (London, 1979), p. 6.
51 Allen, 'Price of Freehold Land', p. 39.
52 PRO RAIL 810/178, BCN, Register of Transfers by Death 1787-1832.
PROB 11/1 330, Will of Samuel Galton.
L. Newton, 'Regional Bank - Industry Relations during the Mid-Nineteenth Century:
Links between Bankers and Manufacturers in Sheffield c.1850 - c.1885', Bus. Hist. Rev.,
Vol. 38, No. 3 (1996), pp. 64-83, L. Newton, 'The Finance of Manufacturing Industry in
the Sheffield Area c. 1850-1885' (PhD thesis, University of Leicester, 1993), F. Capie
and M. Collins, Have the Banks Failed British Industry? (London, 1992), pp. 28-33, M.
Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain 1800-1939 (London, 1991), pp. 22-32
117
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
and S. Pollard, 'Fixed Capital in the Industrial Revolution in Britain', in F. Crouzet (ed.),
Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution ( London, 1972), pp. 154-5.
B. L. Anderson, 'The Attorney and the Early Capital Market in Lancashire', in J. R.
Harris (ed.), Liverpool and Merseyside (London, 1969), pp. 50-77.
Galton 539, Deed of Defeasance of BCN Shares, Birmingham Reference Library.
Purchases and sales of shares taken from PRO RAIL 810/169, BCN, Share Transfer
Ledger and share prices taken from PRO RAIL 810/589, BCN, Allocation of Receipts
and Expenditure and Prices of Shares.
M. Collins, Money and Banking inthe UK:AHistoiy (London, 1988), pp.115-16.
R. Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization. A Study in Comparative
Economic History (New York, 1967), p. 24.60 D1086/B10, Correspondence of Robert Hale, letter from Robert Hale to his Uncle, R.
H. Hale, 2 July 1763, Gloucester Record Office.
61 Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages, pp. 24 and 32.
Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages, pp. 23-4.
Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages, p. 33.
P. Ballard, 'A Commercial and Industrial Elite. A Study of Birmingham's Upper Middle
Class 1780 - 1914' (PhD thesis, University of Reading, 1983), p. 52.
MS1 199, A Young Lady from Birmingham. Some Early Reminiscences of Elizabeth
Anne Galton (Mrs. Edward Wheler) 1808-1 906, edited by J. L. Moilliet and J. A. K.
Moilliet, Birmingham Reference Library
Banking Act, 1707.
67 W F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred years of Joint Stock Banking (London,
1958), p. 26.
A. M. Taylor, Gilletts. Bankers at Banbury and Oxford (Oxford, 1964), p. 6.
Taylor, Gilletts, p. 17.
70 AB1, Deed of Settlement and List of Shareholders 1836, Midland Bank Archive,
London. Gibbins owned 150 shares in the Coventry Union Bank in 1836.
71 Ballard, 'A Commercial and Industrial Elite', Appendix I.
72 G. Rae, The Country Banker His Clients, Cares, and Work (London, 1885), p. 210.
T8, Ledger of Liabilities and Assets 1838 - 1862, Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank,
Midland Bank Archive, London.
C. B. Drover, Sheldon's Practice and Law of Banking (London, 1972), pp. 299-300.
Capital and reserves divided by deposits, notes in issue and other short-term liabilities
Collins, Money and Banking, p. 102.
76 Mrs. Gaskell, Cran ford (London, 1853), Chapter X.
R. D. Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (London, 1965), p. 194.
78 w Newmarch, 'An Attempt to Ascertain the Magnetude and Fluctuations of the
Amount of Bills of Exchange in Circulation at One Time in Great Britain', Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Vol. XIV (1851), as quoted by Cameron, Banking in the Early
Stages, p. 34.
T2, Minutes of Directors, 19 May 1834 and 24 June 1834, Stourbridge &
Kidderminster Bank, Midland Bank Archive, London.
80 ABI, Coventry Union Bank, Deed of Settlement and List of Shareholders 1836,
Midland Bank Archive, London.
81 G. Cochrane, The Way to Make Railroad Shares Popular(London, 1846).
82 Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages, p. 26.
ABI, Coventry Union Bank, Deed of Settlement and List of Shareholders, 1836,
Midland Bank Archive, London.
T32, Papers re. Formation, Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank, Midland Bank Archive,
London.
P. 011erenshaw, 'The Development of Banking in Bristol 1750- 1914', in C. E. Harvey
and J. Press (eds.), Studies in the Business History of Bristol (Bristol, 1988), p. 68.
Taylor, Gilletts, p. 6.
87 W. F. Spackman, Statistical Tables of the Agriculture, Shipping, Colonies,
Manufactures, Commerce and Population of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
Brought Down to the Year 1843 (London, 1843), p. 157.
118
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
E. V. Morgan and W .A. Thomas, The Stock Exchange ( London, 1962), pp.19-20, H.
Roseveare, The Financial Revolution 1660 -1760 (London, 1991), pp. 35-51, P. G. M.
Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England. A Study in the Development of Public
Credit, 1686- 1756 (London, 1967), p. 514.
Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, p. 19.
9°As quoted by Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, p. 16.
91 Playford, Practical Hints.
Spackman, Statistical Tables, p. 90.
L. S. Pressnell, 'The Rate of Interest in the Eighteenth Century', in L. S. Pressnell
(ed.), Studies in the Industrial Revolution ( London, 1960), p. 179 and Dickson, The
Financial Revolution, pp. 7 and 31.
Playford, Practical Hints.
9° Playford, PracticaiHints.
9° Roseveare, Financial Revolution, p. 68.
Investors receiving £5 or less wouJd hold a maximum of £167 of stock, those receiving
£10, £334 of stock. Playford notes that the holdings would be overstated as nominee
accounts held aggregated holdings and received a single dividend for distribution to
individual stockholders.
9°	 to Restrain the Number and Ill Practice of Brokers and Stockjobbers, passed in
1697, Barnard's Act, 1734, to Prevent the In famous Practice of Stock-jobbing.
AC2711 899, AC27/2025 and AC27/2033, 3 per cent Consols Stock Ledgers for
holders with surnames beginning with the letter G and L for the years 5 July 1817 to
1827, Bank of England Archive, London.
100 AC27/1899 3 per cent Consols Stock Ledger, G, 5 July 1817 to 1827, Bank of
England Archive, London.
101 Rae, Country Banker, p. 222.
102 AC27/1899 3 per cent Consols Stock Ledger, G, 5 July 1817 to 1827, Bank of
England Archive, London.
103 PRO RAIL 810/178, BCN, Will extract from Register of Transfers by Death 1787-
1832.
104 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, p. 6.
105 Defined as market price of a share divided by the current post-tax earnings per
share.
106 One of the Initiated, The Railway Investment Guide. How to Make Money by Railway
Shares; A Series of Hints and Advice to Parties Speculating in the Shares of British,
Colonial, and Foreign Railways (London, 1845).
107 Playford, Practical Hints.
108 Sharpe, Portfolio Theory, pp. 82-96.
109 A. D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow and A. J. Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuations of the
British Economy 1790-1 850, Vol.1 (Hassocks, 2nd edition, 1975), i. 375.
110 Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, p. 76.
111 Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, p. 76.
112 S. R. Cope, 'The Stock Exchange Revisited. A New Look at the Market in Securities
in London in the Eighteenth Century', Economica, Vol. 45 (1978), p. 19.
Course of the Exchange, Guildhall Library.
114 K J. Weiller and P. Mirowski, 'Rates of Interest in 18th-century England', Expi. in
Econ. Hist., Vol. 27, No. 1 (1990), p. 22, P. Mirowski, 'What Do Markets Do? Efficiency
Tests of the 18th-century London Stock Market', ExpI. in Econ. Hisf., Vol. 24, No. 2
(1987), p. 120, R. Eagly and V. K. Smith, 'Domestic and International Integration of the
LofldOfl Money Market, 1731-1789', J. of Econ. Hist., Vol. IlIVI, No. 1(1976), p. 199 and
M. R. Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820- 1844 (Oxford, 1975), Appendix B
quoting Railway Share Index of Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuations
f the British Economy, Vol. I, i.375.
115 PRO RAIL 874/1 7, Stourbridge Navigation, Share Transfer Register.
116 PRO RAIL 8101159 and /169, BCN, Share Transfer Registers and RAIL 810/589,
Allocation of Receipts and Expenditure and Prices of Shares.
PRO RAIL 824/20, Dudley canal, Share Transfer Deeds.
119
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
PRO RAIL 8101159 and 169, BCN, Share Transfer Ledgers. BCN share capital was
doubled on 21 May 1811,24 September 1819, 21 March 1823 and 18 December 1835.
119 PRO RAIL 874117, Stourbridge Navigation, Share Transfer Ledger.
120 PRO RAIL 874/1 7, Stourbridge Navigation, Share Transfer Ledger, Proprietors 2
j3nuary 1809.
121 PRO RAIL 810/589, BCN, Share Transfer Ledger.
122 PRO RAIL 81 0/1 82, BCN, List of Proprietors, 8 May 1840.
123 Weiller and Mirowski, 'Rates of Interest', p. 23.
124 H. Pollins, 'Aspects of Railway Accounting before 1868', in A. C. Littleton and B. S.
y3mey, Studies in the History of Accounting ( London, 1956), p. 340. Pollins is
specifically referring to railway accounting but the same applies to canal company
acCOUfltS.
125 Ward, Finance of Canal Building, pp. 31 and 49.
126 Ward, Finance of Canal Building, p. 30.
127 Ward, Finance of Canal Building, pp. 43-6.
128 Ward, Finance of Canal Building, p. 37.
129 G. H. Evans, British Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 40-1.
130 For example the Gloucester & Berkley canal, Ward, Finance of Canal Building, p. 54.
131 Ward, Finance of Canal Building, pp. 37 and 45 and C. Hadfield, The Canals of the
EaSt Midlands (Newton Abbot, 1966), p. 270.
132 Ward Finance of Canal Building, pp. 29-54, C. Hadfield, The Canals of the West
Midlands. The Canals of the British Isles: VoL 5 (Newton Abbot, 1985), pp. 318-29,
Hadfield, Canals of the East Midlands, pp. 268-76 and J. Phillips, A General History of
Inland Navigation, Foreign and Domestic; Containing a Complete Account of the Canals
Already Executed in England with Considerations on those Projected (London, 5th
edition, 1805), pp. 202, 205, 257, 351 and 389.
133 A Faulkner, The Warwick Canals (Leicester, 1985), p. 21.
134 Hadfield, Canals of the East Midlands, p. 229.
135 Hadfield, Canals of the West Midlands, p. 111.
136 Ward Finance of Canal Building, p. 131.
137 PRO RAIL 881/1, Warwick & Birmingham Canal Navigation, Minutes of General
Assembly 1793-1812.
138 L. Holcombe, Wives and Property. Reform of the Married Woman's Property Law in
Nineteenth-century England ( Oxford, 1983), p. 39.
139 First identified in share price data series, Liverpool & Manchester Railway shares,
Course of the Exchange, 14 February 1826, Guildhall Library.
140 H. Scrivenor, The Railways of the United Kingdom Statistically Considered, in
Relation to their Extent, Capital, Amalgamation, Debentures, Financial Position, Acts of
Parliament by which they are Regulated, Creation and Appropriation of Shares, Calls,
Dividends, and Various Other Minor Particulars (London, 1849), p. 25.
141 A Successful Operator, A Short and Sure Guide to Permanent Investment in
Railways. A Few Plain Rules. How to Invest and Speculate with Safety and Profit in
Railway Shares, (London, 8th edition, 1846).
142 A Successful Operator, A Short and Sure Guide.
143 A Successful Operator, A Short and Sure Guide.
144 j van Fenstermaker, R. P. Malone, and S. R. Stansell, 'An Examination of Railroad
Common Stock Returns 1835-97', J. Trans. Hist., 3rd Series, Vol. 15, No. 1(1994), pp.
21-6.
145 Fenstermaker, Malone, and Stansell, 'An Examination of Railroad Common Stock
Returns', p. 43.146 One of the Initiated, Railway Investment Guide.
147 j • Whitefield, Railway and Government Guarantee. Which is Preferable? Facts and
Arguments to Shew that Guaranteed Railway Stock Offers a Better Investment than do
Government Securities (London, 6th edition, 1849).
148 Cochrane, The Way to Make Railroad Shares Popular.
149 E. D. Chattaway, Railways: their Capital and Dividends with Statistics of their
Working in Great Britain ( London, 1855-6), data compiled as at July 1854.
120
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISK
150 Cochrane, Way to Make Railroad Shares Popular.
151 Cochrane, Way to Make Railroad Shares Popular.
152 PRO RAIL 220/12, Grand Junction Railway, Register of Proprietors, 10 September
1845.
153 PRO RAIL 220/12, Grand Junction Railway, Register of Proprietors, 10 September
1845.
121
CHAPTER 5: RISK MITIGATION
5.1 Introduction
The propensity for investors to take different levels of risk depending on their
gender or socio-economic background was discussed in Chapter 4. Evidence that
investors were able to differentiate levels of risk between individual canal companies
and between the canal and railway investments was examined. It was noted that
contemporary commentators were aware of the concept of different risks and rewards
from investment in land, government stocks and private companies. This Chapter
examines the strategies these investors used to mitigate risk.
Investors were required to weigh the maximisation of their financial returns
against the constraint of providing security for themselves and their families. The factors
affecting personal risk strategies, such as age, comparative wealth, gender and family
circumstances are discussed in this Chapter. Two main strategies to mitigate investment
risk emerge; investors can spread their risk over different investments, that is take a
portfolio approach to risk, or they can reduce risk though insurance. These two
strategies are discussed below.
5.2 Portfolio Management
In conditions of certainty, that is in the ideal world where investment returns can
be predicted with perfect accuracy, investors will place all their funds in a single stock
which yields the highest return. In conditions of uncertainty investors will endeavour to
hold a mix of investments which will provide the best predicted return. Portfolio Theory
was developed to enable investors to optimise their returns through the selection of the
best mix of investments. 1 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before the
development of these theoretical techniques, investors held a portfolio of investments
selected as a response to their needs for liquidity, income, capital growth and their
individual risk/return requirements. The present research establishes that investors held
a range of assets, which were both geographically and functionally diverse. A portfolio
might contain property assets, government stocks, shares in higher risk canal or railway
companies, and short-term money market instruments in order to produce a range of
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risks and returns. The composition of an investment portfolio was likely to have varied
over the life of the investor as personal circumstances and the appetite to take risk
changed. Bernoulli noted in 1738 that the 'utility resulting from any small increase in
wealth will be inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods possessed'. 2 This idea
was also explored by De Moivre, who in 1730 was already defining risk in terms of the
probability of loss. Both these mathematicians were articulating one of the key beliefs of
the Enlightenment, namely that man made decisions on a rational basis, that 'the Risk
of losing any sum is the reverse of Expectation; and the true measure of it is, the product
of the Sum adventured multiplied by the Probability of Loss'. 3 Logically, the satisfaction
derived from each successive increase in wealth is smaller than that derived from the
previous equivalent increase in wealth. Conversely, the dissatisfaction derived from a
loss will always succeed the positive utility derived from a gain of equal size. Much later
research has gone into proving that investors make decisions on anything but a rational
basis.4 There is, however, insufficient quantitative evidence of the portfolios held by
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century investors to determine with any degree of precision
how they made their investment decisions. Nevertheless, the present study shows that
there is considerable evidence that the relatively sophisticated investors in joint stock
companies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were holding widely diversified
portfolios of assets. Many of the investors in the CARD Database held shares in more
than one canal or railway company. In addition they also held government stocks, land,
property, mortgages and bank deposits, as discussed below.
5.2.1 Multiple Canal and Railway Shareholdings
Although there is a wealth of anecdotal evidence on the diversification of
investments, previous research has not been able to quantify the complete portfolios of
investments of individual investors in any significant number. 5 Nor is this study any
exception. As has already been discussed in Chapter 4.2, probate inventories lack
information on real property and wills rarely mention specific assets. Information is
mainly limited to that gleaned from individual investor's diaries or accounts and is
inevitably patchy and unsystematic. In the present study, the CARD Database of 5,913
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individual canal and railway company investors was used to provide evidence of multiple
holdings of canal and railway stocks. The dates at which the shareholder registers of
each company were analysed are not concurrent. However, it has been demonstrated
that shareholders generally retained their shares for considerable lengths of time. Thus,
the appearance of the same investors on different company registers (albeit at slightly
different times) has been taken as prima fade evidence of multiple shareholdings.
The analysis set out in Chapter 4 suggests that investors could differentiate
between the relative levels of risk in the eleven canal companies examined in the
present study. On the other hand, the seven railway companies in the study appear to
have been regarded as a more homogenous group in terms of risk Did investors
attempt to hold a diverse portfolio of canal company shares in order to mitigate risk?
This was tested using CARD Database. The number of shareholders with multiple
holdings was analysed and the results for both canal companies and railway companies
set out in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Multiple Shareholders in Canal and Railway Companies
	Number of	 Canal Shareholders 	 Railway Shareholders
	
Companies in which	 Number	 As % of	 Number	 As % of
	
Shares were held	 Total	 Total
	
1	 2,503	 84	 2,850	 97
	
2	 382	 13	 75	 3
	
3	 82	 3	 7	 0
	
4	 9	 0	 1	 0
	
5	 2	 0	 0	 0
	
6	 2	 0	 0	 0
	
Total	 2,980	 100	 2,933	 100
Source: CARD Database of 2,980 canal and 2,933 railway company
investors, includes all shareholdings in more than one company but
excludes shareholdings in the same company held for more than one
period.
Table 5.1 shows that 477 (16 per cent) of canal company investors held shares in more
than one canal company. In comparison, only 87 railway shareholders (3 per cent) were
multiple investors. Canal investors held up to a maximum of six different stocks, railway
investors four. This indicates a fundamentally different attitude to investment between
the two constituencies of investors. This is further emphasised by the fact that only 30
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investors out of the entire CARD Database held both canal and railway shares. The
propensity of canal shareholders to hold shares in more than one canal company was
examined to determine whether this was a conscious strategy to mitigate risk. Each
multiple canal shareholding was allocated the same risk score of low, medium and high,
which was used in the analysis of risk in Chapter 4.5. The average risk score for
holdings of two, three, four, five and six different companies was calculated and plotted
on Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Propensity of Investors in Multiple Canal Companies to Take Risk
1.95
1.9
.	 1.85
= 18V0 j75
1.7
1.65
1.6
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
Investment Count
Source: Investment Count is the number of multiple canal investments
held by individual investors, minimum of 2, maximum of 6. Mean Holding
Risk is the average risk score, low = 1, medium = 2, high = 3, for each
category of Investment Count. Risk allocation is in accordance with
analysis in Chapter 4.5.
Although the analysis shown in Figure 5.1 is not statistically significant, there appears to
be a tendency for investors holding shares in more than one company to assume a
higher level of risk. This is consistent with investors using a portfolio of shares to
mitigate risk. Any conclusions drawn from such a small number of multiple investors
should however be regarded with caution.
The tendency to hold shares in more than one company may also be a function
of the relative wealth of different classes of investor. The socio-economic backgrounds
of investors holding shares in more than one company was analysed and the results are
shown in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Socio-economic Classification of Multiple Canal Company Investors
Number of Canal Companies Held
Number of Investors	 1	 2	 3 or more	 Total
Landed	 95	 16	 3	 114
Rentiers	 284	 61	 19	 364
Clergy	 127	 28	 4	 159
Professional and Bankers	 102	 30	 15	 147
Manufacturers	 66	 16	 9	 91
Merchants	 50	 14	 4	 68
Artisansand Shopkeepers
	 68	 16	 4	 88
Women	 469	 55	 5	 529
Unknown	 1242	 146	 32	 1,420
Total	 2,503	 382	 95	 2,980
Percentage of Total Investors
Landed	 4	 4	 3	 4
Rentiers	 11	 16	 20	 12
Clergy	 5	 7	 4	 5
Professional and Bankers
	
4	 8	 16	 5
Manufacturers	 3	 4	 9	 3
Merchants	 2	 4	 4	 2
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 3	 4	 4	 3
Women	 19	 14	 5	 18
Unknown	 50	 38	 34	 48
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Analysis of 2,980 individual investors from the CARD Database.
Table 5.2 shows that the Rentier and Professional groups were much more likely to be
multiple shareholders than other investors. These two groups were probably the most
financially sophisticated amongst the constituency of investors. Women were much less
likely to hold shares in more than one company, which probably reflects their lower
economic status. An analysis of multiple holdings amongst railway shareholders
produces a similar result, as shown in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Socio-economic Classification of Multiple Railway Company Investors
Number of Railway Companies Held
Number of Investors	 I	 Multiple	 Total
Landed	 163	 3	 166
Rentiers	 449	 22	 471
Clergy	 98	 3	 101
Professional and Bankers	 312	 13	 325
Manufacturers	 77	 3	 80
Merchants	 210	 5	 215
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 428	 4	 432
Women	 307	 5	 312
Unknown	 806	 25	 831
Total	 2,850	 83	 2,933
Percentage of Total Investors
Landed	 6	 4	 6
Rentiers	 16	 27	 16
Clergy	 3	 4	 3
Professional and Bankers	 11	 16	 11
Manufacturers	 3	 4	 3
Merchants	 7	 6	 7
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 15	 5	 15
Women	 11	 6	 11
Unknown	 28	 30	 28
Total	 100	 100	 100
Source: Analysis of 2,933 individual railway company investors from
CARD Database.
Table 5.3 also shows that Professionals and Rentiers were the groups most likely to own
shares in more than one railway company, whereas Women and other lower income
groups such as Shopkeepers and Artisans were less likely to be multiple shareholders.
Rentiers might be expected to be significant holders of shares, as they tended to be
wealthy and to hold a large proportion of their wealth in financial assets. Women were
also likely to hold a significant proportion of their wealth in financial assets. Women
tended not to inherit real property. Amongst the landed classes real property was often
entailed on a male heir. 6 Women inherited assets held in trusts from husbands or
fathers, under which they could benefit from the income but could not control the
capital.7 In the case of the railway companies, only 6 per cent of the multiple
shareholders were women. Although railways were generally regarded as low-risk
investments and many investors chose them in preference to government stocks, the
present study suggests they failed to attract female shareholders in significant numbers.
In contrast, over 12 per cent of multiple canal company investors were women. The
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Clergy show a similar reluctance to make multiple investments in railway companies.
The risk analysis, discussed in Chapter 4, indicates that investors did not differentiate
levels of risk between the railway companies in the present study. Diversification may
not have been considered necessary by railway investors. Contemporary commentators
even suggested railway shares bore similar levels of risk to that of government stocks.6
If investors regarded railway stocks as low risk then they may have been regarded as
interchangeable with government stocks. This may explain the small numbers of women
who invested in the railway companies in the present study. As is shown in Figure 4.5 in
Chapter 4.5.4, the yield on railway stock, certainly up to 1844 was very similar to that on
Consols. There was thus no incentive for women to diversify their investments and hold
both railway and government stock. Those women requiring a higher yielding investment
continued to hold canal company shares. For example, the proportion of female
shareholders in the BCN increased from 10.5 per cent in 1768 to 21.2 per cent by I84D.
The strategy of mitigating risk through holding a diverse portfolio of investments other
than canal and railway companies is discussed below.
5.2.2 Diversification into Investments Other than Canal and Railway
Shares
It is relatively easy to quantify an individual investor's holdings in the private sector
canal and railway companies. It is much more difficult to determine what proportion of an
individual's total wealth was invested in this way. Investment in joint stock canal and
railway companies was more risky than investment in land and buildings or government
stocks, but they generally yielded a better return. As has been discussed in Chapter 4,
liquidity was an important factor for investors in the present study. Canal and railway
investments were more liquid and incurred lower transaction costs than investment in
land and buildings. They were, however, less liquid than government stocks and short-
term bank deposits. Bank deposits were low yielding and as has been discussed in
Chapter 4, deposits and investment in joint stock banks could be risky, although the
level of risk declined as the capital adequacy of banks improved. Portfolios of holdings in
canal and railway companies were likely to be balanced by investments in other assets.
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The portfolio of investments held by a sample of CARD investors was examined. This
provided a common and homogenous population, rather than a number of separate
samples drawn from landowners, or holders of government stocks. A common sample
population enabled more meaningful comparisons be made between the portfolio
strategy of different socio-economic groups of investors than studies based on the
comparison of the portfolios of investors selected on the basis of different criteria and in
different areas or time periods.
Various source documents were used to determine what other assets were held by
CARD Database investors. Investment by these individuals in land, bank shares and
deposits and government stocks has already been discussed in Chapter 4. Not
surprisingly, given the relatively wealthy background of the CARD Database investors,
the present research did not discover much evidence of substantial investment in land.
However, there is evidence that financial assets such as government stocks and shares
in joint stock banks were held as part of a diversified portfolio.
Further investigation was carried out on the wills and probate records of CARD
Database investors. Wills generally tend not to mention specific holdings of shares since
these were assets which could be readily bought and sold and might not continue to be
owned at the testator's death. In the present study, in order to determine the relative
importance of different assets in the total valuation of a testator's estate, the records of
one particular canal company were examined. The Register of Transfers on Death of the
BCN for the periods 1787 to 1797 and 1820 to 1828 were used to extract information on
the size and composition of the transferees' estates. Forty transferees were selected
from the first period and fifty-eight from the second period. The ledger entries usually
included an extract of the will and probate inventory. The results of the analysis are
given in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: References to Investments in the Wills of Deceased BCN Shareholders
1787-1797 1820-1828 Total
Total Number of Testators	 40	 58	 98
Testators with Multiple Investments 	 1	 6	 7
Percentage of Testators with Multiple Investments	 3	 10	 7
Investments mentioned in Will 	 13	 18	 31
Percentage of Testators with Investments	 33	 31	 32
mentioned in Will
Source: Data from BCN, Register of Transfers by Death 17871832.b0
Sample comprises all transfers on death between 1787-97 and 1820-28.
Multiple investments refers to investments in more than one security or
different types of asset as detailed in the will extract. Investments in Will
refers to any reference in the extract to BCN or other securities where
the testator specifies the method of disposal.
Shares owned by the testator are mentioned in 31 per cent of the wills reviewed in the
two periods. These shares were either held in trust to pay a life interest or specifically
willed to beneficiaries. This could indicate that the investors considered the shares to be
a low-risk asset, which could be relied upon to pay an income to their wives and
daughters. Since they were specifically mentioned in wills drawn up some time before
death, it is likely that these shares were intended as long-term investments, not as
traded assets. Wills mentioning investments in more than one company or type of asset
were more common in the period 1820 to 1828. In order to quantify the importance of
multiple holdings, a sample of BCN shareholders was selected from the ledger recording
transfers on death for the years 1820 to 1828. The sample comprised deceased BCN
shareholders for whom information was also available on the total size of their estate.
This produced a small sample of 25 individuals. The results of the analysis are shown in
Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: Importance of BCN shareholding in Estates by Socio-economic Groups
1821 -1828
	Average Value of	 Average Probate	 Value of BCN
BCN Shares Value Shares as a
Percentage of
Probate Value
	
£	 £	 %
Landed	 1,695	 37,500	 5
Rentiers	 4,642	 20,750	 22
Clergy	 2,400	 65,000	 4
Professional and Bankers	 3,136	 29,500	 11
Manufacturers	 2,450	 20,500	 12
Merchants	 14,160	 25,000	 57
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 1,100	 6,000	 18
Women	 3,202	 11,500	 28
Average	 3,401	 23,927	 14
Source: Data from BCN, Register of Transfers by Death 17871832.h1
Sample comprises 25 transfers on death between 1820-28, where both
the size of the estate and the number of BCN shares held by the testator
are known. Value of estate is taken to be the upper limit of the relevant
probate range. Average share prices taken from BCN Income and
Expenditure Memorandum.12
The small size of the sample means that any conclusions drawn from analysis of the
data should be viewed with caution. The average value of the BCN shares held by
testators was £3,101. This represented on average 14 per cent of the average probate
value of the testator's estate. As might be expected, the BCN shares form a higher than
average proportion of the estates of Rentiers and Women. These groups were more
dependent on financial assets than the Landed group, who held only 5 per cent of their
assets, excluding real property, in BCN shares. The one merchant in the sample held a
very high proportion of his wealth in BCN shares. Merchants appear to have been more
likely than other socio-economic groups to dispose of shares during economic
downturns, as has been discussed in Chapter 3. As a result, they may have placed
greater importance on the liquidity of their investments. No conclusions can be drawn
from the results of such a small sample. However, the length of time the original
subscribers who bought BCN shares in March 1768 held their shares was analysed.
This shows that the Merchant group held their shares for 7.5 years on average. Although
this was less than the average of 9.8 years for the total of all the original shareholders it
is not convincing evidence of a particularly rapid turnover and need for liquidity amongst
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the Merchant group.13
The analysis set out in Table 5.5 only relates to the valuation of BCN shares; it
does not include the valuation of shares in other joint stock companies or other assets.
Eighty-one BCN shareholders in the sample were observed to have owned shares in
more than one canal company. It is therefore likely that Table 5.5 substantially
understates the importance of investment in other joint stock companies amongst the
assets held at death by the testators in the sample. No valuation has been made of the
other assets, excluding shares, held at death. Some anecdotal evidence is available and
is discussed below.
Individual wills give a detailed insight into the diversity of investments, which
were held by investors. For example, Christiana Geast, a widow from Moseley, whose
will, proved in 1825, mentioned the ownership of shares in the BCN, the Stourbridge
Navigation and the Dudley Canal. As has already been discussed in Chapter 4.4.1, she
also had a holding of approximately £4,000 of 3 per cent Consols. 14 The CARD
Database revealed that Geast owned eight BCN 15 shares at her death and one
Stourbridge share in 1809.16 Assuming that she held a minimum of one share in both the
Stourbridge and Dudley canals at her death, the value of these holdings in 1825 would
have been just over £3,000 or about 20 per cent of the total probate value of her
assets. 17
 Her total estate was valued at under £14,000 although this does not include
real property or settled property. Another example of a diversified holding was that of
Edward, Bishop of Oxford, whose will was proved in 1827. At his death he owned 80
new BCN shares 18, 20 shares in the Birmingham & Worcestershire Canal and 50 shares
in the in Basingstoke Canal. His total estate amounted to £70,000.19 The value of his
BCN and Birmingham & Worcester shares alone amounted to over £23,000, or33 per
cent of the probate value.20
 Another cleric, John Rose Holden, an Anglican minister from
Birmingham, left an estate of under £60,000 including, shares in the BCN, the
Basingstoke Canal and debentures in Worcester gaol. One of the more extensive
inventories of assets belonged to Elizabeth Lovatt, a widow from Aston, whose will was
proved in 1827. In addition to her six shares in the BCN, worth about £1,700, she
included amongst her assets, the probate value of which amounted to under £4,000, two
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freeholds in Aston, a share in two lives in the Royal Hotel Birmingham tontine and
£1,500 on mortgage to Thomas Riley, a pawnbroker. 21 The canal shares accounted for
43 per cent of her total assets excluding real property.
Both anecdotal and quantitative evidence suggests that individuals from all
socio-economic groups held diverse portfolios of assets. The average value of BCN
shares in the probate value of those investors' estates that were examined was 14 per
cent. It is likely that the total value of all joint stock shares held at death was
considerably higher. Businessmen may have already divested their business assets to
their sons or male successors prior to death. Thus the proportion of financial assets
held at death might have been greater than during the life of the investor. Earle's study
of post-mortem inventories of 375 individuals from London in the period 1660 to 1730
suggests that this may have been the case. His sample investors held on average one-
third of their total assets in investments. The more wealthy individuals held most of their
assets in government stocks, whereas the less wealthy favoured leaseholds and
mortgages.
As has already been discussed, the CARD investors appear to have held very
little of their wealth in land. There is some evidence that they acquired properties,
probably to provide rental income, as noted by earlier researchers, 24 although this has
not been thoroughly investigated in this study. The CARD investors also owned
substantial balances in Consols. They combined portfolios of risk-free government stock
with higher risk joint stock shares. If the estate of Samuel Galton is typical, they also
kept a high proportion of their assets in cash, probably in the form of bank deposits.
Galton left just over half of his £150,000 estate to his grandchildren in the form of
bequests of cash? The CARD investors appear to have prudently balanced risks and
returns. They readily embraced new financial markets, such as those for joint stock
shares but tempered this with a mix of traditional assets. This willingness to use new
markets as part of a portfolio approach to risk and return was also shown in their use of
life insurance.
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5.3 Life Insurance
The death of the family breadwinner, business partner or debtor could cause
hardship to surviving partners, widows and children or destroy a business. As early as
the sixteenth century, individuals sought to mitigate this risk through the mechanism of
life insurance. By the mid-eighteenth century a new financial industry, which served
the needs of a growing middle-class population, had developed. The soclo-economic
profile of investors in the canals, railways and joint stock banks of the West Midlands fits
closely those sectors of society targeted by the growing insurance industry. The present
research investigates the use of life insurance amongst these investors. The extent to
which different soclo-economic groups of investors used life insurance informs the
discussion of methods of information transfer and attitudes to risk.
The growing insurance industry was based on the rational assessment of risk,
both by the insurer and the insured. However, the widespread use of life insurance had
distinctly murky origins in the insurance of slave cargoes. Clark notes that in the
seventeenth century 'life insurance was condemned throughout Europe as an
incitement to fraud and murder'. 27 At best, early policies were often regarded as a form
of gambling, whereby a policyholder might wager on the death or birth of a person with
whom they had no relationship whatsoever. This activity was finally prevented by the
Gambling Act of 1774, which required policyholders to have a bona tide financial interest
in the insured life. Life insurance developed into a tool to protect the middle class
against risks that they could not afford to self-insure. Life insurance was generally not
used by the wealthiest sectors of society since they could either afford to absorb those
risks or had access to other means of risk mitigation, such as holding a diversified
portfolio of assets. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the need for accessible
insurance for the middling classes was recognised and mutual organisations were
established to provide protection for widows and orphans. This early form of insurance
was through subscription societies, limited by the size of the membership, to which
members paid an entrance fee and annual subscription. On the death of a member, a
share of members' contributions was paid to the deceased's nominated beneficiaries2
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One such society was the Amicable Society for a Perpetual Assurance Office, chartered
in London in 1706. Membership was restricted to 2,000. Annual subscriptions were
divided amongst the nominees of the members who died in that year and consequently,
contributors had little control over the value of the benefit, which would ultimately be paid
to their beneficiaries. 30 These arrangements would appear to substitute one risk for
another and it is not surprising that this form of insurance was not widely adopted. In
addition to these mutual societies, there were two chartered companies, Royal
Exchange Assurance and London Assurance, which began writing life business in 1721.
Insurance was provided for a maximum of one year and both companies refused high-
risk business such as the sick, the elderly, or victims of smallpox.31
 The amount of life
business at this period was small and not very profitable. It was not until the Society for
Equitable Assurances on Lives and Survivorships (the Equitable) was established in
1762 that life business was given a more scientific background, using actuarial tables
based on the work of de Moivre, John de Wit and Edmund Halley. The Equitable
undertook permanent contracts and accepted a broad range of risks.32
As has been discussed in Chapter 3.1, the early application of these life tables
to determine the level of premiums was biased in favour of the life companies. The
present research confirms that this was overwhelmingly the case for those investors in
*the CARD Database who were found to have used life insurance. However, in spite of
the very obvious costs involved in life insurance, it must have satisfied a need to mitigate
the risks to family or business life. The Equitable dominated the market for thirty years,
selling policies primarily to the middle classes of London. The use of life insurance
remained highly concentrated in London, even after other companies began to sell
insurance through a network of agents throughout the country. For example, the Pelican
Life office in 1797 endeavoured to sell life business through the country agencies of its
sister company, Phoenix Fire Office. The Provident Institution, set up in 1806, and the
Sun Life Assurance Company of 1810, also tried to establish nation-wide business,
using agencies set up to sell fire insurance. A number of companies were formed at
this time following the same statistical principles as the Equitable. In order to compete,
these new companies targeted particular sectors of the community, such as widows,
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lawyers, doctors or the clergy. For example, the Scottish Widows' Fund and Life
Assurance Society was established in 1815, the Clergy Mutual in 1829, Law Life
Assurance Society in 1823 and the Clerical, Medical and General in 1824. In the 1830s,
provident institutions were set up which combined life insurance with concepts of thrift
and temperance, such as the Friend's Provident of 1832 which was a Quaker
foundation. Nevertheless, the life insurance market remained small until the mid-
nineteenth century. As Clark notes, life insurance was most avidly adopted by those
members of society aspiring to gentility, such as the growing numbers of professionals.
These individuals realised their 'trading capital', comprising their training and skill,
terminated at their death, leaving their families with a commitment to a lifestyle they
could no longer sustain. The growing urban professional classes swelled the ranks of
policyholders and by the I 850s sums assured through British offices had risen to about
£150 million. The investors in the canal and railway companies were typical of middle-
class policyholders, who sought to mitigate risk through the use of life insurance. The
extent to which these investors utilised this mechanism is discussed below.
5.3.1 Investors Using Life Insurance
By the 1790s, the London-based life companies were actively marketing their
products in the Birmingham area. The Birmingham Gazette carried advertisements for
Royal Exchange Assurance, and Mrs Ann Salt was appointed agent for fire business in
I 792. It is not known whether she also wrote life business. The Westminster Society
also advertised in the Birmingham Gazette in 1792 for life insurance provision 'for old
Age and for the Widow and Fatherless'. The growing population of middle-class
professionals in Birmingham at this time fitted the profile of typical buyers of life
insurance. The Birmingham middle class has already been identified in this study as
willing to embrace financial and business innovation. They might therefore be expected
to have readily adopted the use of life insurance as a means of mitigating risk. This
premise was tested by investigating the use of life insurance amongst the investors in
the CARD Database and the BARD Database. The London Life Assurance Society
(London Life) wrote a total of 14,120 policies between 1823 and 1850. The name of
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each policyholder with an address in the West Midlands was checked against the names
of investors in the two Databases. It was discovered that seventy of these London Life
pohcies were held by 50 of the investors in the Databases. It was interesting to observe
that these investors comprised nearly all the London Life policyholders in the West
Midlands. Clark calculated that the West Midland counties only accounted for between I
and 10 policyholders per county. 39
 The majority of London Life policyholders were from
London and the South East of England and the geographical distribution of London Life
policyholders was not atypical of the life insurance industry as a whole. Clark's analysis
of two other insurance institutions reveals that the number of policyholders in the West
Midlands was substantially less than London and the Southeast. 4° Although in general
the use of life insurance was not widespread in the West Midlands, a large proportion of
those taking up policies were investors in the canals, railways and joint stock banks
examined in the present study. The life insurance market as a whole was relatively small
at this time. Even by 1845, the Chairman of the Mutual Life estimated that less than
100,000 people out of a total population of 25 million were insured with life offices. 41 The
high incidence of life insurance amongst investors in the present study suggests that
they were either well informed about new financial products or particularly receptive to
financial innovation. Table 5.6 gives the proportion of investors in each Database who
were found to have held life insurance policies from London Life between 1823 and
1850.
Table 5.6: Number of Investors who held Life Insurance
Database	 London	 Life Insured	 Total Investors	 Total Investors
	
Investors	 1823-1850
Number As % of Number As % of Number As % of
	
Total	 Total	 Total
Banks	 8	 16	 597	 9	 597	 12
Canals	 14	 28	 2,980	 46	 1,788	 34
Railways	 28	 56	 2,933	 45	 2,933	 55
Total	 50	 100	 6,510	 100	 5,318	 100
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Poilcy Registers. 42 Total
Investors comprises all investors in the CARD and BARD Databases.
Table 5.6 shows that 9 per cent of the total number of investors came from the bank
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database with the remainder split almost equally between canal investors and railway
investors. A disproportionate percentage of investors who held insurance policies were
found in the bank or railway databases. This is probably because railway and bank
investment covered a similar period to that of the insurance records, whereas 40 per
cent of canal investment relates to an earlier period. If the number of canal investors is
adjusted to include only those who were on shareholder registers during the time period
covered by the insurance policy registers, the proportions of investors and investors who
were also policyholders is roughly the same. This indicates that there was no real
difference between the propensity of canal, railway or bank investors to use life
insurance. On the other hand, a comparison between the soclo-economic classification
of investors holding life policies and that of investors in the Databases as a whole
reveals substantial differences, as discussed below.
5.3.1.1 Comparison of Policyholders and Insured Lives
Clark, writing about an earlier period, 1695 to 1775, notes that life insurance
societies drew their members almost exclusively from the middling classes. The socio-
economic classification of the 50 investors who were policyholders was analysed and
the results of the analysis are set out in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7: Social Groups of Policyholders and of Life Insured
	All Policyholders	 Insured Life	 Total Investors
excluding
Policyholders'
Own Lives
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Landed and Rentier	 14	 27	 5	 18	 2,055	 34
Clergy	 6	 13	 4	 14	 462	 7
Professional and	 16	 31	 6	 24	 874	 14
Bankers
Manufacturers	 0	 0	 1	 5	 373	 6
Merchants	 2	 4	 1	 5	 531	 9
Artisansand	 11	 23	 4	 14	 1,018	 16
Shopkeepers
Women	 1	 2	 5	 20	 862	 14
Total	 50	 100	 25	 100	 6,175	 100
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Policy Registers. Total
Investors from CARD and BARD Databases. Socio-economic data on
Bank Investors are only available for 262 shareholders of the Coventry
Union Bank All data series adjusted to reallocate individuals in the
Unknown soda-economic group amongst males in other categories in
proportion to the number of individuals in that group. Policyholders
include all those investors from the West Midlands who held London Life
Assurance policies. Insured Life excludes policyholders who insured
their own lives.
Investors taking out policies were primarily from the Landed, Rentier and Professional
groups and the Artisan and Shopkeeper group. There was only one woman amongst the
policyholders. The 70 policies taken out by these 50 investors were used to make a
further comparison between the socio-economic analysis of the policyholders and that of
the lives that they insured. Twenty-five out of the 50 policyholders insured their own
lives. The remaining 25 insured the lives of other individuals, who were not investors in
the Databases. Table 5.7 reveals important differences between the socio-economic
group of the policyholder and the group of the other lives they insured. The socio-
economic analysis of the group of Insured Lives compares reasonably closely with that
of investors in the Databases as a whole. Two categories, the Clergy and Professionals
appear to have been marginally more likely to have been insured lives than their overall
numbers in the Databases would suggest. These groups also formed a higher than
expected proportion of policyholders. This is not surprising, since it was these groups
which were targeted by life insurance companies. As has already been discussed
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above, specialist insurance companies were established to cater for the needs of the
clergy and the professions. It was particularly these groups whose social standing was
dependent on the salary or stipend of the breadwinner. The most significant difference,
shown in Table 5.7, between the analysis of investors who were policyholders and the
Databases as a whole, is in the proportion of women. Only 2 per cent of policyholders
were women, whereas 20 per cent of insured lives were those of women and 14 per
cent of the total investors in the Databases were female. The number of female holders
of life insurance policies has been shown by Clark to be much higher than that amongst
the female investors in the present study. Clark's analysis of the Amicable Society
participants between 1706 and 1768 suggests that 16 per cent of policyholders were
women and 32 per cent of insured lives were female. The small proportion of female
investors who were policyholders may be explained by the fact that the female investors
belonged to particularly wealthy sectors of society, whereas female policyholders were
often women who relied upon income from lending money or from businesses such as
dressmaking and millinery. The widows and daughters of the middle-class elite of the
West Midlands probably had no need to insure their livelihoods. On the other hand, they
were more likely to be an insured life. The single female investor found amongst the
London Life policyholders was Harriet Perkins, a widow from Edgbaston. She owned two
policies. The first, for £999, was taken out in March 1830 on the life of Edward Henry
Richards, aged 24, an attorney from Lincoln's Inn. This policy was surrendered in
October 1843. Her second policy was taken out in December 1847 on the life of Lord
Burghley, then aged 23. This policy was for £2,500 and ran until his death in 1895.
Further examination of the policy registers revealed that Lord Burghley was the insured
life in three other policies all taken out by different policyholders. No prima facie link can
be established between Lord Burghley and any of these individuals. Clark suggests that
women who lent money took out policies on the lives of their debtors. Although Harriet
Perkins may have been involved in money lending, as many widows were, the longevity
of her policies and the amounts involved suggest that this may not have been the case.
Women were more likely to be the insured life than the policyholder. 47 Table 5.8
compares the socio-economic groups of policyholders who insured their own lives with
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those who insured the lives of others.
Table 5.8: Social Group of Policyholders
	Another	 life insured	 Own life insured
Number As % of Number As % of
	
Total	 Total
Landed and Rentier 	 10	 40	 3	 12
Clergy	 5	 20	 1	 4
Professional and Bankers 	 3	 12	 12	 48
Manufacturers	 0	 0	 0	 0
Merchants	 1	 4	 1	 4
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 4	 16	 7	 28
Women	 1	 4	 0	 0
Unknown	 1	 4	 1	 4
Total	 25	 100	 25	 100
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Policy Registers48 and the
CARD and BARD Databases.
Table 5.8 shows that of the 50 policyholders in the present study, half of them insured
their own life and half the lives of others. Although the absolute numbers in the sample
are very low, there are marked differences in the behaviour of different socio-economic
groups. Members of the Professional group were much more likely to insure their own
lives, which confirms the reliance of families of professionals on the income of the
breadwinner. Members of the lower income Artisans and Shopkeeper group were also
more likely to insure their own lives for much the same reason. Manufacturers and
Merchants in the CARD and BARD Databases did not use insurance to any great extent,
presumably finding that their business assets provided sufficient security. The Landed
and Rentier groups, on the other hand, relying perhaps on reversionary interests on
settled property, tended to insure the lives of others rather than their own. The 70
London Life policies held by the 50 investors in the present study were further examined
to provide an analysis of the socio-economic status of the lives insured under the
policies. Thirty-three out of the 70 policies were in respect of lives other than that of the
policyholder and the socio-economic classification of these insured lives is given in
Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9: Social Class of Insured Life
Number of policies As % of Tot
Landed and Rentier	 6	 18
Clergy	 3	 9
Professional and Bankers 	 7	 21
Manufacturers	 2	 6
Merchants	 1	 3
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 3	 9
Women	 5	 15
Unknown	 6	 18
Total	 33	 100
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Policy Registers and CARD
and BARD Databases. Analysis of 70 policies of which 33 were insuring
lives other than that of the policyholder.
Table 5.9 shows that in the present study, Women were almost as likely as
Professionals, the Landed and Rentiers to be the insured life. All five of the policies
insuring the lives of these women were taken out by male policyholders. Two of the
women were the wives of policyholders, two were widows and one was the wife of a
third party. Clark has established that a husband might insure the life of his wife in order
to protect the family against the loss of her reversionary income on her death. 5° This
may have been the case for one of the five women identified in the present sample. The
Rev. James William Arnold insured his wife, Mary's life for £1,500 in 1849 when she was
50. This policy was surrendered in 1860 and replaced with a further policy. In another
case, Joseph Enoch, a gentleman from Bengeworth, insured the life of his wife in 1837
for £200 when she was 60. Enoch may also have been protecting a reversionary
income. Here, however, the amount involved seems to be rather low for a gentleman to
require such insurance. In another example, two solicitors from Whitchurch, William
Wycherley Brookes and John Lee took out a contingent survivorship policy on the lives
of Elizabeth Bickerton, a widow from Whitchurch and her mother, Elizabeth Gill of
Chester for £100 in 1827. This policy was most probabiy insuring a loan, given the size
of the policy and the fact that it was abandoned after five years in 1832. The high
proportion of policies where Professionals and Rentiers were nominated as the insured
lives by policyholders suggests that some at least of these policies may have been
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insuring business risks. This is confirmed by the evidence relating to the duration of
these policies, which is discussed below.
5.3.1.2 Age of Policyholders
As has been shown in Table 5.8, the majority of investors who insured their own
lives came from the Professional and Banker group. This confirms earlier evidence that
these groups were anxious to mitigate the risk of leaving their families in straightened
financial circumstances on their death. Professionals were under pressure to live the
lives of gentlemen. Indeed they often described themselves in share registers as
gentlemen, rather than by their professional titles. This may have resulted this group
living up to and possibly beyond their incomes, with resulting hardship and the very real
fear of 'sinking' in the social scale after the death of the income earner. It is no surprise
that the average age of investors from the Professional group taking out insurance on
their own lives was 37. This was the age at which these investors were probably
relatively newly married and had young families. Earle reveals that in his sample of 375
middle-class Loridoners, 79 per cent of husbands were over the age of 25 when they
married and nearly 30 per cent were over the age of 3Q 51 Although Earle's sample is
taken from an earlier period than that of the CARD Database sample, it is probable that
the middle-class investors in the present study married at a similar age. The age at
which policyholders, in general, took out insurance has does not appear to have been
investigated in earlier research. In the present study, the age at which the 25
policyholders who insured their own lives took out their policies has been calculated. In
total these individuals took out 37 policies and the analysis of their ages is given in Table
5.10.
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Table 5.10: Average Age of Self-insured by Social Class
	Number of	 Average Age in years of Life
	
Investors	 Insured at Start of Policy
Clergy	 1	 48
Rentier	 1	 30
Landed	 2	 38
Farmers	 1	 45
Professionals	 18	 37
Bankers	 1	 52
Merchants	 3	 27
Shopkeepers	 2	 35
Service Industry and Servants
	
7	 39
Unknown	 1	 35
Total	 37	 37
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Policy Registers52 and the
CARD and BARD Databases. Data comprise 37 policies of the 25
policyholders who insured their own lives.
There are insufficient numbers in any of the groups other than Professionals to draw any
reliable conclusions on the age at which different social groups took out policies. The
data for the group as a whole reveal that the 25 policyholders took out insurance at an
average age of 37. The age at which each of the 37 policies were written varied from 24
to 63 but 62 per cent were taken out when the policyholder was between the ages of 27
and 37, which is consistent with the use of life insurance when families were young and
presumably most vulnerable.
5.3.1.3 Duration of Policies
Life insurance policies which were abandoned after a short period were
probably taken out to protect short-term risks, such as a loan or some business-related
commitment. Once the loan was repaid or the commitment completed the policy would
be cancelled. Policies which were maintained over a long period would be more likely to
relate to the protection of family lifestyle or assets. The 50 policyholders in the present
study generally maintained their insurance for a considerable period of time. The
average duration of policies for each socio-economic group is set out in Table 5.11.
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Table 5.11: Average Duration of Policies by Social Class of Policyholder
Number of Policies	 Average Duration of Policy in
Clergy	 8	 14
Rentier	 12	 14
Landed	 4	 16
Farmers	 1	 43
Professionals	 20	 28
Bankers	 2	 26
Merchants	 4	 36
Shopkeepers	 7	 26
Service Industry and Servants	 8	 13
Women	 2	 31
Unknown	 2	 19
Total	 70	 22
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Policy Registers and the
CARD and BARD Databases. Data comprise 70 policies relating to 50
policyholders who were also investors.
The average duration of the 70 policies taken out by the 50 investors in the present
study was 22 years. Of these policies, 37 were in respect of insurance of the
policyholder's own life. The average duration of these policies was 27 years. All but
three of the 25 investors who insured their own lives retained the policy until they died. It
is very likely that these investors were using life insurance as a protection for families
rather than short-term cover for business loans or other transitory risks. As a whole, the
average duration of policies where the policyholder insured a life other than his own was
16 years. This was substantially less than the duration of policies insuring the
policyholder's own life. The number of policies in the present study where the insured life
was not that of the policyholder was only 33. Thus, any conclusions drawn from analysis
of the socio-economic characteristics of the insured life must be regarded with caution.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that five out of the seven policies naming Professionals
as the other life insured were in connection with loans or other business arrangements.
Only one of these policies was taken out by a policyholder from the Professional group
on the life of another Professional. This was a policy taken out in 1847 by Charles
Meredith, a solicitor from Lincoln's Inn, on the life of Thomas Andrew Fitzgerald
Reynolds, another solicitor from London. It is possible that these individuals had a
business relationship and the insurance policy for £2,000 was to cover partnership
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commitments. This policy was abandoned after five years. A further three policies were
taken out on the lives of articled clerks or apprentices to professions. These policies
were for relatively modest amounts. For example, in 1849, Charles Frederick Marshall
and John Lord, tailors from Bath, insured the life of Francis William Ford, an articled
clerk in Chancery Lane for £100. Ford was twenty-one years old when the policy was
initiated and it ceased after two years. It seems likely that this policy was to insure a loan
to cover Ford's premium as a clerk. Similarly, in 1833, William Burman, a druggist from
Stratford upon Avon, insured the life of Thomas Southam Burman, an apprentice to
David Rice, a surgeon from Stratford, for £1,000. Thomas Southam Burman was
nineteen when the policy was taken out and it was surrendered after nine years,
presumably when the young surgeon was able to repay the loan.
These relatively short-term policies were not typical of the way investors in the
present study used life insurance. Evidence suggests that the comfortably wealthy
investors had no real need for life insurance. Data are not available on the wealth of the
policyholders in the present study, but other indicators, such as the virtual absence of
policyholders who held shares in more than one company, are prima fade evidence that
they were not among the wealthiest investors. Only three policyholders owned shares in
more than one company and only two were amongst the 973 members of the prestigious
philanthropic, political and social institutions in the Birmingham Database. These
societies, where influential people could meet, were likely to have been fora for the
transfer of information, as discussed in Chapter 6.3.2. The most probable means of
information transfer for individuals who were not members of this elite, apart from direct
advertising in newspapers such as the Birmingham Gazette, was through professional
intermediaries. It has already been established that members of the Professional group
was the most likely investors to use life insurance and there is evidence that at least four
solicitors who were investors in the CARD and BARD Databases arranged life insurance
for policyholders in the present study. These individuals did not hold policies with
London Life themselves but, based in the urban centres of Warwick, Leamington,
Gloucester and Bath, they would have had opportunities to disseminate information to a
potentially large number of clients.
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The initial decision to take out life insurance may well have been influenced by
professional advisers. The decision to retain the policies over very long periods of time
when perhaps family circumstances would have changed reflects a considerable degree
of risk aversion amongst these investors. As is shown in Table 5.11, the average
duration of the policies in the present study was 22 years, with 20 of the policies lasting
for more than 30 years. The average sum insured by policyholders in the present study
was £1344, although the maximum amount was £5,000. These amounts were very
substantial, although perhaps not unusually so. Walford estimates that £10.5 million of
the £14.5 million new policies in 1849 were for insured sums of over £500. Of the 70
policies taken out by the investors in the sample, 47 ran to maturity, that is, they matured
on the death of the insured life. Maintaining these policies involved a considerable
outlay. The overall cost of to the policyholders of maintaining the policies to maturity was
calculated by compounding the annual cost of premiums at 3 per cent per annum over
the remaining life of the policy. The total cost of these 47 policies amounted to £132,500.
In return the policyholders received only £64,000 on maturity. Only the very risk averse
would have continued to pay premiums on these policies, which demonstrated such
poor economics. Table 5.12 sets out the average size of the amount insured and the
average premiums payable.
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Table 5.12: Amounts Insured and Premiums Paid
Policies Average Maximum Minimum Average Premium
	
Sum	 Sum	 Sum	 Annual	 Rate
	
Insured	 Insured	 Insured Premium
	
Number	 £	 £	 £	 £
Clergy	 8	 975	 1,500	 500	 28.23	 2.90
Rentier	 12	 1,342	 3,500	 100	 47.84	 3.57
Landed	 4	 2,513	 4,000	 1,000	 90.57	 3.60
Farmers	 1	 2,000	 2,000	 2,000	 77.92	 3.90
Professionals	 20	 1,528	 5,000	 100	 52.23	 3.42
Bankers	 2	 2,750	 5,000	 500	 132.80	 4.83
Merchants	 4	 800	 1,000	 400	 32.50	 4.06
Shopkeepers	 7	 400	 1,000	 100	 8.90	 2.23
Service Industry	 8	 1,275	 3,000	 200	 53.08	 4.16
and Servants
Women	 2	 1,750	 2,500	 999	 40.68	 233
Unknown	 2	 1,175	 2,000	 350	 33.00	 2.81
Total	 70	 1,344	 5,000	 100	 47.28	 3.52
Source: Data from London Life Assurance Policy Registers and CARD
and BARD Databases. Data comprise 70 policies relating to 50
investors.
As might be expected, the policyholders from the wealthiest socio-economic groups
insured the largest amounts. The smaller sums insured in the Merchant category and
the wide range of amounts insured by Professionals suggests that in these two groups
life insurance was being used for business purposes. The other groups would appear to
be composed of investors who had sufficient wealth to maintain their policies and who
were reluctant to abandon them.
In conclusion, life insurance appears to have been widely adopted by investors -
in the West Midlands. It was a convenient mechanism for mitigating risk, particularly
amongst professionals and the clergy. The present research confirms the view that life
insurance was most readily used by the middle classes who were comfortably off but not
very wealthy. These investors clearly belonged to a group who readily adopted financial
innovation and they were probably more risk averse than their peers.
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6.1 Introduction
Access to information is the key determinant of risk evaluation and investment
decision-making. Investors must be able to assess the accuracy of the information
through mechanisms of verification and confirmation. 1 The most likely sources of
company-specific information, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
were the officers, promoters or existing shareholders of that company. Market
information arises from the collective interpretation of political or macro-economic
events. The collective response of investors to both general and specific information
results, ultimately, in a common market sentiment. This can produce the dramatic events
of mania or crises; it may also result in selling or buying of securities on a more modest
scale.2 Chapter 4 discussed whether investors behaved rationally in response to the
information they received. This Chapter examines the potential sources of information in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the reliability of this information and how it was
disseminated to the investing population.
A pre-requisite of an efficient market is that all investors have access to the
same information at the same time and interpret it in the same way. 3 In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries both company specific and general market information was
transmitted through two principal media, namely the press and word of mouth. The press
included newspapers, more specialised publications, such as the CouCse of the
Exchange or the Railway Gazette, and pamphlets. Opportunities to pass information by
word of mouth occurred in both public and private spheres. This social learning is
regarded by some researchers to be a much more effective means of transmitting
information and forming collective opinion than that of the mass media. 4 Access to this
information was constrained by gender and socio-economic status. Male investors had
access to both printed media and information transmitted by word of mouth in reading or
newsrooms. 5 These inner sanctums were not accessible to women. Although, Carswell
found evidence that women established their own coffee house in Birchin Lane in the
City of London, which they turned into a club for drinking tea and playing the stock
exchange during the South Sea Bubble mania. 6
 This establishment appears to have
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been short lived and there is no evidence that women had access to provincial coffee
houses. The basis upon which women made investment decisions, or as earlier
research suggests, those decisions were made for them, is discussed below. 7 Probably
one of the most reliable information conduits was through family networks. 8 The sphere
of work, business partnerships, trade associations and contacts with specialists such as
bankers and brokers must also have been important. Again access to these media was
almost exclusively available to male investors only. Membership of philanthropic,
political, religious or social organisations also presented opportunities to give and
receive information.
The present study attempted to quantify the efficiency of information flow both
about the company and about macro-economic conditions. Information transfer was
measured by comparing the prices of two canal companies' shares, as recorded in the
London market, with prices for the same companies recorded in the local market. The
degree of correlation between the yields on government stock in the national market and
canal shares in the local market was also examined. The degree of inter-connectedness
between individual investors was investigated and the relative importance of family,
business and social interactions was assessed.
6.2 Information Transfer through Public Media
6.2.1 Development of a National Capital Market
An efficient market is one in which all the participants have access to the same
information at the same time, interpret the information in the same way and are able to
deal freely on equal terms without legal or administrative constraints. 9
 A pie-requisite of
an efficient market is a national capital market, where all investors are equally able to
buy and sell all classes of stock on equal terms regardless of where they live. A key
factor in the growth of an efficient national capital market is the development of fast and
accessible methods of information transfer. Quick and reliable information flow was
facilitated by technological, social and legal change during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Considerable research has been carried out on this evolutionary
process. 1 ° Evidence of the availability of information and the mechanisms of information
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flow was obtained from contemporary media such as newspapers and pamphlets. To
evaluate whether the capital market was efficient and to determine when local or
regional markets became integrated into a national market, the behaviour of individual
stock and share prices was analysed. Most of the empirical research on the eighteenth-
century capital market has been confined to the study of the behaviour of government
and quasi-government stocks. For example, Mirowski used price and dividend data for
Consols and quasi-public stocks, such as those of the Bank of England, the East India
Company and the Million Bank, for the first half of the eighteenth century to predict the
'ex-post rational' price of stocks. This price was derived from the present value of future
dividends. It was then compared to the actual price of these stocks. Mirowski concluded
that the lack of correlation between the predicted and actual price of the stocks
demonstrated that the market was not efficient. 11 It seems that the basic premise of this
research is, however, flawed in two respects. Firstly, the future dividend flow was
discounted by the long-term interest rate. In the case of government stocks, the future
dividend rate is fixed and constant. Thus the price of the stock is a function of prevailing
interest rates, which vary according to macro-economic factors. Using the long-term
interest rate as a deflator seems to introduce a certain circularity into the argument.
Secondly, if market efficiency is a reflection of information flow, it would seem quite
rational for prices of government stocks to fall during times of war when investors know
that supply of government stocks is likely to outstrip demand. In spite of the results of
this analysis, Mirowski suggested that all the elements of a modern market were already
present in the eighteenth century, such as property transfer rules, arbitrageurs, freely
available price information and a wide range of potentially tradable instruments.
Other researchers have avoided the problem of using government or quasi-
government stocks to establish evidence for a national capital market. A study used an
index of regional building activity in Middlesex and West Yorkshire for three periods,
1730-1776, 1770-1820 and 1820-1880, compared with yields on Consols and the price
of Bank of England stock. Even though the property market was strongly affected by
local factors, significant correlation between the two series was observed in the later
periods. This suggests that although regional capital markets were still segmented in the
153
CHAPTER 6: INFORMATION TRANSFER
mid-eighteenth century by the time of the Napoleonic Wars there was evidence of capital
market integration.12
The present research also attempts to use regionally generated share price
information to test the development of a national capital market. In this case, the price
and yield of BCN shares was taken as an indicator of investor sentiment in a local
capital market and their behaviour was compared to that of Consols as representative of
the national capital market. This approach overcomes some of the problems of
Buchinsky and Polak's work on property indices since a continuous data series of two
financial instruments was available from 1770 to 1828. It has already been established
that investors in canal company shares were more likely to invest in government stocks
than they were in land (see Chapter 5.2.2) The BCN stock was sold in the regional
market of the West Midlands. Transfers of stock took place through the company and
the shares were rarely traded in the London market. For a period of more than seventy
years, over half the BCN investors resided in the local area, as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 61: Location of BCN Investors: 1768 and 1840
1768	 1840
	
Number	 As % of	 Number	 As % of
	
Total	 Total
Birmingham	 58	 55	 138	 25
Other West Midlands	 35	 30	 156	 26
London	 2	 3	 48	 9
Other	 10	 12	 287	 40
Total	 105	 100	 629	 100
Source: BCNI 768 from listing 105 original subscribers of 513 shares.
CN 1840 from listing of 629 shareholders holding 8,789 shares.13
Table 6.1 shows that even by 1840, only a small proportion of investors was resident in
London. This proportion may be understated since the location of 31 per cent of the
investors is unknown. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the majority of the BCN
investors in the I 840s did not have ready access to the London Stock Exchange. A
measure of the efficiency of information flow is the time taken for price sensitive
information to travel from the company to the national capital market, as defined as the
Stock Exchange in London. In the opposite direction, changes in national market
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sentiment, reflected by movement of the yield in government stocks, can be compared
with changes in the company's share price. A high level of correlation between the
behaviour of the yield on Consols and the yield on BCN shares would tend to indicate
the existence of a national capital market. The speed of information flow is a measure of
the efficiency of that market. The results of the analysis are plotted in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Comparison of Yield on BCN Shares and 3 Per Cent Consols
Source: BCN share price and annual dividends for the years 1770 to
1828. 14
 Yield calculated on mean annual price. Consols annual yield
from Mitchell.15
The BCN share yield was found to be highly correlated with that of Consols throughout
the period 1770 to 1828, as shown in Figure 6.1. The correlation coefficient between
these two series is 0.73, which with 59 data points is significant at better than 95 per
cent. Investors in the BCN, throughout the period 1770 to 1828, were clearly reacting in
the same way to the same factors which were affecting the market for Consols, traded
on the London Stock Exchange. It has been established in Chapter 4.4 that BCN
investors were also investors in Consols in the period 1817 to 1827 and most probably
throughout the period in the present study. Clearly, market sentiment was quickly and
effectively disseminated. This analysis suggests that there was a national capital market
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as early as the I 770s. Even though the majority of BCN shares were not sold through
the London Stock Exchange, investors were aware of the prevailing macro-economic
environment. The behaviour of the yield on BCN shares tends to question some of the
conclusions of earlier research based on the analysis of quasi-government stocks.
Mirowski suggests that the stock market devolved from a peak of efficiency in 1770 and
that thereafter non-market mechanisms for capital investment, such as attorneys placing
funds locally or kinship groups regained their ascendancy.16
The present research suggests that in the case of the BCN, market information
was efficiently transmitted. This was further demonstrated by comparing the prices
quoted in the Course of the Exchange and those recorded in the books of the company
for shares actually transferred. These two prices were used to establish the time
information took to travel from the company to the national capital market and vice
versa. Similar share transfer information was also available for the Stourbndge
Navigation but in the case of this company the evidence for efficient information transfer
was less conclusive, as can be seen in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Share Prices in the Course of the Exchange and
Company Ledger
Source: BCN data from Memorandum of Income and Expenditure and
Stourbridge Ledger price from the Share Transfer Ledger. 17 Course of
Exchange Prices from Course of the Exchange for the nearest day to
the middle of each month I 814 to 1846. The methodology is described
in greater detail in Chapter 4.5.2.
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Figure 6.2 shows that in the case of the Stourbridge Navigation there was a time lag of
approximately twelve months between the prices recorded in the Course of the
Exchange and the company books. The possible reasons for this are discussed in detail
in Chapter 4.5.2. It is likely that the small number of Stourbridge Navigation shares in
issue was a significant factor. In contrast, there is a close correlation between the price
of the BCN shares recorded in the company books and in the Course of the Exchange.
The BCN had more shares in issue and as a consequence had more shareholders in
London. In the sample of government stockholders described in Chapter 4.4.1, a higher
proportion of those holding 3 per cent Consols, also owned BCN shares than
Stourbridge shares. Out of a total of 25 holdings of 3 per cent Consols, twelve were held
by BCN shareholders, whereas only two were held by Stourbridge shareholders. 18 Even
after normalising for the fact that the BCN had double the number of shareholders, the
Stourbridge Navigation had substantially fewer investors familiar with the government
stock market. These Stourbridge investors were likely to have been less sophisticated
and less aware of market sentiment than their BCN counterparts. Market sentiment was
generated in the government stock market, based in London. 19 Although it was not until
the beginning of the nineteenth century that it became fully institutionalised the late
eighteenth-century government stock market was large and liquid.20
6.2.2 The London Stock Exchange
The main institution of the national capital market in government stocks was the
London Stock Exchange. Even before an institutionalised exchange was established, in
the last decade of the seventeenth century, there were sufficient stocks in issue to
support the emergence of specialised dealers. Morgan and Thomas note that, 'there
was a highly developed market [for dealing in stocks and shares] by the mid-[sixteen]
nineties'. 21 Licensed brokers had to be approved by the Lord Mayor, take an oath and
provide a bond of good behaviour. There were also many unlicensed brokers. After
several attempts an Act was passed in 1697 'To Restrain the number and ill Practice of
Brokers and Stockjobbers'. This Act limited the number of brokers to one hundred and
they each had to provide a bond of £500. There was a £500 fine for acting as an
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unlicensed broker, although it seems that this was not rigorously enforced and
numerous unlicensed individuals continued to trade. The Act continued in force until
1704. Dealers in stocks had operated from the Royal Exchange but in 1696 they left the
Exchange and carried on trading in the coffee houses in the City?
As the amount of government debt issues increased during the eighteenth
century, syndicates of brokers bid for the total issue and placed the debt with investors,
earning a profit. Although the mechanisms of the stock market became more
sophisticated, trading continued in a number venues such as the coffee houses and the
rotunda of the bank of England and the brokers and jobbers remained largely
unregulated until the Subscription Room was opened in 1801. Only subscribers to the
Stock Exchange could use the room and the committee of the Stock Exchange
endeavoured to prevent unlicensed brokers from trading in stocks.
This study has already established that CARD investors held government stocks
as part of their total portfolio of assets. They could then have acted as conduits of
market sentiment to the more local market for canal shares. Water, Canal and Dock
companies were not listed on the Course of the Exchange until 1811 and 'it took thirty
years for canal shares to become popular on 'Change Alley and Threadneedle Street'.24
Nevertheless, during the canal mania of the I 790s, the 'awakening of stock market
interest enabled genuine projects to draw upon much wider sources of capital, but it also
gave an incentive to reckless and fraudulent promotion'. Some modern research has
challenged the view that 'capricious changes in investor sentiments, changing fashions, -
or bubbles' are symptoms of an inefficient market. They suggest that investors were
differentiated by their reactions to market information. A limited number of 'smart money'
investors behave rationally. Although these investors influence the behaviour of
'ordinary' investors there is sufficient irrational 'noise trading' in the market to allow
speculative behaviour to dominate. 27 This does not mean that the market as a whole is
inefficient.
After the 1793 boom and the collapse of the bubble companies, there remained
a group of sound undertakings whose shares were regularly traded, although they were
not listed until 1811 28 There is evidence from the present study that canal shares
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became more widely held over time, possibly as a result of their being quoted on the
London Stock Exchange. For example, although the number of shares of the BCN held
by shareholders living in London only increased from just under 3 per cent in 1768 to
just under 8 per cent in 1840, the proportion of shares held by investors outside the local
area of Birmingham and the West Midlands rose from 14 per cent to 48 per cent. This
suggests that a more nationally based system of information transfer was operating by
the mid-nineteenth century. There were 63 canal companies established prior to 1824
with a capital of £12.2 million most of which were quoted in London. The total number of
joint stock companies, together with information on the relative importance of the sectors
in which they operated, are set out in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Joint Stock Companies Established Prior to 1824
Type	 Number	 Authorised	 Paid up Capital
Carital
Source: English.30
By 1842 the total capital of private sector companies quoted on the London Stock
Exchange had risen to £183 million, of which 31 per cent of the paid up capital was
accounted for by railway companies. By this time, canals accounted for just fewer than
10 per cent of the total, as shown in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Companies Quoted on the London Market in 1842
Type	 Number	 Paid up Capital
	
£ millions	 As % of Total
Railroads	 70
	
57.4
	
31
Joint stock banks	 n.a.	 32.4	 18
Assurance Cos., including	 107	 17.8
	
10
Mutuals
Canals	 59
	
17.3
	
9
Docks	 8
	
12.0
	
7
Foreign Mining Cos.	 24	 6.5	 4
British Mining Cos.	 81	 4.5
	
2
Gas Light and Coke	 27
	
4.3
	
2
Water	 11
	
2.5
	
I
Bridges	 4
	
2.1
	
I
Misc.	 n.a.	 25
	
14
Literary Institutions 	 n.a.	 1.0
	
I
Total
	
182.8
	
100
Source: Spackman.31
In spite of railway stocks being quoted on the Stock Exchange from 1827, Henry
Burgess, writing in his Circular to Bankers in 1835 noted that 'it is a remarkable fact that
the Railway system advanced and became established in the public confidence almost
wholly without the assistance of the Stock Exchange'. 32 Even when companies sought a
flotation on the London Stock Exchange they rarely used firms of stockbrokers who had
come to specialise in new issues. Instead many sought applications through
advertisements and used their own bankers and solicitors. Some were handled solely by
provincial brokers and some by both provincial and London brokers. Morgan and
Thomas note, however, that of a sample of 60 prospectuses taken from Bradshaw's
Railway Gazette for 1845, 35 firms of London brokers appeared on at least one
prospectus. The widening constituency of investors in railway stocks, which has been
observed in the present study encouraged provincial brokers to establish formal stock
exchanges.
6.2.3 Provincial Stock Exchanges
Exchanges in Manchester and Liverpool played an important role in early
railway investment. For example, by 1847 the Liverpool exchange quoted 193 domestic
and 40 foreign railway stocks. At the same time it quoted only one canal company.
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Local specialisation developed; in Liverpool in insurance and American securities; in
Manchester, railways and cotton; in Glasgow, shipping and iron, and in Cardiff,
collieries. Local exchanges also quoted local companies, which were not quoted in
London, although a large part of the orders received, were executed in London.
Provincial exchanges rarely traded government stocks, since transfers had to be
registered at the Bank of England. Table 6.4 shows the growth of provincial stock
exchanges between 1830 and 1861.
Table 6.4: Number of Provincial Stock Broking Firms 1830-1 861
	1830	 1837-8	 1845-6 1847 1853 1861
Birmingham	 -	 -	 19	 25	 13	 11
Bristol	 1	 3	 20	 32	 n.a.	 14
Liverpool	 4	 43	 90	 187	 102	 80
Manchester	 2	 38	 85	 105	 66	 49
Source: Killick and Thomas who assembled data taken from trade
directories.37
The Birmingham Stock Exchange was founded in 1845 and was always one of
the smallest. Examination of the list of members suggests that they were even fewer in
number than that suggested by Killick and Thomas. The members' list records that there
were only four member firms and thirteen individual members in 1845, rising to fifteen
members the next year. In 1847 a further eight members and two firms joined the
Birmingham Exchange. Interestingly, only two of the members in the period 1845 to
1847 held any shares in the canal and railway companies or banks in the CARD and
BARD Databases. These were John Wrighton, who held shares in the Coventry Union
Bank in 1836, and William Lee, who held shares in the GWR in 1835.° Neither owned
shares in any other company included in the present study. For a brief period the
Railway Times published share prices for stocks traded on the Birmingham Exchange.
On 9 January 1847 the prices of 85 different issues were provided by John Wade. This
compared to 122 issues traded in London and 141 in Liverpool. Six weeks later, after the
market had deteriorated only 12 issues were traded in Birmingham, although the volume
of stocks traded in London was unchanged. 41 Shortly thereafter, the Railway Times
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ceased to publish stock prices from provincial stock exchanges. John Wade was an
investor in the CARD and BARD Databases. He owned 450 shares in the Grand
Junction railway in 1845 and ten shares in the Coventry Union Bank in 1836.42
An analysis of the railway investors in the CARD Database reveals that less
than one per cent of the total 2,933 investors lived in Birmingham and only 3.2 per cent
lived in the West Midlands. This suggests that there was not an active railway share
market in Birmingham and the West Midlands in the mid-nineteenth century. This
contrasts with the active participation of men and women from Birmingham and the West
Midlands in the canal companies. The reasons for this are unclear. Certainly, even in the
I 840s many of the local canal companies were paying dividends of over 10 per cent per
year, as shown in Table 2 of Appendix V. In comparison, the railway company dividends
of I to 2 per cent would have seemed unattractive. This study has shown that investors
from Birmingham were well experienced in evaluating joint stock shares. For them,
railway investment was not an exciting new opportunity as it might appear to the
widening constituency of investors in the mid-nineteenth century. These Birmingham
investors were prudent and sophisticated. The lack of investment in railway shares
perhaps suggests that they preferred to invest their capital in existing businesses, canal
shares and government stocks as the best mix of risks and returns which was available.
Although there is little evidence of active participation in the shares of the canal
and railway companies by members of the Birmingham Stock Exchange, there is
evidence that individuals acting as brokers did deal and hold shares in these companies. -
6.2.4 Role of Brokers
Many unlicensed individuals acted as sharebrokers in spite of the efforts of
organised Stock Exchanges to regulate and license the profession. As Ward notes, the
canal mania of 1792 led a number of individuals to set up 'Inland Navigation Offices' or
style themselves 'canal agents' or 'brokers'. Many of these individuals advertised their
services in the local newspapers. The Birmingham Gazette carried advertisements from
brokers. For example, Myles Swinney advertised his 'Licensed State Lottery Office' at
25, High Street, Birmingham for tickets in the Irish and English State Lotteries in 1791
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and I 792. Swinney was not an investor in the CARD Database but did hold a share of
the Birmingham Library Tontine in 1799. At this time, individuals who traded in shares
often did not describe themselves as brokers. For example, Matthias Mogridge, a
Birmingham attorney, described himself as a 'General Agent' in the Birmingham Gazette
in 1792 in an advertisement to buy shares in the Worcester & Birmingham, Stourbrdge
and Dudley canals. By July he was also offering to buy Oxford canal and Coventry
canal shares.47 In the Stourbridge Navigation transfer ledger, Mogridge was designated
as a 'Gentleman'. Over the period 1776 to 1827, seven individuals were identified who
actively bought and sold Stourbridge Navigation shares. Closer inspection suggests
that only Mogridge was acting as a trader. Between March 1792 and March 1798 he
bought and sold twelve shares in nine separate transactions. On average he held them
for just under a month, although in most cases it was only seven days. He was most
successful in the period of canal mania when he made a profit of £1,850 in just seven
days. After the euphoria of the mania he was less successful and appeared to give up
dealing.
Analysis of the transfer register of the BCN from the time of the initial
subscription in 1768 to 1773 revealed that a total of 401 shares were transferred over
the period by 89 individual investors. Of these, only six investors might be classed as
traders, see Table 6.5 below. These individuals sold a total of 20 shares, which they had
held on average for 3.7 months.
Table 6.5: Investors Actively Trading Shares in the BCN 1768-1773
Named Investor	 Ascribed Occupation	 Ascribed Address
Richard Chattock	 Gentleman	 Solihull
Samuel Garbett	 Merchant, chemical manufacturer Birmingham
William Holden	 Saddlers' iron monger	 Birmingham
John Meredith	 Gentleman	 Birmingham
Thomas Tomkyn
	
Gentleman	 Bilston
Henry Venour	 Mercer	 Birmingham
Source: Names selected from 185 transfers of 401 BCN shares by 85
different investors between 1768 and 1773.°
Samuel Garbett was on the committee of the BCN and as such would probably have
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had privileged access to information. None of the others appear to have been
professional brokers. A further analysis of the behaviour of the original shareholders of
the BCN who subscribed for shares in March 1768 over a period of sixty-six years
revealed only five investors who bought and then resold shares a few days later. Out of
a total of 948 share transfers, less than 2 per cent of shares were traded in this way.
None of the shares bought and resold within a few days were transferred during the
period of canal mania. 51 Again there is little real evidence that these five investors were
acting as professional brokers. This was a profession that developed later as a result of
the efforts of the London Stock Exchange to restrict share dealing to licensed brokers
who were members of a recognised stock exchange. Analysis of the 5,913 shareholders
on the CARD Database revealed that 36 investors either described themselves as
brokers or gave their address as the Stock Exchange, London. Only one of these
individuals was an investor prior to 1800. This was Joseph Hawtyn, an auctioneer from
Banbury, who held three shares in the Warwick & Braunston canal in I 79452 Canal
shares were often advertised for sale by auction during the period of canal mania. It is
likely that the auctioneers acted as brokers although there is no direct evidence of this in
the books of the companies examined in the present study. For example, a Mr Boott
advertised an auction of five Birmingham & Worcester canal shares in July I 792 and
Thomas Warren was advertising the auction of fifteen shares in the Grand Junction
canal and seven shares of the Hampton Gay canal in ten separate lots in I 792•M
The location of the CARD investors who described themselves as brokers is given in
Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6: Location of Brokers in Canal and Railway Investors
Location	 Number	 As % of Total
Birmingham	 4	 11
Bristol	 1	 3
London	 20	 55
Liverpool	 9	 25
Manchester	 1	 3
Other	 1	 3
Total	 36	 100
Source: All investors designated as 'brokers' or 'sharebrokers' or giving
their address as 'stock exchange' in the CARD Database of 5,913
individuals.
All but four of the brokers were railway company investors. The importance of the
London market is evident from Table 6.6, but as has been discussed in Section 6.2.3
above, Liverpool was also an important centre for trading railway shares, ranking above
Birmingham, which was not an important centre for railway investment. Institutional
share trading, either in London or on provincial exchanges informed market sentiment
through word of mouth and through published share lists.
6.2.5 Published Media
Published sources of investment information were quite comprehensive by the
early-eighteenth century. For example, by the 1670s price currents were published and
by 1690 there were four regular publications, including Houghton's Collection for the
Improvement of Husbandry and Trade, and Castaing's Course of the Exchange. By
1702 a Daily Courant was published in London. These publications were aimed
specifically at investors and included commodity prices and the prices of government
stocks. The Gentleman's Magazine began monthly publication in 1731 and was widely
read both in London and in the provinces. It had a page of statistics on prices of selected
securities, foreign exchange rates, wheat prices and consolidated returns of the London
bills of mortality. The Birmingham Gazette, in the I 740s published prices of Bank of
England and East India Company stock, lottery ticket prices, and statistics on the
aggregate births and deaths by sex and age, which could be used to evaluate
investments in tontines and annuities. In spite of these publicly available sources of
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information, Mirowski noted the 'relative abundance of vehicles for dissemination [which]
actually disseminated such a dearth of information'.57
There is little evidence of published information on either the price of canal
shares before they were quoted in the Course of the Exchange in 1811, or the financial
performance of canal companies. In the early period of canal promotion, companies
were not required to publish financial information beyond rudimentary annual accounts,
which were available for scrutiny by their shareholders. These accounts were not
prepared on a consistent basis so the comparison of one year with another or one
company with another was difficult. Generally, contemporary publications concerning
canals tended to confine themselves to technical matters. For example, Phillips's
comprehensive review of inland navigation provided detailed technical information and a
brief summaries of the parliamentary history of each project. The entry for the
Birmingham Canal refers to the, 'great profits arising from this canal', but this information
seems unlikely to be sufficient for the basis for an investment decision. Other
contemporary commentaries on canals seem similarly concerned with technical rather
than financial matters. Even the Birmingham Gazette, which regularly published
notices about calls and general meetings for the BCN, did not publish share price
information. Similarly, an examination of the Gentleman's Magazine for the periods
covering the flotation of the Birmingham Canal Company and the construction of the
BCN revealed no references to the canal. Perhaps more surprisingly, a scrutiny of the
Gentleman's Magazine for the penod of canal mania also failed to reveal any references -
to this phenomenon. The page devoted to financial information appears never to have
provided price information on canal company shares.
Eighteenth-century pamphlets on investment were mainly concerned with
government stocks. For example, Thomas Mortimer's, Every Man his own Broker, first
published in 1761, ran to fourteen editions and sold 50,000 copies. 6° By the nineteenth
century, a wealth of advice was forthcoming on the efficacy of buying railway shares. 'A
Successful Operator' writing in 1846, promised A Short and Sure Guide to Permanent
Investment in Railways, 61 and 'One of the Initiated' wrote The Railway Investment Guide
in 1845. Both writers emphasised the money-making potential of speculating in railway
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shares. Railway shares were marketed to and bought by a wider group of individuals
than those of the canal companies. From 1849, railway companies were obliged to
make an annual parliamentary return, providing information on the paid up capital of the
company. TM The price of railway shares was quoted in the Course of the Exchange from
1827 and there were many specialist publications. Some of these, 'calculated to assist
parties investing in capital', are listed by 'One of the Initiated,' and include: the Railway
investment Guide, the Railway Shareholders' Manual and the Railway Dire ctory daily
papers such as the iron Times; the twice weekly Railway Herald, and the monthly
Railway Receiver. The weekly Railway Times was founded in 1837 and published the
reports of general meetings, although there was no consistency in the accounting
policies of the published information. 65 Information on the relative performance of each
railway company was collected and published to assist investment appraisal. The
Railway Times was joined by a myriad of other weekly publications, such as The
Railway Gazette, The Railway Chronicle and Herapath's Railway and Commercial
Journal, all of which provided similar information, including notices of meetings, traffic
returns, balance sheets, prospectuses, editorial comment and correspondence. Some
publications were specifically targeted at the investor, such as the Railway Critic and
Shareholders' Adviser and the Money Market Examiner and Railway Review. Other
weeklies, such as the Railway Bell and London Family Newspaper were aimed at a
wider audience. 67 All these publications carried share prices. In the case of the Railway
Times for a brief period in 1847, share prices were provided for the London, Liverpool,
Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham and Sheffield stock exchanges. Although with the
downturn in the market this ceased, and after August 1847 only London prices were
given. Individual companies also published Advertisers which were distributed free at
stations. For example, the London & Birmingham Railway Advertiser boasted a
circulation of 10,000 copies. These news sheets carried timetables and other
information about the company as well as advertisements.
Although published media became more important in the appraisal of
investments during the nineteenth century, the process of social learning remained a key
means of transferring investment information. Male investors could meet in coffee
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houses, navigation offices and share rooms to read and to discuss and transact
investment business. These fora were not available to women.
6.2.6 Navigation Offices, Railway Share Rooms and Coffee Houses
Prior to the establishment of provincial stock exchanges, meeting places were
established where newspapers and other information were available and investors could
transact business. In the latter part of the eighteenth century these fora were often
described as Navigation Offices or Canal Agencies. They sprang up and disappeared as
the mania for canal shares ebbed and flowed. In Birmingham, Overton's coffee house in
New Street, also known as the Navigation Coffee House, was founded in 1769. It
boasted London papers 'on the morrow of their publication at 2 o'clock', plus House of
Commons division lists, session papers, entry bills and Lloyds List.7° The Leicester Arms
was the venue for meetings of John Freeth and his friends in the Jacobin Club in 1792,
where copies of the London and provincial papers were available, together with
parliamentary reports.71.
In 1822 a Commercial and Newsroom was established in Birmingham, which
provided six daily newspapers, namely the Morning Chronicle, the Courier, the Sun, the
Traveller, the True Briton and the Statesman and ten weekly publications, the Observer,
the Philanthropic Gazette, the Farmer's Journal, the Examiner, Bell's Messenger, the
Birmingham Gazette, the Birmingham Chronicle, Gore's Liverpool Advertiser, Uoyd's
List, the Price Current and the Army List. A subscription of £1.25 per annum entitled the
user to nominate six London newspapers for the next year which were then selected on -
majority vote. By November 1823 the Newsroom was proving to be so popular that
shares were sold to raise money to build a Public News Room. 72 Three of the nine
committee members charged with raising the finance were investors on the CARD and
BARD Database. These included Charles Cope, a chemical manufacturer, Edward
Tilsley Moore, Esq.,74 and John Frederick Ledsam.75
6.2.7 Information Transfer through Public Media - Conclusions
As has been discussed in Chapter 5.2.1, out of the total of 5,913 investors in the
CARD Database, only 30 were investors in both canal and railway companies. This
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suggests that there were two distinct pools of investment. The market in canal shares
does not appear to have developed into that for railway shares. The institutionalised
public railway share market did not evolve from the localised and essentially private
canal company market. Both markets appear to have co-existed for a considerable
period. Although it has been shown that from the I 770s, canal investors made informed
decisions based on knowledge of the market in government stocks, buyers and selters
of canal shares appear to have been largely drawn from a geographically and socaUy
restricted population. Canal companies still retained a strongly local investor-base at the
same time that railway companies were drawing investors from a wide geographtcat
area. There was a period of about twenty years when the canal companies were still
yielding considerably better investment returns than the majority of the railway
companies. Although the paid up capital of canal companies quoted on the London
market in the I 840s was a third that of the railway companies, it still amounted to just
over £14 million. 76 This must have been sufficient for a national market in these shares
to have been sustained. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that this was the case. It
seems that the older forms of information transfer persisted, such as personal contact
and word of mouth. On this basis, canal investors might be expected to be more highly
connected to each other through business and other public activities than railway
investors were. The evidence for this is examined below.
6.3 Information Transfer through Semi-public Commercial and
Social Fora
When the market for investment was mainly local, as has been shown to be the
case in the canal companies, one of the most important mechanisms for spreading
information was likely to be existing business and commercial links. The social and
cultural life of the middle classes also provided opportunities, primarily for men, to meet
other wealthy and influential individuals and to have contact with prestigious members of
the aristocracy.77 It is difficult to establish whether investment information was
discussed at these meetings. However, the existence of such conduits is prima fade
evidence that information could have been disseminated in this way.
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6.3.1 Business and Commercial Fora
Before joint stock company shares were traded on the London Stock Exchange,
purchases and sales of shares were generally made locally. Decisions were likely to
have been informed by prevailing market sentiment, as has already been discussed in
Section 6.2.1 above. Nevertheless, the decision to buy or sell a particular canal
company stock was probably the consequence of information available in the local
market. There is evidence, reviewed in Chapter 4.5.3, that investors could differentiate
between the relative risk of each stock and make an informed choice. The source of
much of this information would have been existing shareholders and the officers of the
company concerned. These individuals may have disseminated that information to
others through public and private spheres of contact. A potentially important source of
contact was the semi-public fora of voluntary associations. The members of 33
philanthropic, political, religious, commercial and social voluntary associations based in
Birmingham were assembled to form the Birmingham Database. The institutions
included are shown in Table 7 of Appendix I. The methodology used to construct the
Birmingham Database is discussed in Chapter 2.4. The 1,291 individuals analysed in
the Birmingham Database comprised a sample of the middle-class elite, which
dominated Birmingham social life between 1760 and 1850. If investors were also
members of the Birmingham Database, this is a prima fade evidence that investment
information could have been disseminated through these fora.
The degree of social and business interaction in Birmingham was assessed by -
comparing those BCN investors who attended general assembly meetings in 1768,
1790, 1800 and 1810 with those on the Birmingham Database. General assemblies of
the BCN were usually held semi-annually. Committee meetings of smaller groups of
active investors and managers of the company met more frequently, often weekly in the
early years of the company's existence. Female shareholders, with rare exceptions,78
did not attend the general assemblies, although male shareholders did attend as proxies
on their behalf. The general assemblies were well attended; there were between 40 to
60 per cent of male shareholders present at meetings examined in 1790, 1800 and
1810. The proportion attending meetings appears to be high but accords with the
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numbers attending the general assemblies of other canal companies, for example the
Coventry canal and the Warwick and Birmingham canaL 8° Members of the Birmingham
Database made up 10 per cent of the male investors of the BCN in 1840 and 22 per cent
of the Birmingham Database investors attended BCN proprietors' meetings. 81 These
individuals would have been well informed about company affairs and they knew each
other both in a business context and socially. It is highly likely they were disseminators
of information and that they did this in a social as well as a business context.
Individuals who belonged to business partnerships were likely to have passed
on information about investment opportunities. Given the level of trust inherent in such a
relationship, a high degree of commonality of investments might be expected between
business partners. In the case of banking partnerships, there is considerable evidence of
members of the partnership holding shares in the same company both singly and jointly.
For example, banking partners who were investors in the BCN in 1840 included Samuel
Lloyd and John Taylor and Osgood Haribury, who was the London correspondent
banker to the LLoyds. Partnerships of attorneys included John Simcox and John Lee,
Clement lng!eby and William Spurner. 82 Attorneys and bankers were accustomed to
giving investment advice as part of their normal business activities. For example,
Samuel Tertius Galton, himself, sought advice from his French bankers as to whether to
sell 'French stock' in 1818.
By the end of the eighteenth century, professionals began to establish their own
regulatory societies, such as the Birmingham Law Society, which was founded in 1818.
Samuel Garbett and Josiah Wedgwood were founder members of the General
Chamber of Manufacturers in I 785. Garbett was an investor in the CARD Database. A
Commercial Committee of prominent Birmingham businessmen was formed in 1790.
Amongst the 45 individuals who attended a meeting of the Committee in May 1790, 17
were members of the CARD Database. If the institutions analysed in the Birmingham
Database are classified into philanthropic, religious, political, commercial and social
categories, the highest proportion of investors is found in the commercial section, as
shown in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.7: Membership of Institutions in the Birmingham Database and Number of
Investors
	Members	 Investor Members
	
Number	 Number	 As % of Total
Members
Philanthropic	 399	 75	 19
Commercial	 56	 15	 27
Political	 237	 22	 9
Religious	 193	 24	 12
Social	 203	 25	 12
Total	 895	 161	 18
Source: Members of the 33 institutions in the Birmingham Database.
Members include the same individuals who are members of more than
one categoiy of institution. Investors include investors who are members
of more than one category of institution.
These institutions were an important aspect of the public sphere in which wealthy
middle-class males socialised and no doubt conducted business. Much of this activity
was designed to promote the economic power of the participants and to demonstrate,
'middle-class weight and responsibility'. 87 Even ostensibly philanthropic activities
enabled the leaders of middle-class society to demonstrate the extent of their wealth and
organisational skills to their peers and members of the landed and aristocratic classes.
The most prestigious of these philanthropic activities were useful fora for the exchange
of information and are examined in greater detail below.
6.3.2 Voluntary Associations
The credit-worthiness of individuals was enhanced by their reputation and
standing in the public sphere. The middle-class elite involved in conspicuous public
service, such as serving on the committee of the Birmingham General Hospital,
employed the skills gained as bankers, lawyers and businessmen in philanthropic
activities. 90 These wealthy individuals were also likely to have been regarded as sources
of reliable information and advice about investment opportunities. The present study
examined the relative importance of various Birmingham philanthropic, religious, political
and purely social institutions as fora for the dissemination of information.
The individuals making up the Birmingham Database were compared to the
investors in the CARD and BARD Databases. A total of 146 individuals (15 per cent) of
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the members of the Birmingham Database were found to be investors. These individuals
belonged to the wealthier middle-class groups as can be seen from Table 6.8.
Table 6.8: Socio-economic Classification of Investors in the Birmingham Database
Number As % of Total
Clergy	 12	 8
Landed and Rentiers 	 32	 22
Professionals and Bankers	 40	 28
Manufacturers	 25	 17
Merchants	 19	 13
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 15	 10
Women	 3	 2
Total	 146	 100
Source: Data from 146 individuals in the Birmingham Database who are
also investors in the CARD and BARD Databases. Unknown socio-
economic groups reallocated in proportion to the number of known male
investors in each group.
Investors who were also members of the Birmingham Database were primarily from the
wealthier Landed, Rentier, Professional, Manufacturer and Merchant groups. The Clergy
and the Artisan/Shopkeeper groups only accounted for 18 per cent of the total. The
proportion of Women, as might be expected, was also very low. Women were
encouraged to participate in philanthropic activity, but their contributions tended to be
confined to purely social and charitable roles.91 Although fifteen of the ninety benefactors
of the Birmingham General Hospital were women, there were no women on the
committee. Women appear to have been active members of societies only when men
were not or could not be involved, for example in dispensing charity to other women.
An example of a society run by women was the Ladies' Society for the Relief of Negro
Slaves. This Society was active in the first half of the nineteenth century and involved,
amongst others, female members of most of the leading Quaker families in Birmingham,
such as the Lloyds and the Cadburys. Only one member of the Society, Barbara de
Lys, also held shares in the BCN.
Wealth was obviously an important factor in the number and prominence of an
individual's philanthropic and social activities and hence that person's level of
connectivity to other individuals. Wealthier investors were also more likely to own
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multiple shareholdings and thus also have more opportunities to receive investment
information and pass it on to others. An analysis of the 146 investors in the Birmingham
Database revealed that they were more likely than average to hold shares in more than
one company, as shown in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9: Investors in the Birmingham Database Owning Multiple Investments. (In
Number of Investors)
Number of Investments
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 Total
Clergy	 5	 2	 2	 2	 10
Landed and Rentier 	 17	 13	 2	 0	 32
Professional and Bankers	 23	 5	 11	 0	 39
Manufacturers	 16	 9	 1	 0	 26
Merchants	 12	 5	 1	 0	 19
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 9	 4	 1	 2	 15
Women	 2	 0	 2	 0	 4
Total	 84	 38	 21	 3	 146
Source: Data from 146 individuals in the Birmingham Database who are
also investors in the CARD and BARD Databases. Unknown socio-
economic groups reallocated in proportion to the number of known male
investors in each group.
Table 6.9 shows that 43 per cent of the investors in the Birmingham Database held
shares in more than one company. This compares with 10 per cent of investors in the
CARD Database as a whole, as discussed in Chapter 5.2.1. These multiple investors
were highly inter-connected and were probably well informed and effective conduits of
information.
Significantly, 88 per cent of those members of the Birmingham Database who
were also investors held shares in canal companies. Only 9 per cent were rail
shareholders and the remainder owned bank shares. This is further evidence that
trading in canal shares was essentially local and relied upon non-market forms of
intermediation, where the inter-connectivity of investors was important. In contrast, the
market for railway shares was intermediated through an institutionalised and largely
impersonal national market. The importance of non-market forms of intermediation has
already been noted in the mortgage market and in the provision of loans between family
members. The transfer of information through such private mechanisms was highly
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effective, and is examined below.
6.4 Information Transfer through the Private Sphere
The private sphere of relationships between family members and friends was an
important conduit of information. Family connections were often interwoven with
religious and business relationships (see Chapter 7.5.1). An attempt was made to
establish the total number of investors in the BCN who were linked by family
connections. A crude estimate of the total number of investors with family relationships
was obtained by listing all investors sharing a surname and the same address. This
probably understates the proportion of related investors since it ignores relationships
through marriage where surnames or addresses differ. The results are shown in Table
6.10.
Table 6.10: BCN Shares Held by Investors with a Prima Fade Family Relationship,
by Socio-economic Group
	1768	 1790	 1800	 1810	 1840 All Years
Clergy	 0	 0	 0	 0	 14	 14
Landed and Rentier 	 3	 1	 4	 3	 63	 74
Professional and Bankers 	 2	 1	 4	 5	 44	 56
Manufacturers	 4	 4	 2	 7	 15	 32
Merchants	 2	 0	 3	 1	 8	 14
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 0	 10	 0	 1	 3	 14
Women	 8	 0	 2	 7	 105	 122
Unknown	 5	 4	 16	 8	 60	 93
Total	 24	 20	 31	 32	 312	 419
As % of all BCN Investors 	 23	 26	 36	 39	 50	 43
Source: Family defined as investors sharing the same surname and the
same address. Data from BCN 1768, 1790, 1800, 1810 and 1840.96
Table 6.10 shows that a large proportion of the BCN investors were related through
family connections. The proportion of investors with family relationships with other
investors increases from 23 per cent in 1768 to 50 per cent in 1840, which is probably
the result of shares being distributed to family members on the death of an investor. This
confirms the importance of the local market for distribution of canal company shares.
The groups classed as 'financial' investors, namely, the Landed, Rentiers, Professionals
Bankers and Clergy had the highest levels of family relationship. This is consistent with
these groups being more reliant on information disseminated by word of mouth. In the
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case of 'economic' investors, such as Merchants and Manufacturers, direct business
contact may have been more important. Women were also strongly connected by family
relationships to other investors. This again suggests that advice from relatives was a key
part of the investment process.
If female investors relied primarily upon the advice of male relatives, the
analysis should show the family relationships of female investors to be predominantly
with related male investors. Both male and female investors in the BCN in 1840 were
classified into those which had no family relationship to any other investor, those which
had relationships with another family member of the same sex and those which had a
family relationship with a member of the opposite sex. The results of this analysis are set
out in Table 6.11.
Table 6.11: Family Relationships of Male and Female BCN Investors in 1840
Male	 Female
Number As % of Total Number As % of Total
	
Males	 Females
Same sex	 116	 26	 30	 17
Male and female 	 66	 15	 44	 25
Opposite sex only	 33	 7	 36	 21
No family relationship	 238	 53	 65	 37
Total	 453	 100	 175	 100
Source: Data extracted from List of Proprietors, 8 May 184O.
Table 6.11 shows that 37 per cent of female investors had no family connection with any
other investor, on the basis of the criterion of family relationship defined above. As has
already been discussed, this cilterion may understate family relationships particularly by
marriage. As expected, the percentage of female investors without family connections is
substantially lower than that for males. Female investors were more likely than males to
be related to an investor of the opposite sex. This seems to confirms the importance of
male relatives as advisors to their daughters and sisters. This was certainly the view of
Thomas Mortimer who wrote in 1761 that brokers only existed because female investors
relied upon them and that females would do better to use male relatives to render this
service instead. However, male investors were more likely than females to be related
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to other male investors, for example, fathers with sons, or with brothers. This again
confirms the importance of personal connectivity between males in the canal share
market. This was compared with the family connections of investors in the Great
Western railway in 1835, using the same criterion of relationship. The results of the
analysis are given in Table 6.12.
Table 6.12: Proportion of GWR Shareholders with a Prima Facie Family
Relationship
	Family	 Total Investors	 Family Relationship
	
Relationship	 Investors as
	
Investors	 Percentage of Total
	
Number	 Number	 %
Clergy	 6	 50	 12
Landed and Rentier 	 59	 457	 13
Professional and Bankers 	 39	 228	 17
Manufacturers	 13	 38	 34
Merchants	 23	 152	 15
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 44	 348	 13
Women	 60	 142	 42
Unknown	 5	 31	 16
Total	 249	 1,446	 17
Source: Family defined as investors sharing the same surname and the
same address. Data from GWR, Register of Proprietors.99
Table 6.12 shows that the overall proportion of investors with family relationships to
other investors is only 17 per cent compared with 43 per cent for the BCN. This is further
evidence that the market in railway shares was driven by national institutional
intermediaries rather than local personal relationships. The only surprising figure is the
high proportion in the of Manufacturer group who had family relationships with other
investors. This anomaly is probably because the total number in that group is low. Not
surprisingly, Women are the only group with a high proportion of family relationships.
This suggests that even after the market evolved into one dominated by national
institutional intermediaries, women were still dependent on their male relatives for the
management of their investments.
6.5 Conclusions
Analysis of the different characteristics of canal and railway investors suggests
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that two different mechanisms for information transfer and investor behaviour were in
operation. The dissemination of information about canal companies appears to have
been predominantly by personal contact and share transfers took place largely in the
local market. This market was informed by market sentiment in the national market as
has been demonstrated by the close correlation between the yield on BCN shares and
Consols. Or, the other hand, new mechanisms developed to transmit information to
potential investors in the railway companies. Share dealing became institutionalised and
information was disseminated through formal public media such as the stock exchange
and the press. There appears to have been little overlap between investors in canal and
railway companies in the present study, and the two models of investor behaviour
appeared to co-exist. There is no direct evidence that the modern institutionalised
system evolved from the localised canal company model. Certainly in the case of
investors in Birmingham, where the canals had been enthusiastically embraced there
appears to have been relatively little interest in railway investment. It may be argued that
canal investment was regarded as a higher risk and as a consequence required greater
personal scrutiny and investigation, hence preserving the older system of personal
information transfer. In contrast, there is evidence to suggest that railway companies
were regarded as a more homogenous low-risk commodity, which could be adequately
marketed through more impersonal media.
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7.1 Introduction
The investors in the present study represent a broadly defined middle class
which shared many common values. They were selected on the basis of one economic
criterion, namely ownership of shares. As a consequence, the basis of sample selection,
apart from this economic constraint, was neutral in terms of socio-economic background,
gender or social, cultural, religious or political orientation. Although the sample
population was broad based, it was also cohesive. It has been shown to share common
attitudes to both environmental and investment risk. Differences arising from socio-
economic background or gender, in the appetite for or mitigation of those risks have
been identified and discussed in earlier Chapters. These differences, however, are of
degree rather than substance. On the other hand, fundamental differences in the
attitudes to risk and investment are apparent between this group of middle-class
financial investors and the landed classes. In this Chapter the social and cultural
background of the CARD investors is examined. Inferences are drawn on how and why
his predominantly urban rentier class was differentiated from the landed classes.
Earlier researchers have made a case for distinguishing the middle classes from
both the landed and the labouring classes by the source of their income, which was
generated from the active pursuit of an occupation, in either a business or a profession.
For example, the middle classes were those who possessed property, but this was not
generally in the form of extensive holdings of land, but took the form of capital invested
in a business. The middle class included professionals, but excluded those involved in
manual labour. 1 This rigid classification according to the sources of income and wealth
has been questioned by Morris, on the grounds that it fails to cope with individuals who
derived income from many different sources, such as landed proprietors who also
derived income from businesses. 2 Other researchers have attempted to identify the
extent to which those who derived their wealth from business invested in landed estates.
Rubinstein and the Stones found little evidence that the wealthy middle class acquired
land, although Thompson suggests that the descendants of the wealthy middle class
used the money derived from commerce and industry to buy estates and embraced the
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lifestyle of the landed gentry. 3 Koditchek also suggests that this was also the goal of the
textile magnates of Bradford.4 The present research has shown that the investors in the
CARD Database did not own substantial amounts of land. Nor did they tend to inherit
vast wealth, although there is evidence that interests in businesses and investments
were inherited. The investors in the CARD Database were comparatively wealthy but, as
has been described in Chapter 4.5, they were also relatively risk averse. They were
concerned to nurture their wealth and preserve their comfortable lifestyle for themselves
and their dependants. What constituted the 'middle-class lifestyle' and whether social
and cultural mores can be the defining characteristic of class is also the subject of earlier
research. Perkin, for example, defined class in terms of ideals, the middle classes were
entrepreneurial and competitive, and the landed were paternalistic.5 This classification is
again challenged by Morris who suggests that it fails to recognise the paternalism
inherent in much of middle-class charitable activity or the entrepreneurial skills of many
landowners. 6 The complexity and difficulty of defining class according to a single
criterion is recognised by Neale who suggested a five-class stratification of society
defined by a mixture of economic and social indicators, such as income, wealth,
occupation, manners. Class was recognised by either the assumption of authority by the
upper classes and attitudes of deference by the middle and working classes. Neale's
middle and middling classes embraced most of social groups who were investors, from
industrial and commercial property owners to petit bourgeois and wealthier artisans.7
This wide spectrum of social groups is also recognised in Davidoff and Hall's definition -
of a middle class, comprising two ranks, based on a number of economic, social
religious and political criteria.8
This research has examined the how a prima facie middle-class population
evaluates and copes with risk. The sample population of investors appeared to exhibit a
number of common attitudes to investment, such as the need for liquidity, prudent use of
portfolios and life insurance to reduce risk and lack of interest in financial speculation.
These common values appear to be embraced by a broadly defined group of rentiers
drawn from the middle class or middling sort. This Chapter examines the extent to which
social and cultural factors, such as relative levels of wealth, age, gender and political
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and religious affiliation appear to have influenced the attitudes to risk and the behaviour
of these investors.
7.2 Comparative Wealth
Although the sample population shared many common economic and social
attributes, the CARD investors came from a broad range of income groups and owned
an equally wide range of capital resources. Colquhoun attempted to quantify the income
levels of each echelon of society in 1812 from royalty to the indigent poor. His 'attempt
to exhibit a general view of society' revealed an unequal distribution of resources. For
example, Coiquhoun's top ten income earning groups, excluding royalty, accounted for
just over 27 per cent of the aggregate annual income, but made up only 5 per cent of the
total population of Great Britain and Ireland. Nevertheless, Colquhoun's analysis reveals
the existence of a middle class comprising not only 'eminent' merchants, bankers and
manufacturers, but also more modest employers of capital such as shopkeepers and
artisans. A growing class of professionals comprised civil servants and those in the
fields of law, engineering and medicine. Colquhoun's analysis was used to estimate the
proportion of the total population of Great Britain and Ireland that belonged to those
socio-economic categories from which the investor population in the present study was
drawn. These categories are shown in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Estimate of Incomes of Socio-economic groups of Potential
Shareholders from Coiquhoun's Analysis in 1812 of Great Britain and Ireland
Socio-economic	 Population of Group	 Average Group	 Total Group Income
Group	 Annual Family
Income
	
Number	 As % of	 £	 £' 000s	 As % of
	
Total	 Total
Temporal Peers	 12,900	 0.08	 10,000	 5,160	 1.20
Spiritual Peers	 720	 0.00	 5,010	 240	 0.06
Baronets	 12,915	 0.08	 3,510	 3,022	 0.70
Knightsand	 110,000	 0.64	 2,000	 22,000	 5.11
Esquires
Gentlemen Living	 280,000	 1.64	 800	 28,000	 6.50
on Income
Eminent Clergy	 9,000	 0.05	 720	 1,080	 0.25
Lesser Clergy
	 87,500	 0.51	 200	 3,500	 0.81
Dissenting Clergy
	 20,000	 0.12	 100	 500	 0.12
Legal Profession	 95,000	 0.56	 400	 7,600	 1.77
Medical Profession	 90,000	 0.53	 300	 5,400	 1.25
Eminent Merchants	 35,000	 0.20	 2,600	 9,100	 2.11
and Bankers
Lesser Merchants	 159,600	 0.93	 805	 18,354	 4.26
Surveyors and	 43,500	 0.25	 300	 2,610	 0.61
Engineers
Manufacturers	 264,000	 1.54	 804	 35,376	 8.22
Shopkeepers and	 700,000	 4.09	 200	 28,000	 6.50
Tradesmen
Artisans	 4,343,389	 25.40	 48	 49,054	 11.39
Farmers	 1,540,000	 9.01	 120	 33,600	 7.80
Persons included in
	 n.a.	 n.a.	 n.a.	 5,211	 1.21
Other Groups with
Income from Funds
Total of Above	 7,803,524	 45.63	 n.a.	 252,597	 58.66
Groups
Total Population	 17,096,803	 100.00	 n.a.	 430,521	 100.00
Source: Table adapted from Colquhoun.9
Table 7.1 shows that in 1812, 45 per cent of the total population belonged to the same
range of socio-economic groups as the CARD Database investors. However, the
majority of the CARD Database investors were members of the more wealthy social
groups. This is shown in Table 7.2, which gives the soclo-economic categories of the
entire CARD Database.
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Table 7.2: Socio-economic Groups of Canal and Railway Investors
	No. of Investors	 Percentage of Total Investors
Landed arid Rentier	 1,115	 19
Clergy	 260	 4
Professional arid Bankers	 472	 8
Manufacturers	 171	 3
Merchants	 283	 5
Artisans and Shopkeepers
	
520	 9
Women	 841	 14
Unknown	 2,251	 38
Total	 5,913	 100
Source: Data from the CARD Database of 5,913 investors.
As can be seen in Table 7.2, the less wealthy Artisan and Shopkeeper group only make
up 9 per cent of the total CARD investors, whereas they comprise 29 per cent of the
total population in Colquhoun's classification. A direct comparison of the distribution of
the total population of Great Britain and Ireland and that in the CARD Database is given
in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Comparison of CARD Database and Coiquhoun Distribution of
Population
Categories According to Colquhoun	 CARD	 Database	 Colquhoun
Classification
	
Number	 % of Total	 Number % of Total
Landed and Rentier 	 1,115	 40	 1,955,815	 11
Clergy	 260	 9	 117,220	 1
Professional	 391	 14	 228,500	 1
Manufacturers	 171	 6	 264,000	 2
Merchants and Bankers 	 364	 13	 194,600	 1
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 520	 18	 5,043,389	 29
Total of Categories under Database	 2,821	 100	 7,803,524	 45
Classification
Other Colquhoun Categories 	 n.a.	 n.a.	 9,293,279	 55
Total Population as per Colguhoun
	 n.a.	 n.a.	 17,096,803	 100
Source: The number of investors in the Database was reclassified
according to Colquhoun's classification. Unknowns and Women
categories were ignored and percentages recalculated.
Table 7.3 shows the concentration of investors in the most wealthy groups, even when
comparing only those socio-economic groups covered in the CARD Database, that is
ignoring the 55 per cent of the population in the other Colquhoun categories such as the
labouring or pauper classes. This is not surprising since investment of surplus income in
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canal and railway shares was probably only undertaken after the acquisition of a
freehold residence and perhaps investment in government stocks. Colquhoun's 1812
analysis shows the importance of those sectors of the population reliant on income
rather than the employment of capital. The growth of this middle-class professional
group and its importance in the development of the market in financial investment is
examined in Section 7.7 below. When the distribution of total wealth including land and
capital is considered, the dominance of the traditional sectors of society is apparent. The
distribution of capital resources was discussed in Chapter 4, where Table 4.1 showed
that 49 per cent of capital investment in 1799 was in land and property. At the same time
the amount invested in domestic and foreign trade was only 8 per cent with a further 4
per cent invested in mines, timber and canals.1°
Comparative wealth clearly is an important factor in the evaluation of investment
risk. Opinion varies as to the extent to which wealth affects attitudes to risk. Although in
Bernoulli's view wealthy people are more risk averse, Sharpe suggested that increases
in wealth result in a greater appetite for risk. It is possible that both these premises are
true. It is reasonable to assume that individuals with a relatively small surplus income or
capital would be prepared to risk this in the hope of accelerating the acquisition of a level
of wealth which would normally take years, if ever, to amass. The sacrifice of this small
surplus would seem insignificant in comparison to the potential gains. On the other
hand, an individual with substantial wealth would probably be more reluctant to hazard
its loss. Julius Hardy, the Birmingham buttonmaker, appears to be an example of the
less wealthy speculator. Hardy was in business with his brother and they employed thirty
to forty workers. In 1792 he remarked in his diary that his business was doing well and
throughout that year he actively sought out speculative investments. In January of 1792
he bought shares in the Mining and Copper Company; in August he travelled to
Ellesniere to take shares in a proposed canal from Chester to Shrewsbury; in November
he bought shares in a proposed canal from Bristol to Worcester and in December he
travelled to Devizes to invest in the proposed Devizes to Southampton canal. This
activity took place at the height of canal mania. By February of the next year Hardy had
noted the deterioration of the political situation in France and the fall in Consols; by the
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end of April he had laid off half his workforce.12 It seems that most of Hardy's capital was
invested in his business and that he was prepared to hazard the surplus arising from
favourable trading conditions, perhaps because he did not have family commitments at
this point. Hardy does not appear on the share register of any of the companies in the
present study, but it is impossible to prove that he was merely a speculator. In contrast,
most investors in the CARD Database appear to have bought shares in the early canals
as part of a long-term strategy. As has been discussed in Chapter 6, share turnover was
slow and there is little evidence that shares were actively traded. For the middle class,
ownership of financial assets was an important strategy for the creation and
maintenance of wealth. In contrast, as outlined in Chapter 4.2, only twenty-one of the
investors in the CARD Database were identified as substantial landowners.13
The type of assets which generate wealth, rather than the absolute level of
wealth, is likely to have a greater bearing on an individual's attitude to risk. Land is an
illiquid asset and the income from land, particularly in the period from 1790 to 1815, was
probably largely ploughed back in agricultural improvements rather than invested in
financial assets. For example, Deane notes that during this period the landed classes
invested £2.2 million in inclosure. 14 In contrast, during this period a substantial
proportion of the wealthy middle class of Birmingham, invested in canal and railway
companies. The proportion of investors amongst these wealthy individuals who lived in
Birmingham was examined. Ballard's list of all individuals with estates of £10,000 or over
whose wills were proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury between 1775 and 1864
was compared with the investors in the CARD Database. 15 Of the total of 321 individuals
identified by Ballard, 108 were CARD Database investors. The results of the analysis
are shown in Table 7.4.
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Table 7.4: Investors Whose Estates were Valued at over £10,000
1775-1804	 1805-1834	 1835-1864
	
In CARD	 Total	 In CARD	 Total	 In CARD	 Total
Database Estates Database Estates Database Estates
Half Millionaires	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 2
Quarter Millionaires	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2	 2
£100-249,000	 1	 2	 1	 3	 5	 7
£50-99,000	 1	 1	 2	 4	 7	 18
£10-49,000	 9	 23	 33	 86	 46	 173
Total	 11	 26	 36	 93	 61	 202
As % of Total Estates	 42	 39	 30
Source: Total Estates from Ballard. 16 Probate values do not include real
estate.
Table 7.4 shows that between 30 and 42 per cent of the wealthiest individuals in
Birmingham were investors in the CARD Database. This would tend to contradict the
argument that the wealthy are more risk averse. On the other hand, as has already been
discussed, these individuals may not have regarded this type of investment as
particularly risky. These individuals were likely to have been financially sophisticated, to
have had good access to information and to have adopted strategies to mitigate their
risk. Table 7.5 shows the proportion of investors who died leaving estates of over
£10,000 who owned shares in more than one company, and who also appeared in the
Birmingham Database of members of the 33 prestigious voluntary societies of
Birmingham.
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Table 7.5: Deceased Investors with Multiple Shareholdings and in Birmingham
Database
Investors Not in
	
Investors in Birmingham 	 Total
	
Birmingham Database	 Database
Number of Number of Av. Estate Number of Av. Estate Number of Av. Estate
Holdings	 Estates	 L's	 Estates	 L's	 Estates	 L's
1	 68	 57,327	 19	 59,294	 87	 57,756
2	 22	 44,818	 13	 51,154	 35	 47,171
3	 7	 20,429	 10	 40,400	 17	 32,176
4	 4	 36,250	 0	 na	 4	 36,250
6	 1	 15,000	 0	 na	 1	 15,000
Total	 102	 50,855	 42	 52,276	 144	 51,269
Source: Data on estates taken from Ballard17 and BCN Transfer
Ledger. 18 Birmingham Database includes 973 individual members of 33
societies, listed in Table 7, Appendix!.
Table 7.5 shows that 57 out of the total of 144 investors in the CARD Database with
estates over £10,000 (40 per cent) owned shares in more than one company. The
proportion of multiple shareholders in the CARD Database as a whole is only 9 per cent
(see Chapter 5.2.1). Multiple shareholding, as has been seen in Chapter 6.2.1, is a
strategy for mitigation of risk. As might be expected, these wealthy Birmingham
shareholders were also members of fora where information could be exchanged
amongst other influential members of Birmingham society. Table 7.5 shows that 42 out
of the 144 investors (29 per cent) who left estates of over £10,000 were members of the
prestigious Birmingham voluntary societies on the Birmingham Database and over half
of these owned shares in more than one company. The socio-economic analysis of
these investors is given in Table 7.6.
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Table 7.6: Socio-economic Groups of Deceased Investors with Estates over
£10,000
Number of Investors Average Estate
in L's
Landed and Rentier	 13	 62,154
Clergy	 4	 30,000
Professional	 19	 41,503
Bankers	 17	 97,647
Manufacturers	 45	 39,579
Merchants	 20	 83,600
Artisans and Shopkeepers 	 15	 26,839
Women	 7	 7,229
Unknown	 4	 250O
Total	 144	 51,269
Source: Data from the 144 investors for whom date of death and size
estate was available.19
Table 7.6 shows that the Merchant and Banker groups left the largest average estates.
Since the probate value does not include land, this conforms to Colquhoun's estimate of
incomes given in Table 7.1. Inevitably, the sample of deceased investors is biased
towards those in the more wealthy groups, as only testators who left more than £10,000
are included. Ballard identified only one female testator, Phoebe Webster, a widow who
inherited her husband's wiredrawing business. Information on other female testators
collected from other sources reveals that their estates were substantially smaller than
those of their male counterparts. 2° The gender implications of wealth and shareholding
are examined in greater detail In Section 7.4 below. The type of assets held and their
relative value is also a function of the age of the investor are investigated below.
7.3 Age
Earlier research has suggested that age is an important determinant of investor
behaviour. Morris identified six stages in what he describes as the male middle-class
property cycle, which existed during the industrial revolution. 21 Each stage is
characterised by a different investment strategy. Men were usually in their late thirties or
early forties before they had accumulated sufficient capital, often inherited on the death
of a parent, to invest in a house and perhaps other real property and financial assets. Up
to that point, capital was accumulated in a business, the family home was usually
rented, and income was earned almost exclusively from a trade or profession. In the
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next stage of the cycle, unearned income from rents, dividends and mortgages became
a more important part of the family income; the family home was owned, and capital
might be withdrawn from the business. Finally, after death, accumulated wealth was
used to protect the lifestyle of dependants and the estate was more or less equally
apportioned to provide the seed capital for the next generation. The broad geographical
and occupational diversity of the investors in the CARD Database was used to test the
concept of age as a determinant of investor behaviour.
The dates of birth for 66 out of the total 5,913 individual investors on the CARD
Database were obtained from various sources, including life insurance data, wills and
biographies. This information was used to calculate the age of the investors at the time
they were first listed on the share register. The age of the investor's first appearance on
a share register is shown in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: Age of Investor on First Listing in a Company Share Register
Number of Investors Average Age on First Listing
Rentiers	 5	 40
Landed	 2	 27
Clergy	 6	 46
Professionals	 4	 35
Bankers	 16	 45
Manufacturers	 2	 47
Artisans	 1	 53
Merchants	 1	 25
Shopkeepers and Services 	 2	 36
Women	 5	 35
Unknown	 22	 39
Total	 66	 40
Source: Data from 66 out of 5,913 investors in the CARD Database.
Although the number of investors in the sample is relatively small, the average age of 40
for the first appearance in a share register confirms Morris's view of the middle-class
property cycle. However, the number of investors in each socio-economic category is
too small to make any meaningful distinction among the age-related behaviour of
different occupational groups. The average age of the five women in the sample was 35
and ranged between 20 and 46. Only spinsters or widows were able to own shares in
their own name and married women could only own shares if they were held in a trust on
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their behalf? This constraint at first sight, might explain the age profile. Closer
investigation suggests that this was not the case. Four of the women held shares in their
maiden names, although all four married and the men they married were alive when the
shares were held. Although the date of their marriages is not known, in view of the
women's ages it seems likely that they may have been married at the time the shares
were held. None of the women appears to have inherited the shares on the death of a
father or grandfather. The most likely explanation is that the shares were held in some
form of trust, possibly as a marriage settlement. The share registers in these instances
are silent on whether these women's investments were controlled by trustees, although
the existence of trustees was usually noted. All five women came from either the wealthy
Galton or Lloyd families; they were mature, probably well educated and must have been
exposed to a sophisticated financial family background. Regrettably however, there is no
direct evidence that they were anything more than passive investors.
The age of investors was further analysed to determine whether the propensity
to take risk was age-related. Each canal investment was classified as high or low risk, as
already described in Chapter 4.5.3. Railway company shares were always regarded as
very low risk and were classified accordingly. In Figure 7.1 high risk is denominated as
2, low risk as I and very low risk as 0.
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Figure 7.1: Age of Investor and Propensity to Take Risk
10	 20	 30	 40	 50	 60	 70	 80
Age of Investor
Source: Data from 66 investors extracted from the CARD Database. The
Y axis (Risk) is the level of risk associated with each in vestment as
determined by the analysis in Chapter 4.5.3 and 4.5.4, with level of risk
allocated as, 2 for high risk, I for low risk and 0 for very low risk Age is
the age of the Investor when they owned the shares.
Figure 7.1 indicates that in the sample, investors under 25 years old and over 55 did not
invest in high-risk shares. The small size of the sample and the lack of a clear trend
make it unwise to make any firm conclusion on the propensity of different age groups to
take risk. Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate that those in their middle years
would perhaps have been in a better position to evaluate and take nsk in comparison to
the young and perhaps less experienced, or the elderly and less commercially
connected investor.
7.4 Gender
The importance of female investors in the private sector joint stock companies
does not appear to have been sufficiently recognised by earlier researchers. 24 Davidoff
and Hall do acknowledge that the 'aggregate of small investments held by women' could
be regarded as an important source of capital in commercial and industrial development,
although legal and social constraints cast women in the role of passive providers of
capital, whose investments were managed by male relatives or advisers. In the present
study, women were found to be important investors, although the extent to which
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individual women made investment decisions is difficult to establish. Analysis of the
CARD Database reveals that 529 out of a total of 2,980 canal company investors (18 per
cent) were women. The number of female investors in the railway companies examined
in the study was 312 out of a total of 2,933 (II per cent). Women were thus an important
constituency even though no evidence was found in this study that they attended
meetings of proprietors or took any active part in the management of the companies or
their investments.
There were particular legal constraints preventing married women from owning
and disposing of property. Under common law, a woman on marriage lost her legal
identity and became a 'feme covert'. Any property owned by a woman became the
property of her husband on marriage. Wives lost control of personal property
permanently, but a husband could not dispose of his wife's real property, such as
freehold and copyhold land, without her consent. After his death, the wife's real property
reverted to her control. 27 Shares in joint stock companies were classified as chattels
incorporeal and a husband had the right to reduce them to possession, that is to convert
them into personal property over which he had absolute rights of disposal. 28 If the
husband did not reduce them into possession, the ownership of the shares reverted to
the widow on her husband's death.
By the eighteenth century, the provisions of the common law in respect to
women's property were being superseded by the use of equity trusts. These were drawn
up before marriage to provide a 'sole and separate estate' administered by trustees.
These settlements were used by a broad spectrum of social groups to preserve even
quite small amounts of personal property? Property was placed in the trust on behalf of
the wife who could benefit from the income but was not permitted to dispose of the
property. This protected the wife's assets from her husband's creditors. 30 The pre-
nuptial settlement usually provided for a specific jointure, whereby the cash portion a
wife brought into the marriage was commonly used to buy land to provide an income to
support the married couple and to provide an income for the widow on her husband's
death. The land itself was left to the heir on the death of the widow. If the husband left
no will, common law provided that real property should be left according to
195
CHAPTER 7: SoCIAL AND CULTURAL INFERENCES
primogeniture. This meant that all the real property went to the eldest son. In the
absence of any sons the property went to the daughters jointly.31
The pre-nuptial contract was also used to define the amount of pin money which a
husband was obliged to provide for his wife. This allowance was generally used to buy
clothes and other personal items, although researchers suggest that it was used in some
cases to invest in assets, such as property or shares. 32
 Carswell suggests that in the
early -eighteenth century, the legal position regarding the purchase of shares by married
women using pin money was unclear. He remarks that 'for a brief moment fashion and
the existence of a market in which women could deal legally because the law had never
thought of it, gave married women prominence and wealth in their own right'. The
women who took advantage of this pre-South Sea Bubble market were generally from
the upper ieveis of the aristocracy and their ability to access this market did not survive
the collapse of the Bubble. There is little evidence in the present study that married
women owned shares. With only two exceptions, the women in the CARD Database
were described as either spinsters or widows, although there is some evidence that
shares were held by women under their maiden names even though they may have
been married.
Researchers have also investigated the ability of women to dispose of property.
Erickson collated data from other researchers in fourteen areas of England covering the
period 1414 to 1710. She concludes that the perception that women had no access to
their property when married and only at the whim of their husband's will after his death is
not an accurate one. In her study, Erickson revealed that women were executrixes of
between 46 and 96 per cent of wills, usually those of husbands and sisters, and sole
executrixes in between 8 per cent and 80 per cent. This is confirmed by Berg who notes
that research into women's property in the eighteenth century was generally carried out
on rural records and that the practice in urban areas was different. Her study of the
wills of Birmingham testators between 1700 and 1800, confirmed that 18 per cent of wills
were written by women and women accounted for 30 per cent of executors and
guardians.37
The legal constraints regarding women's right to own property had a profound
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impact on the way both men and women invested and inherited wealth. The present
research shows how, within the constraints of a legal system that severely restricted
married women's property rights, a sample of BCN investors attempted to provide for
their relatives after death. The provisions in the wills of these investors shed further light
on how both men and women approached fundamental investment decisions in respect
of value, risk and diversification.
7.4.1 Wills and Female Investors
The Register of Transfers on Death of the BCN for the period 1787 to 1832 was
used to explore how women of the middle-class elite in the West Midlands settled and
inherited property. 38 In total, 98 transfers of BCN shares on the death of the investor
were analysed for two periods 1787 to 1797 and 1820 to 1828. These two periods were
selected to investigate whether there was any change in investor behaviour as the
market in shares in private sector joint stock companies developed. Although the later
sample contained less information on the names and relationships of beneficiaries, the
sample did have reasonably comprehensive data on the value of the total estate. The
earlier sample had little information on the value of the estates. Analysis of the two
samples produced remarkably similar results, as shown in Table 7.8.
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Table 7.8: Analysis of Testators and Beneficiaries: BCN 1787-97 and 1820-28
1787-1797	 1820-1828 Total
Testators
Total
Female	 Number
% of total
Beneficiaries
Total
Female	 Number
% of total
Beneficiaries receiving life interest
Total
Female	 number
% of total
% females receiving life
interest out of total female
beneficiaries
40	 58
	
98
13	 20
	
33
33	 35
	
34
48	 56
	
104
26	 31
	
57
54	 55
	
55
18
	
18
	
36
13
	
15
	
28
72
	
83
	
78
50
	
48
	
49
Wives
Wives as beneficiaries 	 8	 10	 18
Wives inheriting life interest	 6	 9	 15
% Wives inheriting life interest 	 75	 90	 83
Source: Sample comprises all transfers on death between 1787-97 and
1820-28 taken from the BCN Register of Transfers by Death 1787-
1832.
Table 7.8 shows that 34 per cent of the testators and 55 per cent of beneficiaries in the
BCN samples were female. Approximately 50 per cent of female beneficiaries received a
life interest only in the assets of the testators estate This is clearly because of the
constraints imposed by the legal system on married women owning property in their own
right. Nevertheless, many unmarried women also inherited life interests only. Although
some male beneficiaries did inherit life interests, the largest group of investors inheriting
life interests was female, amounting to 72 and 83 per cent, respectively, in the two
samples. Widows of testators were particularly likely to receive the life interest in their
husbands' estates. In the two samples the proportions were 75 and 90 per cent,
respectively. An example is Anne Simpson, widow of William Simpson of Bordesley
Green, whose will was proved at Doctors Commons on 29 November 1793. Anne
Simpson received the life interest in four BCN shares. On her death the shares passed
to William Keay, the son of William Simpson's first wife by a former husband and to
Thomas Crowne, Anne Simpson's own son by her former husband. 4° A more typical
example is that of Joseph Hadley of West Bromwich, whose will was proved on 21
March 1821. He owned two shares in the BCN and his total estate amounted to under
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£6,000. He left a life interest in the income to his widow, Nancy. On her death the assets
were to be sold and the proceeds divided equally between his sons, Joseph and William,
his daughter, Sarah Gilbert, and his daughter-in-law, Nancy Maurice. 41 An interesting
example of a female beneficiary inheriting an estate absolutely was that of Marie
Marguerite Richard, a Frenchwoman described as 'co-habitant' of George Augustus
Allen, an army captain who died at Sidmouth in 1826. Marie was left the residue of the
estate of under £10,000, which included fourteen BCN shares, after the deduction of a
£500 legacy.
The sample of BCN wills does not reveal any cases of primogeniture or the
favouring of eldest sons in the division of estates. Primogeniture was not common
practice amongst the middle classes.42 Eldest sons who had reached their majority and
were expected to carry on the father's business were often provided for during the
lifetime of the testator. In these circumstances, these assets would not be mentioned in
the will. Testators, on the other hand, carefully provided for daughters. The wills for the
earlier period of 1787 to 1797 reveal four cases where married daughters were left
shares in trust as part of a separate estate. A typical example is the case of William
Butler's daughter, Mary who was the wife of John Merry. Under his will, proved on 20
May 1791, her father, a gentleman from Birmingham, left his daughter the interest in his
real and personal estate during her life, stipulating that it was for her own, 'sole &
separate use notwithstanding her couverture for & free from the control & Debts of her
present Husband'. Unmarried daughters were also provided for in a similar way.
Brittania (sic) and Sarah Lee, the unmarried daughters of John Lee, a buttonmaker from
Birmingham, were left one BCN share each, in trust 'for her own sole and separate use
without the lett or controul of any person or persons with whom she may intermarry or
any of his or their creditors'. Their married sister, Rebecca Hodgson, was also left one
share under similar terms.
The will of Samuel Galton, who died in 1799, provided a carefully calculated
distribution of his assets which illustrated his view of the needs but also perhaps the
relative importance of his offspring. Samuel's only son, also called Samuel, inherited all
the banking partnership assets and shares worth three times more than those
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bequeathed to Samuel Tertius Galton, the eldest grandson of Samuel senior. Samuel
Tertius was sixteen when his grandfather died and destined to join the banking
partnership with his father. Samuel senior' s three other grandsons were fifteen, ten and
six when he died and although the two youngest ultimately joined the banking
partnership they were given half the number of shares that Samuel Tertius received. All
the grandsons were given the same £15,000 cash legacy. None of Samuel senior's
daughters survived him. His three granddaughters inherited half the number of shares
that the three youngest grandsons inherited and their cash bequest was only £6,000
each. Clearly the protection of the Galton family business was paramount. Perhaps it
was assumed that in the fullness of time income and capital generated by the business
would provide more fully for the younger offspring. The apportionment clearly illustrates
one reason why female shareholders tended to own fewer shares than their male
counterparts.
Earlier research on the size of the estates of wealthy individuals from Birmingham
gives the impression that women scarcely figured amongst the wealthiest individuals
between 1775 and 1924. Ballard found no women amongst the eleven ha'f and quarter
millionaires he identified from the probate valuations for the period 1775 to 1850. He
found only one woman amongst the lesser wealthy (defined as probate values from
£10,000 to £50,000) during the same period. This is surprising, since the two samples
in the present study taken from BCN shareholders revealed seven women leaving
estates in the lesser wealthy category out of a sample of only 98 testators.
Data on the probate value of the testator's estate exist for 51 men and women out
of the total sample of 98 testators. The average size of both male and female estates for
these 51 individuals is given in Table 7.9.
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Table 7.9: Estates of Testators BCN 1820-1 828
Testators Average Size of Estate
	
Number	 £
Males	 35	 22,660
Females	 16	 8,975
Total	 51	 18,367
Source: Sample comprises all estates in the BCN, which transferred on
the death of the investor between 1820 and 1828 for which data on the
total estate were available, from the Register of Transfers by Death
1787-1832. Probate values do not include the value of land.
The average probate value of the estates shown in Table 7.9 is £18,367. The average
size of estates of female testators is substantially less than that of their male
counterparts. This differential is much more marked than that between the average size
of shareholdings of male and female investors. An analysis of the share register of the
BCN in 1840 is given in Table 7.10.
Table 7.10: Average Size of Male and Female Shareholdings in BCN 1840
	Investors	 Averag HoldJg Market Value of Averge Holding
	
Number	 Number of shares	 £
Male	 454	 15	 3,313
Female	 175	 11	 2,353
Total	 629	 14	 3,046
Source: Share price used to calculate market value taken from Course
of the Exchange, 12 May 1840.
Table 7.10 shows that based on shareholdings in the BCN in 1840, the average value of
stock owned by female investors was only 30 per cent lower than those of male
shareholders. In comparison, the probate value of the estates of female investors in the
BCN between 1820 and 1828, as shown in Table 7.11, was 60 per cent lower than that
of their male counterparts. It is unlikely that this difference could be accounted for by
changes in relative wealth between the period 1820 to 1828 and 1840. If, as Davidoff
and Hall note, women 'were the beneficiaries of "passive" property, such as trusts,
yielding income only', it is not surprising that their estates were substantially smaller
than those of men. This view is challenged by Berg who notes that in her study of the
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wills of Birmingham women that 47 per cent owned real property. Nevertheless,
women in the social classes most commonly seen as investors in canal and railway
companies rarely owned and controlled substantial commercial business assets. One
woman who did was Phoebe Webster, who described herself in the share register of the
Warwick and Birmingham canal in 1798 as a wiredrawer. 5° Widowed in 1788 when she
was twenty-nine, she managed Penns Mill for twelve years until her son, Joseph was old
enough to take over the business. In 1788 Penns Mill was a substantial business
comprising three wire mills, a forge, steel manufactory, a warehouse and retail
organisation.51 After Joseph took over the business, Phoebe became a passive investor
with a continuing interest in the business of £9,000 on which she earned 5 per cent per
annum. 52 Whilst she was running the business she invested in 10.5 shares in the
Warwick and Birmingham canal in 1798 and in 6 shares in the Warwick and Braunston
canal.
The tendency for women to hold financial assets is also shown by analysis of
the 104 beneficiaries is identified in Table 7.8. The average size of estates where
females were the sole or main beneficiaries was compared with those of their male
counterparts. Probate valuations existed for 52 out of the total 104 beneficiaries. The
analysis by gender is given in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Value of Estates Passing to Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries Average Size of Estate
	
Number	 £
Males	 34	 17,474
Females	 18	 19,089
Total	 52	 18,033
Source: Sample comprises all estates in the BCN, which transferred on
the death of the investor between 1820 and 1828 for which data on the
total estate were available. Data from Register of Transfers by Death
1787-1832. Probate values do not include the value of land. Average
Estate comprises the mean total estate receiving probate, not the amount
individual beneficiaries received.
Although the analysis in Table 7.11 suggests that female beneficiaries benefited more or
less equally to their male counterparts, other evidence, such as Samuel Galton's will
suggests that wealthier individuals may have left the bulk of their estates to male
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relatives. The data refer to the total value of the estate only. This does, however, give
some indication of the value of assets passing to female beneficiaries. However, it
should be recalled that approximately 50 per cent of female beneficiaries received only a
life interest and consequently were not free to will their property to whoever they might
choose on their own death.
7.4.2 The Female Property Cycle
Morris makes a convincing case for a distinct cycle of asset ownership and
disposal in respect to men. Can any conclusions be drawn on the cycle of female
property ownership? As has already been discussed in Section 7.3 above, the small
sample of women in the CARD Database with known dates of birth first acquired shares
in the companies in the present study at the average age of 35. This age was only
slightly less than that for all investors. In view of the requirement to surrender assets on
marriage either to a husband or to a trust, it would be expected that women would tend
to hold shares for a shorter period than their male counterparts. This premise was tested
by calculating the number of years investors in the BCN retained their shares. This was
calculated in two ways. Firstly, shareholders on the registers in each of the years 1768,
1790, 1800, 1810 and 1840 were compared and the average number of years each
investor held shares was calculated. Because of the long time period between the dates
of the share registers, this analysis was only capable of producing a crude comparison
of the relative length of time male and female investors held shares. The results are
shown in Table 7.12.
Table 7.12: Average Duration of Shareholding in BCN 1768-1840
Number of Investors Average Duration in years
Male	 608	 3.95
Female	 217	 2.28
Total	 825	 3.51
Source: Number of investors includes all individuals who held shares in
the BCN in any of the five years, 1768, 1790, 1800, 1810 and 1640.
The analysis in Table 7.12 suggests that women held shares for a considerably shorter
average period than men. The second calculation of the average duration of share
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ownership was made from a record of all the transfers of shares made by the original
subscribers to the BCN over a sixty-six year period. This revealed that the average
period this group of investors held shares was 9.8 years and that female subscribers
held shares for an average duration of 10.6 years. This evidence is not consistent with
the results of the first calculation, but this is probably explained by the fact that the
original subscribers to the BCN may not have been typical of later investors. Certainly
the proportion of women was much lower. In 1768 11 per cent of shareholders were
women and this had risen to 21 per cent in 1840. Nevertheless, it is likely that this
analysis provides a more accurate view of the actual duration of male and female
shareholdings than that shown in Table 7.12.
As has been discussed above, after the death of their husbands, widows were
often left shares as a life interest. In the BCN shareholder records, spinsters outnumber
widows by three to one. Interestingly, out of a total of 213 female investors two are
described as wives. The average size of shareholdings and the average length of time
spinsters, widows and wives held shares is shown in Table 7.13.
Table 7.13: Average Size and Duration of Shareholdings of Female Investors in the
BCN 1768-1840
Female Investors Average Shareholding Average Duration
	
Number	 Number	 Years
Spinsters	 101	 9	 2.40
Widows	 31	 16	 1.61
Wives	 2	 34	 20.00
Unknown	 83	 6	 2.05
Total	 217	 9	 2.32
Source: Number of female investors in the includes all women who held
shares in the BCN at some time in any of the five years 1768, 1790,
1800, 1810 and 184O.
It is not surprising that widows owned on average more shares than spinsters since they
were likely to have inherited the shares from their husbands. There is no substantive
difference between the length of time spinsters and widows maintained their
shareholdings. More interesting is the position of Elizabeth Penn and Mary Ann
Wakefield, who were the two married women investors. These wives held their shares
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for 20 years and had substantially larger average holdings than those of the other
women. Both women came from prima fade comfortable backgrounds. Their husbands
were respectively, William Penn, a glassmaker from Dudley, and George Wakefield, also
an investor in the BCN in 1840, who was described in the share register as an esquire
from Sutton Coldfield. Although no firm conclusions can be drawn from these two
examples, it would seem that if women were not constrained by marriage to dispose of
assets, the characteristics of share ownership were very similar to that of men.
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the importance of women as a source of capital for
canal, and to a lesser extent, railway companies. Women were willing to invest during
the construction period of some of the more risky projects. In the operating period
female investors exhibited the risk-averse behaviour typical of financial investors.
Women had a preference for assets that provided a high income. There is also evidence
that they invested in government stocks and life insurance as part of a balanced portfolio
of assets. The present study did not find evidence of women actively managing their
investments, although there is evidence that some women did so. Women did not have
the same access to information as male investors. Although there is evidence that some
female investors managed businesses, this was unusual. 6° As a consequence, most
women did not have access to information from the commercial world. Women were
also excluded from active management of voluntary societies (see Chapter 6.3.2).
Women appear to have relied on their male relatives for investment advice. The
importance of family connections was examined in Chapter 6.4. Family connections as a
source of information and support were important to both male and female investors.
Kinship links were often reinforced by religious networks, as discussed below.
7.5 Religious Affiliation
Religious affiliations had a profound influence over economic and cultural life in
the period 1750 to I 85Q. Attendance of the established Anglican Church was declining
at the beginning of the period, whilst the progressive dismantling of prescriptive religious
conformity encouraged the rapid growth of dissenting communities. 61 At the end of the
period, the Church Census of 1851 revealed that approximately 40 per cent of the
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population of England and Wales attended church services, of which just over half were
Anglican. The Census confirmed that attendance at church or chapel had become a
largely middle-class activity. The period 1750 to 1850 saw the decline in the numbers of
Quakers and Unitarians and the rise of New Dissenting communities of Independents
and Congregationalists and other nonconforming groups such as Methodists. Members
of these communities were drawn mainly from the lower strata of the middle classes.
Over the period, the constituency of Old Dissent was drawn increasingly from the
wealthy upper middle class. At the same time, Evangelical Anglicanism was also
developing a constituency amongst the same social group.
These trends in social and religious activity were reflected in the changes in
Birmingham society over the period. For the middle classes, membership of a religious
group was also an affirmation of particular cultural and political beliefs. Dissent and
radicalism were the marque of the wealthy merchants and manufacturers who came to
challenge the Tory Anglican axis after Birmingham became a Municipal Borough in
1838. The appointment of the Evangelical, Henry Ryder, as Bishop of Coventry and
Lichfield in 1824 helped revive Anglicanism in Birmingham. Ryder created new Anglican
parishes and appointed Evangelical clergy to these livings, including William Marsh who
took over the parish of St. Thomas in 1829. Ryder also appointed William Spooner as
Archdeacon of Coventry. Members of the Spooner family were prominent
Evangelicals. Both Barbara Spooner and her grandfather Sir Henry Gough, Lord
Calthorpe, were investors in the CARD Database. The Calthorpe's were also leading -
Evangelicals.
At the same time, the Dissenting community was establishing more places of
worship and evangelical dissenting clergy, such as John Angell James, were
instrumental in building an active dissenting community. 67
 In spite of political differences,
Evangelical Anglicans and Dissenters had much in common. Both communities believed
in the importance of education, anti-slavery and temperance. These 'serious Christians'
built networks based on their denominational beliefs, strengthened by kinship and
business links. These networks were potent conduits for transferring information and
inculcating cultural, social and political norms.
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The supposed link between Protestantism and entrepreneurial performance in a
capitalist economy, first advanced by Weber in the early-twentieth century, has been the
subject of considerable research. The reason dissenters sought to establish their own
businesses has been attributed to legal constraints, which prevented them from
practising a profession, such as the law, or pursuing a trade through the guild system or
establishing businesses in incorporated towns and cities, until after the repeal of the
Test and Corporation Acts in 1829. As a result of exclusion from traditional middle-class
activities, dissenters were assumed to be more innovative and directed their energies
into developing their own businesses70 Recent research has attempted to test this
premise that there were a disproportionate number of dissenters amongst entrepreneurs
and industrialists. Hagen traced the religious affiliations of the 92 entrepreneurs and
industrialists mentioned in T. S. Ashton's Industrial Revolution. He found that 41 per cent
of those individuals from England and Wales were dissenters and 58 per cent were
Anglicans. These results appear to confirm Weber's thesis. However, Rubinstein
suggests that Hagen's work is flawed since Ashtori ignored important sectors of the
business community such as financiers, merchants, shipowners and warehousemen. 71
Rubinstein tested Weber's hypothesis by investigating the religious affiliation of the
wealthiest sectors of society. He used probate records in England and Wales to select a
sample of individuals who were likely to have been successful businessmen. The
religion of 'very wealthy' individuals (millionaires, half millionaires) and 'wealthy'
individuals (those with more than £100,000 of property subject to probate) was extracted
from obituaries in newspapers. This provided evidence of the religious affiliation of the
individual at death rather than the religion they inherited at birth. Although Rubinstein
suggests his analysis tended to overstate the number of dissenters, he found that in the
period 1720 to 1879, approximately 15 per cent of both the very wealthy and the wealthy
categories were dissenters. 72 Anglican made up approximately 50 to 56 per cent of the
very wealthy and 70 per cent of the lesser wealthy categories. Gilbert estimated that the
total number of dissenters in national population was at its peak in 1700 at around 5 per
cent, but by 1740 this number had halved.73 It would seem from Rubinstein's research
that dissenters were relatively more numerous amongst the well-to-do merchants and
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industrialists than in the population as a whole.
A similar study was carried out on the population of dissenters in Birmingham.
Ballard traced the religious affiliation of wealthy individuals who died between 1775 and
1864 and whose estates had a probate value of over £100,000. The sample was very
small: only 20 individuals qualified, of whom 70 per cent were Anglican. Out of the
remaining 30 per cent who were nonconformists, the majority was either Unitarian or
Quaker. This compares with a total of 6,000 dissenters in Birmingham in 1800 out of a
total population of 73,000 (8.2 per cent). This proportion was sustained in the 1851
Church Census, which recorded 17,452, nonconformists out of a population of 232,841
(7.5 per cent). 74 In spite of doubts about the accuracy of the Church Census, Ballard's
work suggests that dissenters made up a disproportionately large percentage of the
wealthiest members of Birmingham society. The present study re-examines Ballard's
research using a more representative sample of the middle-class population of
Birmingham.
7.5.1 Investor Religious Affiliation
In order to examine the religious affiliations of the sample population, members
of the Birmingham Society of Friends, 75 were compared with investors on the CARD and
BARD Databases. The investor population was drawn from a wider range of socio-
economic groups than Ballard's sample of those leaving estates of more than £100,000.
In total, forty-nine members of the Birmingham Quaker meeting were found to be
investors in the Databases. All but two of the Quaker investors had addresses in the
West Midlands area and these two investors had Unknown addresses. The total number
of investors in the Databases from the West Midlands amounted to 1,062. Thus
investors who were also members of the Birmingham Society of Friends represented 4.8
per cent of the total number of investors from the West Midlands. The number of
dissenters in the Databases as a whole is undoubtedly higher since the records of only
one dissenting congregation was included in the study. Thus the proportion of dissenters
amongst the moderately wealthy of the West Midlands was likely to have been
substantially greater than the 2.5 to 5 per cent estimated by Gilbert as pertaining to the
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population as a whole. Davidoff and Hall suggest that 18 per cent of their sample of the
Birmingham middle class were Quaker. 76 However, the selection criteria of their sample
is unclear and was undoubtedly biased towards the selection of dissenting individuals
since it comprised 40 per cent dissenters to 54 per cent Anglicans. Rubinstein notes that
research that purports to show the predominance of dissenters is fostered by trotting out
the same names over and over again. He suggests that 'when one has named the most
celebrated Quaker dynasties, like the Gurneys, Peases, Barclays and Cadburys, one
has virtually exhausted the roll-call of Quaker wealth'7' However, the present study did
look beyond these well-known names. The investors in the CARD and BARD Databases
represent a broad cross-section of middle-class individuals. The records of the
Birmingham Society of Friends included all the members of the congregation.
Nevertheless, the 49 members of the Birmingham Society of Friends who were found to
be investors were from the wealthiest groups in the Databases as shown in Table 7.14.
Table 7.14: Socio-economic Classification of Dissenting Investors
Total CARD	 and BARD	 Dissenter Investors
Databases________ _______________
	
Number of	 As % of Total	 Number of As % of Total
	
Investors	 Investors
Landed	 296	 5	 25	 4
Rentier	 886	 14	 3	 6
Clergy	 266	 4	 0	 0
Professional and Banker	 502	 8	 11	 22
Manufacturer	 213	 3	 5	 10
Merchant	 305	 5	 5	 10
Artisan and Shopkeeper
	 586	 9	 1	 2
Women	 917	 14	 10	 20
Unknown	 2,539	 39	 12	 24
Total	 6,510	 100	 49	 100
Source: Dissenting Investors are investors who were members of the
Society of Friends Birmingham Meeting 177O185O.78
As can be seen from Table 7.14, investors from the dissenting community were
members of the wealthiest social groups. For example, 22 per cent of the dissenting
investors were from the Professional and Banker group compared to 8 per cent in the
Databases as a whole. In contrast, the number of dissenters in the Artisan and
Shopkeeper group was only 2 per cent compared with 9 per cent for the Databases as a
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whole. On the other hand, the proportion of dissenters in the Landed and Rentier
groups, which comprises some of the wealthiest members of the investor population,
was lower than that in the Databases as a whole. The Landed group, in particular were
largely Anglican. In addition there was a tendency for dissenters to leave their
communities and become Anglicans once they attained a certain level of wealth and
status. The wealthy Galton family was a typical example of this. 79
 The Quaker
community disowned Samuel Tertius Galton in 1807 after his marriage to Violetta
Darwin, an Anglican. 80 His daughter, Elizabeth Anne Galton remarked in her memoirs
that her father joined the Church of England after his marriage, although the family still
maintained close ties with dissenting relatives, such as the Gurneys.81
Compelling evidence of the importance of dissent in engendering successful
businesses is shown in the work carried out by Pratt. 82 He extracted data on Quaker
banks from the quarterly meetings of the Lancashire, Warwickshire, Yorkshire,
Gloucestershire and Bristol Quaker societies, supplemented by information from
directories and secondary sources. He found that at least six of the country banks
operating in these five areas in the I 750s were founded by Quakers and that by 1785
Quakers controlled 16 per cent of the 119 country banks in his sample area. Extending
the results of his sample to the rest of England and Wales, Pratt estimates that 25 per
cent of the country banks were Quaker concerns at the start of the Industrial Revolution.
He notes that half the Quaker bankers were connected through marriage to other
Quaker banking families. Quakers started to transport money as a consequence of their
extensive journeys to the quarterly and annual meetings of other communities. Later
they set up channels for providing credit. Quakers were accustomed to monitor the
business probity of fellow members of their community. Knowledge of individuals'
creditworthiness and the Quaker reputation for honesty no doubt contributed to the
development of Quaker banking partnerships.
The present study also confirmed the importance of the Quaker banking families
in the social and economic life of Birmingham and the West Midlands. For example,
Samuel John Galton and Joseph Gibbins, the founders of the Galton and Gibbins
banking partnership in 1804, were both investors in the Warwick and Birmingham
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canal. Galton was a gunmaker and supplied the slave trade, engendering the
disapproval of the Quaker community, which disowned him in 1796 'for fabric[ating]
lnst[ruments] of War'. Joseph Gibbins was charged with persuading Galton to give up
the business interests, which conflicted with Quaker ideals. Banking was clearly
deemed to be acceptable even though it may have financed the gun trade. The banking
partnership included Galton's eldest son, Samuel Tertius, and later his younger sons,
John Howard and Hubert. Gibbins left the partnership in 1806 and was replaced by Paul
Moon James. James was a Unitarian who married Olivia Lloyd, one of the daughters of
Charles Lloyd and Mary Farmer in 1808.87 Both the Farmers and the Lloyds were
Quaker families from Birmingham. The banking partnership of the Lloyds and Taylors
was founded in 1765. Sampson Lloyd, a Quaker, was an iron master and merchant and
John Taylor, a Unitarian, was a manufacturer and merchant in the bullion trade.°8
Another early banking partnership in Birmingham was founded in 1766 between Robert
Coales and John Lewis Moilliet, who were both merchants. Moilliet was a Quaker, but
the religion of Coales is not known. By 1840 the partnership was known as J. L. Moilliet
& Sons and included John Lewis's son James, who married Lucy Galton, daughter of
Samuel Tertius Galton. Thus the Quaker families of Galton, Moilliet and James were
linked both by marriage and by business interests. This was consolidated in 1865 when
Taylor and Lloyds and J. L. Moilliet & Sons amalgamated to form LLoyds Banking
Company Limited.
Davidoff and Hall note that Quakers and Unitarians were commonly among the
wealthier merchants and manufacturers of the upper middle class. They maintain that
Unitarians, in particular, were often high status professionals and bankers. However,
since they do not specify how they selected their sample of individuals from Birmingham
it is difficult to assess their analysis of occupational groups.9° All the members of the
banking partnerships mentioned above, with the exception of Robert Coales, were
investors in the CARD Database.
The leading dissenting families in Birmingham not only had strong business
connections but they also were connected by marriage, both amongst themselves, and
to other leading dissenting families. The shareholdings of James Taylor in the books of
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the BCN reveal the extent of the business and personal connections between these
dissenting families. Taylor owned 60 BCN shares solely in his own name. In addition he
owned 40 shares with George Braithwaite Lloyd and 20 shares with Hubert John Galton
and Theodore Moilliet. These joint holding were presumably in respect of their business
interests. There is also circumstantial evidence that James Taylor owned BCN shares
jointly with other trustees, in connection with family marriage settlements. For example,
he held 58 shares with Ralph Adderley, and Taylor's sister, Caroline, owned shares in
the Warwick and Birmingham canal in her own name before she was married to George
Bowyer Adderley. 91 James Taylor also held 12 BCN shares in conjunction with members
of the Skey and Steward families to whom he was also connected by marriage. Taylor's
first wife was Louisa Skey, who was probably his cousin, and Taylor's son, William
Francis, married Augusta Steward.
These connections were likely to have been a potent means of disseminating
information about business and investment. In the present study an attempt was made
to analyse the degree of intermarriage between the leading dissenting families in
Birmingham. Thirty investors on the CARD Database were found to be members of the
Quaker Galton and Lloyd families and the Unitarian Ryland and Taylor families. These
individuals were then checked against family trees and the CARD Database. It was
found that these 30 individuals were connected by marriage to a further 19 investors,
mainly from dissenting backgrounds. For example, the Rylands were connected to the
Priestleys, the Smiths, and the Pembertons, all of whom were Unitarians. The Lloyd
family was connected to the Quaker Farmer, Pearson, Barnes, Hanbury and Barclay
families. Table 7.15 shows the socio-economic groups to which these 49 related
investors belonged.
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Table 7.15: Socio-economic Group of Dissenting Family Investors
Socio-economic Group	 Number of Investors
Landed and Rentier	 6
Clergy	 3
Professional	 I
Bankers	 18
Manufacturers	 6
Merchants	 I
Artisans and Shopkeepers	 I
Women	 9
Unknown	 4
Total	 49
Source: 30 members of the Ga/ton, Lloyd, Taylor and Ryland familles
were taken from the CARD Database and all the connections to 19 other
investors through marriage selected.
The investors were picked from three banking families so it is not surprising that this
socio-economic group dominates the analysis. However, it is clear that these dissenting
families were firmly ensconced in the upper middle-class elite of Birmingham. These
family connections were extremely strong. An analysis of the number of connections
between individuals in the dissenting families who were also investors reveals that there
were 352 separate relationships. These are analysed in Table 7.16.
Table 7.16: Degrees of Inter-relationship amongst Investors
Type of Relationship 	 Number of Separate
Relationships
Husband/wife	 8
Father/mother/son/daughter! 	 }	 59
grandparents/grandchildren	 }
Brother/sister	 67
Cousin/nephew/niece/uncle/aunt/in-law 	 218
Total	 352
Source: Relationship of 49 members of dissenting families who are also
investors in the CARD Database.
Table 7.16 shows that these 352 investors were highly connected with each other. On
average, each investor had a family relationship with just over 7 other investors. This is
clear evidence of the importance of family connections in the dissemination of
information and the investment decision-making process. However, even where a family
connection did not exist, there is evidence that information was disseminated through
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the network of religious affiliation. For example, the Rev. John Kenrick, a Unitarian,
owned 72 shares in the BCN in 1840. He was described as living in York. Kenrick
studied under John Kentish, who owned 60 shares in the BCN at the same time.
Between 1805 and 1807 Kenrick had lived in Kentish's house in Birmingham. This is
compelling evidence of the strength and duration of relationships within a religious
community.
As can be seen from Table 7.17, a very high proportion of the Birmingham
Quaker community (49 out of a total of 347 individuals, or 14 per cent) were investors in
the CARD and BARD Databases. This compares with only 3 per cent of the Unitarian
community (5 out of a total of 153 individuals).
Table 7.17: Social and Philanthropic Behaviour of Quaker and Unitarian
Communities in Birmingham
Members of
	
Religious	 Investors in CARD and	 Members of Birmingham
	
Society	 BARD Databases	 Database
	
Number	 Number	 As % of Number	 As % of
	
Society	 Birmingham
	
Membership	 Database
Unitarians	 153	 5	 3	 9	 1
Quakers	 347	 49	 14	 43	 5
Source: Members of Unitarian Society taken from List of Members of
Unitarian Brotherly Society. 97 Members of Quaker Society taken from list
of members of Birmingham Meeting of Society of Friends, 1770 to
1850. 98
 Birmingham Database comprises 973 members of 30 voluntary
societies listed in Table 7 of Appendix I, adjusted to exclude the 153
members of the Unitarian Brotherly Society.
Even taking into account the smaller size of the Unitarian community, there appears to
be a difference in behaviour between these two groups. Davidoff and Hall place both
Quakers and Unitarians amongst the 'higher ranks' of the middle class. They also
record that Unitarians were committed to 'science and rationality' and were a strong
influence in the Birmingham Philosophical Institution. 10° However, Table 7.17 shows that
only 9 Unitarians compared to 43 Quakers participated in the social and philanthropic
activities included in the Birmingham Database. Even allowing for the smaller size of the
membership of the Unitarian Brotherly Society, some evidence of Unitarians
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participating in funding such important projects as the General Hospital and the General
Dispensary might have been expected. This is particularly true given that the overall size
of the Unitarian community amongst the middle-class elite of Birmingham appears to
have been larger than that of the Quakers. Davidoff and Hall estimate that the Unitarian
community was three times that of the Quakers. 101 These authors hint that Unitarians
largely retreated from public life after the Church and King riots in Birmingham in 1791,
when prominent Unitarians, such as Joseph Priestley, were attacked for their support of
repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. 102 Unitarians, including Joseph Priestley's
son103 were among the investors in the CARD Database, but they do not appear to have
been socially and politically active. In contrast, Seed suggests that in national politics
prior to the 1832 Reform Act, Unitarians were the only dissenting group to have real
influence. 104 Although this had diminished by the mid-nineteenth century as Unitarianism
failed to be adopted by the industrial middle class and the number of Unitarian MPs
declined.
7.5.2 Charitable Ethos
A number of the formalised philanthropic activities in Birmingham were
sectarian. Although philanthropy may have owed more to social and commercial impetus
than altruism and the availability of sufficient wealth. The formation of committees to
raise money for building hospitals, libraries and schools gave middle-class men the
opportunity to associate on equal terms with members of the landed aristocracy.105
Manufacturers, merchants and professionals sought the patronage of the Earl of
Dartmouth in promoting the Birmingham Canal Navigation. 106 In much the same way,
middle-class philanthropists enlisted the support of members of the local aristocracy for
their charitable endeavours. High profile philanthropic projects such as the building of
the General Hospital in 1766 were a way of demonstrating the same skills, which the
middle class used to finance and operate the canal and railway companies. In the
analysis in Chapter 6.3.2, members of the CARD and BARD Databases were also found
in large numbers in the Birmingham Database, which includes members of prestigious
voluntary societies. Of the thirty-three associations examined, nine were purely
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charitable with a further four being mainly of charitable purpose, but sponsored by a
particular religious denomination. There is less direct evidence of private charitable
activity, although wills do mention small bequests. Wealthy middle class men often
supported the charitable activities of their female relatives through the provision of
money and expertise. 107 Elizabeth Anne Galton recalled that in 1834, Samuel Tertius
Galton, her father, provided money for a school to be built at their house in Leamington
for the education of poor children. Adele, Elizabeth Anne's sister, taught in the school,
which clearly did not have the approval of the local clergyman who declined to support
it.108
The philanthropic activities of the wealthy middle class of Birmingham reflect the
preoccupations of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century life with health and education.
Such projects often had some religious connection but were generally run on
interdenominational lines, such as the Birmingham Infant School Society set up in
1825.109 Other educational projects were sectarian, such as the Society for Protestant
Dissenting Schools established in 1761 and the Unitarian Brotherly Society, which
trained Sunday school teachers and managers. Thirteen philanthropic institutions and
activities were examined in the present study and a total of 730 individuals were
identified as participants. These philanthropic projects are listed in Table 7.18.
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Table 7.18: Number of Investors in Charitable Societies
	Number of	 Investors
TotalMembers Number As a % of Total
Members
General Dispensary 1793	 16	 3	 19
General Dispensary 1840
	 15	 4	 27
General Hospital 1765	 117	 38	 32
General Hospital 1839	 61	 22	 36
Library 1799	 159	 36	 23
Deaf and Dumb Institution 1812
	 43	 14	 33
Eye Hospital 1823	 17	 5	 29
Friends Book Club 1840-1
	 24	 6	 25
Fever Hospital 1825 	 15	 7	 47
Infant Schools 1825 	 20	 6	 30
Orthopaedic Hospital 1825	 26	 10	 38
Protestant Dissenting Schools 1761	 15	 3	 20
Poor Relief 1794	 41	 9	 22
Abolition of Slavery 1790	 8	 3	 38
Unitarian Brotherly Society 1796	 153	 14	 9
Total	 730	 180	 25
Source: investors taken from the CARD and BARD Databases. Sources
for membership of charitable institutions set out in Appendix I/l
As can be seen from the analysis in Table 7.18, a very high proportion of the
participants in these philanthropic projects (25 per cent) were also investors in the
CARD and BARD Databases. Investors were also well represented amongst those
participants who were involved in more than one philanthropic activity. Out of a total of
233 individuals who were associated with more than one charitable project 45 per cent
were investors. These were wealthy individuals, such as Samuel Tertius Galton, the
banker. On his death in 1844, the probate value of his estate was £45,000.hbo Galton
was a subscriber to the Infant Schools in 1825, the Deaf and Dumb Institution in
1812 , 112
 the Eye Hospital in 1823113 and the Orthopaedic Hospital in 1817.114 Galton
was born into a Quaker family but became an Anglican on his marriage to Violetta
Darwin. Undoubtedly his support for charitable works reflects his religious upbringing,
but it is also likely that he used his participation in high profile charitable enterprises to
further his business activities as a banker. 115 Another supporter of multiple charitable
projes was Richard Spooner. Spooner stood as a candidate in the parliamentary
elections to the Warwick constituency in 1820 and the Birmingham constituency in
1841. 116 In Spooner's case, his charitable activities in the Infants Schools in 1825,
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Orthopaedic Hospital in 1817, the Eye Hospital in 1823 and the General Hospital ml 839
may have been to forward his political career. The same motivation was probably also a
contributory factor to Joshua Scolefield's and Francis Lawleys support of the
Orthopaedic Hospital. Scholefield stood as a candidate in the 1841 election and Francis
Lawley opposed Spooner in the 1820 election. Analysis of the socio-economic
background of the 180 investors who also took part in philanthropic projects reveals that
Professionals were by far the largest single group, comprising 23 per cent of the total.
The full analysis is given in Table 7.19.
Table 7.19: Socio-economic Analysis of Investors who were Members of
Charitable Societies (Number of Investors)
U)
C	 U)	 c.
.2	 •5	
'	 U)	 CU)
a)a)	 >s	 U)	 c_
D)	 c3)
5	 •5U)	 CU	 I)	 'fi	 c	 o
-	 3	 '	 < C,)
General Dispensary 1793	 0	 0	 0	 2	 0	 1 0	 0	 3
General Dispensary 1840	 1	 0	 2	 0	 0	 0 1	 0	 4
General Hospital 1765	 15	 0	 9	 5	 2	 1	 1	 5	 38
General Hospital 1839	 4	 0	 7	 0	 3	 4 0	 4	 22
Library 1799	 2	 3	 2	 1	 4	 3 1 20	 36
Deaf and Dumb Institution 1812
	 0	 4	 5	 0	 2	 0 0	 3	 14
Eye Hospital 1823
	 2	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0 0
	
1	 5
Friends Book Club 1840-1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 2	 0 0	 3	 6
Fever Hospital 1825	 0	 0	 5	 1	 0	 0 0	 1	 7
Infant Schools 1825	 1	 0	 4	 0	 0	 0 0	 1	 6
Orthopaedic Hospital 1825
	 1	 1	 5	 0	 0	 0 0	 3	 10
Protestant Dissenting Schools
	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 3
1761
Poor Relief 1794	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2 0	 7	 - 9
Abolition of Slavery 1790	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 3
Unitarian Brotherly Society	 2	 1	 1	 2	 0	 1	 0	 7	 14
1796
Total	 28	 10	 41	 15	 14	 12 3 57
	 180
Source: Investors taken from the CARD and BARD Databases. Sources
for membership of charitable institutions set out in Appendix Ill.
Professionals were the group most likely to benefit from philanthropic activities through
contact with other influential people. 117 For example, both John Taylor and Charles
Lloyd, the bankers, were active participants in a number of charitable projects. Taylor &
Lloyds were appointed treasurers to the Society for the Abolition of Slavery in 1790118
and the Infant Schools in 1825,119
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Not surprisingly, given the virtual exclusion of women from membership and
management of voluntary societies, only three female investors were found amongst the
180 participants in the philanthropic projects analysed in the present study. Women did
participate in charitable activities but not in an executive capacity. They taught in Sunday
Schools, dealt with the female recipients of the charitable largesse and were permitted
to subscribe to charitable causes. 12° For example, 15 out of the 90 people subscribing
more than £10 to the General Hospital in 1765 were women. 121 Nevertheless, the
exclusion of women from corporate life also applied to their participation in philanthropic
institutions.
Perhaps for this reason women may have been more inclined to support
charitable projects posthumously than their male counterparts. Certainly, the generosity
of Elizabeth Farquharson, a widow from Birmingham, who bequeathed legacies of
£6,100 to the General Hospital and a charity school on her death in 1796, is not
matched in the wills of some of the wealthiest male investors. Samuel Galton, who
during his lifetime was a notable public benefactor, left only small bequests to the
General Hospital amongst the disposal of his fortune, valued at probate at £150,000.1
Samuel Garbett, another lifetime benefactor of the General Hospital was relatively more
generous. He left £400 of his £15,000 estate to the charity school of St Philips Church
and £400 to the General Hospital.124
7.6 Political Affiliation
The period of canal and railway building was marked by enormous social and
political upheaval. Rapid urbanisation was fuelled by inclosure and agricultural
modernisation. Industrialisation and the development of the factory system led to a
growing class of wage labourers, who were vulnerable to economic recession. A
succession of wars during the period exacerbated the cycle of booms and slumps
caused by interruption to trade. The West Midlands was one of the areas which was
most acutely affected by these processes. The population of the area later covered by
the Borough of Birmingham grew from 62,000 in 1801 to 234,000 in 1851.1 The old
Poor Law was unable to cope with the needs of this burgeoning conurbation yet the new
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Poor laws of 1834 were deeply unpopular amongst both the beneficiaries and those on
whom the rates were levied. The peaks and troughs of the post-war economy also
affected middle-class businesses and professions, but the gap between the labouring
classes and the middling sort became wider. At the same time the middle class were
also differentiating themselves politically from the aristocracy and gentry. The middle
classes felt they were taxed disproportionately by a parliament, which was largely made
up of representatives of the land-owning classes. The abolition of income tax in 1816,
the high duties on imported raw materials, the 1815 Corn Law and the Orders in Council
all conspired against middle-class business interests. The middle classes had common
cause with working-class Radicals.121
In the early days of the French Revolution many in the middle class shared
Wordsworth's view:
That a benignant spirit was abroad
Which might not be withstood, that poverty....
Be found no more, that we should see the earth
Unthwarted in her wish to recompense
The meek, the lowly, patient child of toil......
Should see the people having a strong hand
In framing their own laws; whence better days
To all mankind.128
These sentiments were echoed in the pages of the Birmingham Gazette on 11 July 1791
with a notice that 'a number of Gentlemen intend DINING together on the 14th instant to
commemorate the auspicious day which witnessed the Emancipation of Twenty-six
Millions of People from the yoke of Despotism'. 1	Shortly thereafter, the excesses of
the French Revolution and fears of a similar working-class revolution in Britain caused
middle-class property owners to eschew the radical agenda. 13° The radical Unitarian,
Joseph Priestley was driven from Birmingham during rioting in 1791. In 1792,
Birmingham Anglicans and Tories were meeting to form the Association for the
Protection of Liberty and Property against Repubilcans and Levellers. Of the eighteen
committee members of the Association for the Protection of Liberty, seven were
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investors in the CARD and BARD Databases, reflecting the innate conservatism of
middle-class rentiers. The opposition of the established church to radicalism and its
associations with dissent was demonstrated by no less than six Anglican clergy being
members of the committee. 131 In the event, the middle-class establishment in
Birmingham had little to fear from radical agitation. After the 1791 riots, middle-class
reformers lost their nerve for a generation:' 32 Throughout the period leading up to the
1832 Reform Act, the constituency for North Warwick, of which Birmingham was a part,
regularly returned Tory candidates to Westminster. The middle classes pursued their
own political agenda, through extra-parliamentary pressure groups, many of which were
concerned with the economy. 1 In 1790 the Commercial Committee was preoccupied
with the question of brass exports. Seventeen of the forty-five members of this
committee were members of the CARD and BARD Database, including leading
manufacturers and traders such as Matthew Boulton, William Chance and Sampson
Freeth.
Working-class radicalism continued to survive in Birmingham. Wages and prices
were no longer regulated and became determined by the market. It became more
difficult for those without capital to set up their own businesses and the social and
economic divide between master and labourer widened. 1 Although the landed interest
did well during the last ten years of the French War, the disruption to trade in industrial
goods, exacerbated by the Orders in Council, united middle-class manufacturers and
traders in opposition to government policy. The economic crisis of 1810 -11 saw the
middle and working classes unite to fight against the Orders. In Birmingham, Thomas
Attwood, a banker, was responsible for leading the campaign.
After the end of the French Wars, high wheat prices and flagging trade
continued to activate the middle classes to the radical cause.	 In 1816, George
Edmonds, the son of a Baptist minister, founded the radical Hampden Club. Not
surprisingly, only four out of the forty-eight members of the Club in 1817 were investors
in the CARD and BARD Databases, including Edmonds himself, and James Luckcock.
Davidoff and Hall considered that Luckcock epitomised the ideals of respectability and
civic and moral responsibility of the developing middle classes. 131
 He was a jeweller
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from Birmingham with a moderately successful business, which provided sufficient
capital for him to acquire two properties in Edgbaston and shares in the Warwick and
Birmingham canal. 1 The income from his investments enabled him to devote time to
his religious and political interests. He was an active member of the Unitarian Brotherly
Society, which trained teachers and managers for Sunday schools; he was an ardent
supporter of the anti-slavery campaign and he worked for Radical reform. Luckcock
attended a public meeting on 22 January 1817, which was organised by the Hampden
Club and addressed by Edmonds. The meeting, which was held at Newhall Hill, was
attended by 10,000 to 20,000 people. Later, in July 1818, Edmonds, together with four
companions, was arraigned for conspiracy to elect and return Sir Charles Wolseley
without lawful authority following a meeting of Liberal sympathisers. 14° Thereafter
Wolseley styled himself as 'MP'. The Birmingham Gazette, which was a supporter of the
Anglican-Tory axis, commentated rather sniffily that 'not a single individual, resident or
holding a respectable situation in society, took a prominent share in the day's
proceedings'. 141 Only fourteen months later in September 1819, recognising the change
in public opinion following the Peterloo Massacre, the Birmingham Gazette published
James Luckcock's letter sympathising with the plight of the poor. He wrote on 23
September 1819 that 'I sincerely sympathise with the lower class in their privations and
sufferings.. .whoever tells them that their distresses are temporary, and that it is out of
the power of human means to grant present relief, are uttering the foulest libel on the
bounty of Providence'. 142 Luckcock's reaction to the brutality of the government reaction
to civil unrest is captured in Shelley's The Mask of Anarchy:
Tis to work and have such pay
As just keeps life from day to day
In your limbs, as in a cell
For tyrants' use to dwell'
'Rise like Lions after slumber
In unvanquishable number-
Shake your chains to earth like dew
222
CHAPTER 7: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFERENCES
Which in sleep had fallen on you-
Ye are many - they are few.1
Although written in 1819, the poem was not published until 1832, on the eve of
parliamentary reform.
Few of the middle-class reformers in Birmingham would have supported
Shelley's call for revolution. Nevertheless, in December 1829, Thomas Attwood
established the Birmingham Political Union with the intention of uniting 'the lower and
middle classes of the people of this town' to press for reform. 1 Thirty-seven individuals
including George Edmonds and James Luckcock's son, Felix, signed the Declaration.
Edmonds had been released from gaol in 1823 and continued to be active in radical
politics, although the leadership of the radical movement in Birmingham passed to
others. Only three of the signatories were investors in the CARD and BARD Databases.
The Union held a public meeting on 25 January 1830 which 15,000 people attended.
The Birmingham Political Union was a model for other Unions throughout the country,
although in the factory towns of Lancashire and the West Riding, Reform was perceived
as being too closely associated with the employers and failed to obtained popular
working-class support.1
At a public meeting on 7 May 1832, 200,000 people were estimated to have
gathered at Newhall Hill in Birmingham. Most concerned with the reform of the economy,
Attwood, ever the pragmatist, first espoused support for the Ultra-Tories before
endorsing the Whig Reform Bill. Middle-class political affiliations were characterised by
such unlikely alliances. Like the electors of George Eliot's Middlemarch, the citizens of
North Warwick contemplated the Reform Bill and the prospect of 'a Tory Ministry passing
Liberal measures, or of Tory nobles and electors being anxious to return Liberals rather
than friends of the recreant Ministers'. 1 The Reform Bill finally received Royal Assent
on 7 June 1832. In the event, it did little for the emancipation of the working classes. The
Act did increase the franchise for the more wealthy sections of the middle class and
recognised the importance of the new urban centres. Nationally suffrage increased to
217,000. Birmingham became a Parliamentary Borough with the right to elect two
Members of Parliament. Approximately 7,000 of the 170,000 population in the new
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Municipal Borough, created in 1838, were entitled to vote under the £10 rental
qualification. 147 The first election in Birmingham after the Act was passed was on 12
December 1832. Thomas Attwood and Joshua Scholefield, who was also a member of
the Birmingham Political Union, were elected without opposition.
The Conservative interest continued to represent the county. North
Warwickshire returned Sir Eardley Eardley Wilmot and William Stratford Dugdale in
1832. In the borough of Birmingham the Conservatives attempted to retrieve their
electoral defeat. On 17 December, a Loyal and Constitutional Association was formed.
Of the twelve founding members five were investors in the CARD and BARD Databases.
The founders were typically representatives of the Tory landed interest, such as the
Earls of Dartmouth and Bradford and Evangelical Anglicans such as Lord Calthorpe and
Richard Spooner. Spooner had stood as a Radical in the 1820 election, but by 1832
'yellow Dick' had deserted to the Conservative cause. At the election in 1835, Spooner
stood as a Conservative, but the two sitting members for the Liberal interest were
reelected.1
Birmingham became a Municipal Borough in 1838. Prior to this the Street
Commissioners, who were dominated by Whigs, had been responsible for local
government. Of the 50 Street Commissioners elected in May 1769, 17 were investors in
the CARD and BARD Databases. These were manufacturers, like Samuel Galton,
merchants, such as John Oseland or professionals such as Dr John Ash. At least 11 of
the Commissioners were Dissenters; Quakers, such as Sampson Lloyd or Unitarians, -
like John Ryland. After 1838, Radicals dominated the Municipal Council.
The investors in the CARD and BARD Databases were poorly represented
amongst the Radical interest. Not surprisingly, the moderately wealthy manufacturers,
merchants, professionals and rentiers were mainly concerned with the state of the
economy. Where this agenda coincided with the objectives of the working classes, such
as on political reform in the 1830s, they supported a more radical platform. The voting
behaviour of investors in the CARD and BARD Databases, living in the North
Warwickshire constituency, was investigated in four elections over the period 1774 to
1837. This analysis sought to determine whether the socio-economic background of
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investors had an effect on political affiliation.
7.6.1 Investor Voting Behaviour
Until 1838, when Birmingham was created a Municipal Borough, Birmingham
electors were entitled to vote for two seats in the constituency of North Warwickshire.
The votes cast were recorded in published Poll Books. The voting record of the investors
in the CARD and BARD Database who lived in the North Warwickshire area was
analysed for elections in 1774, 1820, 1832 and 1837. The votes cast per candidate were
compared to the voting pattern of the constituency as a whole and the result significance
tested.
Table 7.20: Investor Voting Behaviour in North Warwickshire 1774-1 837
Affiliation	 Total Votes	 Investor's Votes
1774	 Number As % of Total	 Number As % of Total
Holte	 Independent	 1,845	 28	 20	 41
Skipwith	 Tory	 2,954	 45	 23	 47
Mordaunt	 Court	 1,787	 27	 6	 12
Total	 6,586	 100	 49	 100
1837
Wilmot	 Tory	 2,771	 27	 22	 33
Dugdale	 Tory	 3,301	 32	 20	 30
Skipwith	 Tory	 2,303	 23	 14	 21
Bracebndge	 Liberal	 1,802	 18	 11	 16
Total	 10,177	 100	 67	 100
Source: Data extracted from Poll Books of the North Warwickshire
elections 1774,1820, 1832 and 1837.150
The analysis set out in Table 7.20 shows that in 1774 and 1820, investors in the CARD
and BARD Databases were more inclined than the electorate as a whole to vote for the
Independent or Radical candidate. This was found to be significant using the Chi-
squared test. Differences in voting behaviour in the 1832 and 1837 elections between
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investors and the electorate as a whole were found not to be significantly different.
The numbers of investors for whom voting information is known is very small.
Nevertheless, in the 1820 election, there is a discernible difference in behaviour
between socio-economic groups. Not surprisingly, the Radical vote came from
Manufacturers, Merchants, most Professionals, urban Rentiers and Shopkeepers. The
Tory vote was primarily from the Clergy and Landed groups. In 1820 Richard Spooner
stood as the Radical candidate. A number of investors who voted for Richard Spooner in
1820 were Unitarians, such as John Kettle, a merchant, John Ryland, a wiredrawer and
John and William Taylor from the wealthy banking family. John Taylor voted for
Dempster Hemming, the Liberal candidate, in 1832 but rather confusingly appears to
have joined the Conservative Association in that year. 151 William Taylor voted for
Richard Spooner in 18.41,152 but by 1832 Spooner had become a Conservative. Since
party politics was in its infancy in the early to mid-nineteenth century, it is perhaps not
surprising that voters exhibited a degree of personal rather than party loyalty. After the
1832 Reform Act, a large proportion of the urban middle-class voters of the Borough of
Birmingham became ineligible to vote in the North Warwickshire elections. The voting
patterns of those investors still entitled to vote in North Warwickshire mirrored those of
that constituency.
The voting patterns of investors in the four elections examined in detail between
1774 and 1832 do reflect the particular concerns of their class. The urban middle class
were willing to adopt radical politics when their lifestyles became threatened and they
made common cause with the working classes in the period leading up to the 1832
Reform Act. Generally, investors were much more likely to be members of Whig
dominated institutions such as the Street Commissioners or the Conservative
Association than they were to join the radical Birmingham Political Union. Carruthers
suggests from his research into trading of government stocks in the early-eighteenth
century that in imperfect markets there is evidence that shares were more likely to be
traded amongst individuals sharing the same political beliefs than between those of
different political backgrounds. Additional security was derived from membership of a
group where political ties often reinforced business or family connections. Certainly,
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the investors in the present study appear to share common political, religious and social
backgrounds.
7.7 Development of the Professional Classes
The growth of the middling classes during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries has been widely examined.IM Nevertheless, the middle classes only
accounted for a small proportion of the population at this time. The middle classes may
have secured a disproportionate share of capital and income in comparison to the
labouring classes but this was still insignificant in comparison with the assets held by the
landed elite. Table 7.21 sets out the total population in each of the middle-class income
groups identified by Colquhoun.
Table 7.21: Income of the Middle Classes of Great Bntain and Ireland in 1812
Socio-Economic	 Population of Group	 Average	 Group Income
Group	 Annual
Income per
Family
Number As % of Total	 £ £ millions As % of Total
Capitalists
Knights/Esquires 	 110,000	 0.64	 2,000	 22,000	 5.11
Gentlemen	 ) 280,000	 1.64	 800	 28,000	 6.50
Living on Income )
Clergy
Eminent	 9,000	 0.05	 720	 1,080	 0.25
Lesser	 87,500	 0.51	 200	 3500	 0.81
Dissenting	 20,000	 0.12	 100	 500	 0.12
Civil service	 123,500	 0.72	 300-980	 9,370	 2.18
Officers in Armed	 79,500	 0.46	 7,151	 1.66
Services
School Teachers	 210,000	 1.23	 204	 7,140	 1.66
Lesser Merchants	 159,600	 0.93	 805	 18,354	 4.26
Manufacturers	 264,000	 1.54	 804	 35,376	 8.22
Professionals
Lawyers	 95,000	 0.56	 400	 7,600	 1.77
Eminent
Merchants	 )	 35,000	 0.20	 2,600	 9,100	 2.11
Bankers
Physicians etc.	 90,000	 0.53	 300	 5,400	 1.25
Surveyors	 )	 43,000	 0.25	 300	 2,610	 0.61
Engineers	 )
Total	 263,500	 2	 3,600	 24,710	 5.78
Professional
Total	 1,606,600	 9	 9,233	 157,181	 36.74
Source: Colquhoun.' Total population includes the total number of
family members supported by each income earner.
Table 7.21 shows that 37 per cent of incomes in 1812 were earned by individuals who
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belonged to broadly defined middle-class occupations. These groups only made up 9
per cent of the total population and of these, the professional group comprised only 2
per cent of the population. In comparison, the proportion of professionals in the CARD
Database was 8 per cent of the total number of investors. The investors in the CARD
Database were largely those who, as Koditchek notes in his study of the Bradford
capitalists in the period 1750 to 1850, were never wholly dependent for their income on
their business activities. They 'developed diverse, balanced investment portfolios that
enabled them to secure themselves as elites. 1 Middle-class capitalists aspired to
transfer resources from more risky direct investment in commercial and industrial assets
into safer and more passive investment forms and to 'build a viable identity as
gentlemen on the foundations of an increasingly rentier-capitalist role'. 1 The middle
classes, particularly those from the professional groups were concerned with the
dangers of 'sinking', economically and as a corollary, socially. As has been discussed in
Chapter 5.2.2, the investment of surplus cash in canal and railway companies was not
regarded as a high-risk strategy but part of a diversification into investments which
offered the prospect of secure returns for family dependants and for a comfortable old
age.
Researchers have noted the growth of the professional class in the late-
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 1 This growth was a reflection of the development
of new occupations, as society became more complex. In total 465 investors in the
CARD Database were in professional occupations. As can be seen from Table 7.22, the
proportion of professionals increased through time.
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Table 7.22: Growth in Professional Occupations 1760-1 849 (Number of Investors
employed in professional occupations)
	1760	 1760	 1800	 1820	 1830	 Total
	
to	 to	 to	 to	 to
	
1779	 1799	 1819	 1829	 1849
Accountant, Bookkeeper	 0	 0	 1	 0	 45	 46
Architect, Surveyor
	 1	 3	 0	 0	 17	 21
Attorney, Barrister 	 3	 1	 2	 5	 77	 88
Banker	 1	 12	 11	 9	 48	 81
Broker	 0	 0	 0	 0	 21	 21
Dentist	 0	 0	 0	 0	 3	 3
Doctor, Surgeon	 3	 11	 7	 3	 77	 101
Engineer	 0	 1	 0	 0	 16	 17
Armed Forces	 0	 0	 0	 0	 33	 33
Other	 0	 0	 0	 0	 54	 54
Total Professionals	 8	 28	 21	 17	 391	 465
Total CARD Database Investors
	 243	 926	 528	 297	 3,919	 5,913
Professionals as a Percentage of
	 3	 3	 4	 6	 10	 8
Total Investors
Source: Analysis of investors in the CARD Database.
Table 7.22 shows that the proportion of investors employed in professional occupations
increased from 3 per cent to 10 per cent over the period 1760 to 1849. The new
professions, such as accountants, brokers, engineers, architects and surveyors, were a
response to the increasing specialisation of the business world. To some extent the
development of these professions was a direct result of the changes brought about by
investment in transportation infrastructure through the mechanism of publicly owned joint
stock companies. Just as George Eliot's own father had grown from tenant farmer to
successful land agent, surveyor and valuer so too does Fred Vincy in Middlemarch. His
career in the Church is abandoned after the railway line surveyors appear in the
countryside. 1 However, there was also enormous growth in the numbers of
practitioners of older professions such as attorneys and banisters, doctors and
surgeons.
Professional occupations were generally part of the growing urban middle
classes. In the present study 16 per cent of investors from Birmingham were from the
Professional and Banker categories, as can be seen in Table 7.23.
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Table 7.23: Birmingham Investors in the Professional and Banker Group
Number As % of Total
Attorney	 -	 13	 23
Banker	 20	 36
Doctor/surgeon	 18	 32
Engineer	 1	 2
Armed forces	 1	 2
Surveyor	 3	 5
Total Professionals	 56	 100
Total investors	 346	 100
Professionals as a Percentage of Total Investors 	 16
Source: Investors from the CARD Database with addresses in
Birmingham.
The analysis in Table 7.23 confirms the findings of earlier research, which used trade
directories as source documents. This showed physicians and surgeons, attorneys and
solicitors as the most dominant professional groups. 16° Although by 1852 the more
modern professions such as architects, accountants, surveyors and auctioneers and
estate agents were starting to become more widespread. The absence of these
professions amongst the CARD investors from Birmingham may be because they were
probably less wealthy than members of the older professions and did not belong to the
social elite.161
Surprisingly, the largest category of Birmingham Professionals was that of
doctors and surgeons, only slightly fewer in number than Bankers. The medical group is
also understated since it does not include unqualified practitioners such as apothecaries
and druggists. The prominence of the medical profession may be the result of their
access to information networks. The number of Birmingham Professionals who were
also members of the 33 voluntary societies in the Birmingham Database is shown in
Table 7.24.
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Table 7.24: Birmingham Professionals who were also Members of the Birmingham
Database
	Birmingham	 Members of Birmingham Database
Professionals
	
Number	 Number	 As % of Total
Bankers	 71	 10	 14
Doctors	 93	 8	 9
Attorneys	 61	 5	 8
Total	 225	 23	 10
Source: Data from 973 members of Birmingham voluntary societies on
the Birmingham Database and Birmingham Professionals from the
CARD Database, as defined in Appendix III.
In total, 23 out of the 465 Birmingham Professionals (5 per cent) were also members of
the Birmingham Database, The 23 Professionals came from three groups, Bankers,
Medical Practitioners and Attorneys. The presence of Bankers and Attorneys at the
heart of Birmingham society is not remarkable. The importance of these two groups in
acting as advisers and intermediaries has already been discussed. There is also
evidence that some members of the medical profession were also active investors and
may also have been sources of information and conduits for its transfer. Two
Birmingham doctors, John Ash and William Small, were original subscribers to the BCN
and members of the management committee. 1 They were well connected to other
prominent investors in Birmingham through their work on the committee of the General
Hospital. 1 Elizabeth Anne Galton, the daughter of Samuel Tertius Galton, the
Birmingham banker, noted in her diary that their family doctor was Joseph Hodgson. Dr.
de Lys and Dr. John Johnstone were also friends of the family. 1 Dr. de Lys's daughter;
Barbara, and Drs. Hodgson and Johnstone all owned shares in the BCN in 1840. Dr
Johnstorte owned 24 shares jointly with the bankers, J. L. Moilliet, Paul Moon James,
John Barclay Galton and Samuel Tertius Galton. 1
 Adele Galton, the sister of Elizabeth
Anne, married a Dr. Booth, although there is no evidence in the present study that he
was a canal or railway investor. These doctors must all have mixed with the wealthy and
financially sophisticated elite of Birmingham middle-class society. Like pollinating bees
the& may well have passed on information from one patient to another. The relative
prominence of members of the medical profession in investment in canal companies has
also been noted by other researchers. Ward recorded the involvement of doctors from
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Liverpool in speculative activity in the late eighteenth century but could offer no
explanation.1
The relative absence of newer professions amongst the Birmingham-based
investors is also a reflection of the lack of interest in railway stocks from the investors in
that city. It will be recalled that railway investors tended to dominate the CARD and
BARD Databases in the later years, when these new professions began to emerge.
There is a wider mix of professionals from both Bristol and from Liverpool where railway
investment was more popular. This is further evidence of the two separate
constituencies of canal and railway investment already discussed in Chapter 6.2.3. The
difference in the types of Professional investor in the canal and railway companies is
analysed in Table 7.25.
Table 7.25: Professional Investors in Canal and Railway Companies
Canal	 Rail
Number As % of Number As % of
	
Total	 Total
Accountant, Clerk, Bookkeeper 	 3	 2	 43	 13
Architect, Surveyor	 5	 3	 16	 5
Attorney, Barrister	 28	 20	 60	 19
Banker	 53	 37	 28	 9
Broker	 0	 0	 21	 7
Dentist	 0	 0	 3	 1
Doctor, Surgeon	 45	 31	 56	 17
Engineer	 3	 2	 14	 4
Armed Forces	 2	 1	 31	 10
Other	 4	 3	 50	 16
Total	 143	 100	 322	 100
Source: Analysis of the total number of investors in the CARD Database
classified as Professionals and Bankers.
Table 7.25 shows that the old professions of attorneys, barristers, bankers, doctors and
surgeons dominated the professionals who invested in the canal companies. Although
both the legal and medical professions are still the most important professions amongst
the railway company investors, the proportion of bankers has declined markedly and the
newer professions such as accountants have increased substantially.
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7.8 Conclusions
The sample population of canal and railway company investors was selected on
the basis of economic criteria. The investors are drawn from a wide spectrum of socio-
economic backgrounds. Nevertheless they share many social and cultural values. These
investors were broadly representative of the growing middle class. They were clearly
differentiated from the landed class in terms of the sources of their wealth and their
attitudes to risk. The investors exhibited strong religious affiliations. A large number of
the sample population were dissenters, who belonged to closely inter-connected family
groups. Membership of societies, often based on common political or religious affiliation,
provided fora for social interaction, which reinforced class identity, but also provided a
medium for the exchange of ideas and information.
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This research set out to establish that risk assessment and the strategies used
to mitigate risk are fundamental to the understanding of middle-class society in the
period 1760 to 1850. The sample of investors in West Midland's canal and railway
companies was selected solely on the basis of economic criteria. The resulting
population of 5,913 investors was intended to be neutral in respect of social and cultural
factors, although the economic selection criterion excluded those who did not have
sufficient surplus wealth to invest. Theoretically the sample population could have
included anyone from a sufficiently wealthy background. In fact it was dominated by
individuals from socio-economic backgrounds typical of the middle classes. 1
 This large,
homogenous population was used to re-evaluate earlier research into the ways in which
the middle class was differentiated from the landed and labouring classes. The effect of
socio-economic background and gender on attitudes to risk and risk mitigation within this
middle-class population was also investigated.
The sample population of investors was classified into categories according to
gender, socio-economic background and geographical location. The behaviour of each
of these groups was then examined under different risk scenarios. Earlier research has
categorised investors into two types, 'financial' investors and 'economic' investors. 2 In
the present research, financial investors corresponded to the socio-economic groups of
Rentiers, the Landed, Clergy, Professionals and Bankers. The remaining categories of
Merchants, Manufacturers, Artisans and Shopkeepers were prima fade economic
investors. This crude classification of financial and economic investors ignores the 	 -
likelihood that economic investors may have had mixed motives and behaved as
'financial' investors in some circumstances and that economic investors may not have
had a specific commercial interest in the company in which they held shares. It also
ignores differences in investment strategy amongst the different categories of financial
investors. Nevertheless, discernible differences in the behaviour of these broadly
defined groups of financial and economic investors were observed.
The prevailing risk environment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
discussed in Chapter 3. Other researchers have suggested that newly acquired
affluence was threatened by the risk of early death, war or business failure, thus
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encouraging the adoption of risk mitigation strategies such as life insurance. At the same
time, some sectors of society were permeated by reckless, risk-seeking behaviour.3
Even government finance and life insurance embraced the ethos of lotteries and
gambling.
Other studies have attempted to correlate the incidence of bankruptcy with
different phases of the economic cycle. 4 Although a tendency for bankruptcies to
increase in periods when the economy was expanding was observed, the research
could not establish a statistically significant correlation between specific phases of the
business cycle and business failure. These inconclusive results are probably because
the factors affecting bankruptcy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were too
varied and the time lag between economic incidents and business failure was too long.
in the present study, the turnover of shares, which are relatively liquid assets, was
observed at different stages in the business cycle, and in war and peacetime conditions.
The extent to which different socio-economic groups were effected by the prevailing risk
environment was investigated by analysing the purchases and sales of shares in two of
the canal companies over several business cycles during the period before and after the
American and French Wars. The study revealed that more shares changed hands in the
troughs of business cycles than during peaks (Chapter 3.5.2). The turnover of shares
belonging to economic investors, such as Merchants and Manufacturers, was higher
during troughs in the cycle than that of financial investors. On the other hand, financial
investors were more likely to sell in peak or neutral periods. Merchants, and increasingly
over the period, Manufacturers, were dependent on external credit from banks and it is
not surprising that they were most adversely affected by downturns in the business
cycle.5 The tightening of conditions in the money market during downturns in the
economy may have required them to liquidate investments to provide additional cash for
their business at the least advantageous time. Behaviour of investors during periods of
war and peace also confirms the vulnerability of the Merchant group to the disruption of
trade (Chapter 3.4.2). The financia' investors in the sampte population tended to buy
canal shares tess frequently during wartime. This appears to confirm the financiat
sophistication of this group who may have been switching from joint stock shares into
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government securities as wartime yields on government stocks rose.6
The behaviour of investors in response to the underlying risk environment was
the background to the further study of the response of these shareholders to specific
investment risks. Investment risk is the uncertainty of the return on an investment, in
terms of income and capital. Uncertainty results from an investor having inadequate
information. This may be because the information is not available or inaccurate, or that
investors do not have equal access to information. Equal access to good quality
information, which all investors interpret in the same way, is one of the requirements for
an efficient market. Other factors which are essential for an efficient market include
liquidity, which is a function of both the number and variety of shares available for
trading, and the existence of legal and institutional structures to facilitate the transfer of
shares and the presence of market makers and arbitrageurs. 7 The inequalities in an
inefficient market heighten uncertainty and the level of investment risk. Earlier research
on the efficiency of the market for shares in the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth
centuries used data on the yield of government or quasi-government stocks.8
Researchers are agreed that the market for government stocks was well developed by
the end of the eighteenth century. 9 Although Mirowski challenges the view that the
market was efficient. 1 ° The present study extends this research to the market for joint
stock shares in the canal and railway companies. The prices of canal company shares
were not regularly reported until 1811. However, share prices exist for two of the
companies in the present study in a complete series for the last three decades of the
eighteenth century up to and beyond the period at which the Course of the Exchange
started to report prices. As this information extends over such an important period in the
development of the capital market it can be used to shed new light on the debate about
when the national capital market developed. The yield on the shares of the Birmingham
Canal Navigation was compared to that on Corisols for the period 1770 to 1828. The
fluctuations in the yield between the canal share and the bellwether government stock
were found to be significantly correlated. This is new evidence for the existence of a
national capital market in the late-eighteenth century and corroborates the findings of
Buchinsky and Polak's research in the property market. 11 A similar exercise on the yield
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of the shares in the Stourbridge Navigation failed to produce a statistically significant
correlation. Further investigation revealed that reporting of the price of the BCN shares
in both the local market and the stock exchange in London were closely matched,
whereas the reporting of share prices of the Stourbridge Navigation lagged by about
twelve months. This evidence shows that the eighteenth-century capital market in canal
company shares still exhibited inefficiencies in the transfer of information. Inefficiencies
would have been likely to cause further differentiation in the investment risk amongst
different companies.
Research on twentieth- and twenty-first- century stock markets has defined the
relative risk of a stock as a function of the variability of its yield in comparison to the
performance of the market or a relevant sector of the market and the probability of the
stock earning a particular yield. 12 The present study attempted to construct an index of
the yield on late-eighteenth- and mid-nineteenth-century canal company stocks.
However, the poor quality of the underlying data on prices and dividends made them
unsuitable for use in quantitative risk analysis. A series of measures were devised to
rank each canal company according to the level of risk during the construction and
operating periods. Contemporary opinion regarded railways as generally low-risk
investments13 and it proved virtually impossible to differentiate between the group of
railway companies in the present study. The canals companies were found to be more
differentiated in terms of risk. The present study investigated whether the gender or
socio-economic background of investors effected their propensity to take different levs
of investment risk.
The results of this study suggest that different socio-economic groups did have
varying investment objectives. Differences in the behaviour of the financial and
economic investors were found to be more pronounced during the construction period
than the operating period (Chapter 4.5.3.3). This is probably because the overall level of
risk was higher before the canals were completed. In addition, inertia of investors
holding onto shares acquired earlier probably blurred results in the operating period.
Financial investors, particularly the Clergy, were much more likely than economic
investors to foflow low-risk investment strategies during the construction period.
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Financial investors were probably more likely to make decisions based on financial
criteria, such as the yield on a particular stock. Economic investors may have included
other benefits in their risk analysis and found higher risks to be acceptable. Some
economic investors, such as Manufacturers or Merchants, may have had access to
better information about the companies, whereas, some financial investors, such as the
Clergy, were isolated from the business community.
The risk analysis revealed the Landed group exhibited different behaviour to that
of other financial investors. This may be further evidence of the differentiation of the
middle and landed classes. It was established that financial assets, such as shares,
were not an important part of the wealth of the landed group. The differentiation of
different groups on the basis of their attitudes to risk was investigated further by the
examination of the strategies used to mitigate risk. Strategies such as portfolio
management and life insurance have been examined by other researchers. 14 In the
present, study investors who held shares in more than one canal or railway company, or
who held life insurance policies were investigated. The research also attempted to
establish the extent to which the sample population also held investments in land and
government stocks.
The study found evidence that a substantially higher proportion of investors held
multiple investments in canal companies than in railway companies. This confirms the
premise that investors were capable of differentiating between different levels of risk in
the canal companies in the present study. There is some evidence to suggest that
investors holding higher-risk investments were more likely to hold a portfolio of canal
shares. The railway companies in the present study were a much more homogenous
and lower-risk group. Investors generally held the shares of only one of these
companies. Financial investors, in particular Rentiers and Women, were more likely to
hold multiple investments than economic investors. Holding of multiple investments
might be a function of wealth, which would explain the greater incidence of Rentiers.
Female investors, however, were generally less wealthy than their male counterparts,
and thus the holding of multiple investments is more likely to denote risk-averse
behaviour.
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Rentiers and Women were also more likely to hold a significant part of their
assets in shares. There is also evidence that government stocks were widely held by
investors in the present study (Chapter 4.4.1). Again, financial investors exhibited a
preference for holding financial assets. Bankers and Women were the two groups of
investor in the present study most likely to hold government stocks. The value of the
holdings was substantial, which contradicts contemporary evidence that holdings of
these stocks were generally small although the size of the sample in the present study
was extremely limited. 15 In contrast, little evidence was found of substantial landowners
holding shares or of investors holding substantial amounts of land (Chapter 4.2.1). This
corroborates Rubinstein's research into the extent to which the wealthy middle class
acquired estates and assumed the lifestyle of the landed gentry. 16 Little support was
found for Thompson's view that the descendants of wealthy middle-class businessmen
joined the landed classes.17
Earlier research has made the case for the differentiation of the middle classes
from the landed and labouring classes on the basis of their sources of income. The
present study, based on a sample population selected on the basis of the economic
criterion of surplus investment capital is clearly differentiated from the labouring classes,
who relied on manual labour and did not own property. 18 The present study suggests
that it is also possible to differentiate the middle classes from the gentry not only by their
lack of investment in land, which has already been explored by other researchers, but
also by importance the middle classes placed in the ownership of liquid financial assets.
These investments could be easily disposed of to provide extra capital for their
businesses or passed on to their descendants in the form of marriage portions or the
seed capital for future business enterprises. 19
 The mix of investments held by the
investors in the sample population, the age they acquired them and how they disposed
of them on death was investigated. The present study established that investors first
acquired shares at the .average age of forty, which corroborates evidence of the male
middle-class property cycle described by Morris. 20 The study also revealed that investors
first took out life insurance at the average age of thirty-seven.
A very high proportion of investors held life insurance (Chapter 5.3.1), which
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confirms the prudence of the sample population and its willingness to embrace financial
innovation. Again, differences were distinguished between the behaviour of economic
and financial investors. Life insurance was primarily used by financial investors.
Professionals insured their own lives to protect their families in the event of their
premature death or to insure partnership arrangements or indentures. Most commonly,
life insurance was taken out by males in their thirties, presumably to protect young
families. The present study revealed that female investors, who were drawn from
amongst the wealthier socio-economic backgrounds, did not use life insurance
extensively. This contradicts evidence from other studies, which show relatively large
numbers of women used life insurance to protect their income or insure a debt.21
Women in the sample population rarely need to insure their own lives, as they did not
have an income from a trade. The lives of these women were more likely to be insured
by others to preserve a reversionary income. Lower income groups, such as Artisans
and Shopkeepers were active users of life insurance since it was easily accessible
through local agents. It was also a relatively inexpensive way to provide, through annual
payments out of income, a capital sum for dependants in the event of the policyholder's
death.
Access to information was the key to effective risk evaluation. Analysis, in
Chapter 6, of the different characteristics of canal and railway investors suggests that
two different mechanisms for information transfer and investor behaviour were in
operation. The dissemination of information about canal companies appears to have -
been predominantly by personal contact, and share transfers took place largely in the
local market, although these transactions were informed by the prevailing sentiment in
the national market. New mechanisms evolved to transmit information to potential
investors in the railway companies. Share dealing became institutionalised and
information was disseminated through formal public media such as the London and
provincial stock exchanges and the press. In the present study there was little overlap
between investors in canal and railway companies. The local exchange of canal
company shares co-existed with the national, institutionalised railway share market. The
two populations of investors were separate and do not appear to have moved from using
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one market to the other. Certainly in the case of investors in Birmingham, where canal
stocks had been enthusiastically embraced, there appears to have been relatively little
interest in railway investment. Canal investment was likely to have been regarded as
requiring greater personal scrutiny and investigation, hence preserving the older system
of more personal information transfer. In contrast, there is evidence to suggest that
railway companies were regarded as a more homogenous low-risk commodity, which
could be adequately marketed through more impersonal media.
This research appears to confirm the view that social learning was a more
effective means of transferring information than the press. Personal contact between
members of the middle-class elite in various public spheres was important, although
family relationships, often reinforced by religious affiliation, were probably the most
effective means of information transfer. The research provided evidence of the
importance of nonconformists as providers of capital, which corroborates the views of
earlier researchers on the importance of these groups in the business community. This
research distinguished between the behaviour of Quakers and Unitarians. A much high-r
proportion of Quakers were investors. Quakers were also more likely to be members of
the voluntary societies whose members were recorded in the Birmingham Database.
This provides firm evidence to substantiate earlier research, which suggests that
Unitarians retreated from public life after the Church and King riots in Birmingham in
1791.24
Professionals were the largest single group of investors who belonged to
voluntary societies. This group was probably the most likely to benefit from contact with
other influential people. This study confirms earlier research that there was a growth in
the new professions over the period? The proportion of investors who were
Professionals increased from 3 to 10 per cent over the period. However, these were
much more likely to be railway investors than canal investors. This further illustrates the
widening of the constituency of investors who bought shares in the national capital
market.
Earlier researchers have suggested that during the period 1760 to 1850 the
middle classes not only came to differentiate themselves from the landed aristocracy
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and the gentry in terms of their social activities and religious affiliation, but they also
began to differentiate themselves politically. in towns such as Birmingham, the middle
classes made common cause with working-class Radicals in the agitation for reform of
the franchise. 27 Although their support was ultimately directed towards different
objectives, which preserved middle-class values. Nevertheless, the political behaviour of
the population of investors provides quantitative evidence of the objectives of middle-
class voters in the period. investors who represented the wealthy middle class were
significantly more likely than the constituency as a whole to support Independent or
Radical candidates in the period up to the 1832 Reform Act. Radical support made
common cause amongst both financial and economic investors. Only the Landed and
the Clergy did not support the Radical agenda.
The present research successfully distinguishes between the behaviour of male
financial and economic investors. The use of risk analysis as a tool highlights the
anomalous behaviour of female investors. Previous researchers have tended to
underestimate the importance of women as investors. 28 In the present study, 18 per
cent of canal shareholders and 11 per cent of railway shareholders were women. There
is no substantial evidence to suggest that they were any more than passive financial
investors. However, their collective presence was of great importance to the viability and
liquidity of the equity markets. The research shows that women's estates were
substantially smaller than those of men, (an average of 60 per cent lower probate value).
This may be because they originally inherited fewer stocks than their male siblings.
Nevertheless, the value of their share holdings was only 30 per cent below that of their
male counterparts. Analysis of their propensity to take risk suggests that they invested in
higher-risk canal companies during the construction period but sought out higher
yielding, low-risk investments in the operating period. Their behaviour conformed more
to the model of economic investors, possibly because their investment activity was
directed by male advisors or they had less access to information in the early years of a
company's iife. Certainly over the life of a company, females conformed to the behaviour
typical of financial investors. The present study confirms that female investors were
substantial holders of low-risk government securities, and that they were also more likely
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than most male investors to hold shares as part of portfolio of investments.
The present research has attempted to inform the debate on the differentiation
of the middle class from the perspective of how they assessed and mitigated investment
risk. The research has produced evidence of a class of financial investors with common
values of risk assessment and common prudent objectives to preserve and pass on their
wealth to future generations in the form of liquid, financial assets. These investors did
not own substantial amounts of land, nor did they appear to aspire to the lifestyle of the
gentry. They developed and supported cohesive social and cultural activities within the
urban environment. This environment perpetuated their ability to acquire and
disseminate information, which informed their ability to evaluate and mitigate risk
effectively.
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1. Selection Criteria
1.1 Canal Companies
The eleven canal companies included in the present study represent the total
number of such companies, which operated in the West Midlands for which shareholder
information is available. The canal companies included in the CARD Database are listed
in Table I below.
Table 1: Canal Companies Included in the CARD Database
Code	 Date	 Original	 Final
Authorised	 Share	 Share
	
Cap!tal	 Capital
£	 £
Birmingham Canal Navigations	 BCN	 1768	 70,000	 112,000
Birmingham & Liverpool Junction BLC	 1826	 400,000	 800,000
Coventry	 CCC	 1768	 50,000	 87,500
Dudley	 DUD	 1776	 7,000	 206,325
Grand Junction	 GJC	 1793	 500,000	 1,800,000
Stourbridge Navigation 	 SN	 1776	 30,000	 43,000
Stourbridge Extension	 SEC	 1837	 na.	 49,000
Warwick & Birmingham	 WCB	 1793	 69,300	 160,000
Warwick & Naptori 	 WBRC	 1794	 79,500	 79,500
Worcester & Birmingham	 WOBC	 1791	 180,000	 610,000
Gloucester& Berkley	 GBC	 1793	 112,000	 440,000
Total	 1,497,800	 4,387,325
Source: Original share capital from Ward. 1 Final share capital from
Course of the Exchange, Mileage and Dates Authorised and Completed
from Hadfleld.2
1.2 Railway Companies
The total number of railway companies which obtained parliamentary approval to
construct lines in the West Midlands are set out in Table 2. Those included in the CARD
Database and the Share Price Analysis, discussed in Chapter 4, are indicated in the
Table.
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Year	 Capital	 Included in
£'OOO	 CARD
Database
1826
	
510
1827
	
0.35
1836
	
630
1840
	
170
1836
	
950
1843
	
106
1836
	
150
1840
	
60
1828
	
45
1834
	
20
1839
	
400
1842
	
200
1836
	
750
1842
	
750
1833
	
1,040
1835
	
52
1838
	
546
1840
	
125
1841
	
441
1844
	
257
1834
	
0
1835
	
2,500
1839
	
1,250
1848
	
500
Included in
Share Price
Anayis
V.
V.
V.
V.	 V.1833
	
2,500
1835
	
0
1837
	
0
1839
	
1,000
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Table 2: Total Capital Authorised by Parliament for Railway Companies in the
West Midlands between 1826 and 1848
Railway
Liverpool & Manchester
Ctieltenham
Birmingham & Derby Junction
Birmingham & Gloucester
Birmingham, Bristol and Thames Junction
Bristol & Gloucestershire
Cheltenham & Great Western
Grand Junction
Great Western
Great Western Additional powers for the
purchase of the Birmingham & Oxford
and Birmingham, Wolverhampton and
Dudley Railways
London & Birmingham
Manchester & Birmingham
	 1837	 2,100
Stratford & Moreton	 1833	 0
Warwick & Leamington Union
	 1842	 130
Birmingham & Oxford Junction	 1846	 700
Birmingham & Oxford Junction	 1846	 300
(Birmingham Extension)
Birmingham, Wolverhampton & Dudley	 1847	 50
Amendment
Birmingham, Wolverhampton & Stour 	 1846	 1,110
Valley
Coventry, Nuneaton, Birmingham & 	 1846	 270
Leicester
Oxford, Worcester & Wolverhampton	 1845	 1,500	 V.
Alteration and extension	 1846	 220
Amendment	 1848	 750
TOTAL	 21,571
Source: List of companies and share capital from Scrivenor.3
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1.3 Joint Stock Banks
The total number of investors included in the Bank Database, (BARD
Database), which comprises shareholder information from two banks, is shown in Table
3 below.
Table 3: Share Capital and Investors Included in the BARD Database
Code Date	 Issued	 Shares	 Shares in	 Investors
Share	 Included	 Database
Capital	 in BARD	 as
Database Percentage
of Shares
in Issue
Coventry Union Bank CUB 1836
Stourbridge & SKB 1834
Kidderminster Bank
Total
	
£'OOO	 £000
	
200	 200
	
250	 230
	
450	 430
% Number
100	 262
92	 356
96	 618
Source: Coventry Union Bank data from Deed of Settlement and List of
Shareholders 1836. Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank data from Deed
of Settlement 1834.
2. Completeness of Source Documents
The source documents have varying degrees of completeness. A complete list
of source documents is given in Appendix Ill. Table 4, below, gives the percentage of
shares in each of the canal and railway companies for which shareholder information
was available and was included in the CARD Database.
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Table 4: Total Share Capital Analysed in CARD Database
Total Shares in Issue	 Shares Included in	 Percentage of Total
CARD Database	 Shares Included in
CARD Database
Number	 Number	 %
Canal Companies
BCN1768	 500	 500	 100
BCNI79O	 500	 202	 40.4
BCNI800	 500	 161	 32.2
BCNI8IO	 500	 107	 21.4
BCNI84O	 8,000	 7,594	 94.93
BLC1826	 4,000	 2,554	 63.85
BLCI83O	 4,000	 366	 9.15
BLCI84I	 4,000	 800	 20
CCC1768	 500	 335	 67
CCCI78O	 500	 93	 16.6
CCCI79O	 500	 133	 26.6
CCCI800	 500	 74	 14.8
CCCI8IO	 500	 83	 16.6
CCCI8I6	 500	 255	 51
CCCI82O	 500	 66	 13.2
DUDI 776	 2,074	 62	 2.99
DUDI79I	 2,074	 463	 22.31
G8C1817	 440	 372	 84.55
GJC1793	 5,000	 2,101	 42.02
GJCI800	 5,000	 1,964	 39.28
SEC1837	 500	 359	 71.8
SN1776	 300	 268	 96
SN1809	 300	 256	 85.33
WBRCI794	 795	 780	 98.11
WCB1793	 1,000	 921	 92.1
WCB1798	 1,000	 522	 52.2
WCBI8O8	 1000	 571	 57.1
WCBI82O	 1,000	 546	 54.55
WCB184O	 1,500	 1,044	 69.6
WCB1849	 1,500	 422	 28.13
WOBCI79I	 1,800	 1,625	 90.28
Railway Companies
BGR1836	 9,500	 na	 na
BGRI 844	 9,500	 1,974	 20.78
B0R1847	 50,000	 na	 na
CGW1836	 7,500	 1,097	 14.63
GJR1845	 66,943	 17,393	 25.98
GWR1835	 25,000	 22,675	 90.7
MBR1838	 30,000	 28,939	 96.46
0WR1845	 30,000	 23,510	 78.37
Source: Total shares in issue for periods after 1811 taken from the
Course of the Exchange for the relevant year. For periods prior to 1811
total canal company shares taken from Ward and checked against
Hadfield. 6 Total railway shares checked against Scnvenor.7
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3. Classification
The following information on individual investors in the eleven canal companies
and seven railway companies was extracted form source documents and entered on the
CARD Database:
Surname;
First name;
Number of shares held;
Sex;
Title/social status;
Occupation, and
Address.
3.1 Soclo-economic Classification
The following fifteen-category classification was used in the present research
L	 Landed, including peers, gentlemen and esquires in rural locations, farmers;
G Rentiers, including gentlemen, esquires in urban locations;
P1 Professionals;
P2 Bankers;
P3 Brokers;
MI Manufacturers;
M2 Food Processors, such as brewers, millers;
M3 Artisans;
TI Merchants;
T2 Shopkeepers;
T3 Persons engaged in service industry, including servants, innkeepers;
IC Iron, coal, or metal masters;
C Clergy;
W Women; and
U Unknown.
This classification is a development of those used by Ward in 1974 for canal investors
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and Reed in 1975 for railway company investors. 8 Ward classified shareholders into
nine socio-economic groups, namely:
Peers;
Landed gentlemen;
Yeomen, graziers, tenant farmers;
Capitalists;
Manufacturers;
Tradesmen;
Professional men;
Clergymen, and
Women.
Reed, in his study of railway investors, developed a similar classification, namely:
Trade, including merchants, brokers, agents, most retail trades, shipowners;
Manufacturing, including mining;
Banking;
Professions, including law, medicine, clergy, officers in the services and merchant
marine, architects;
Miscellaneous, including white-collar groups, teachers, engineers, craftsmen,
servants;
Land, farmers and graziers;
Non-occupational, gentlemen, esquires, nobility;
Women, and
Unspecified.
Both Ward's and Reed's classifications have certain deficiencies. For example,
Ward distinguishes Landed Gentlemen from the Capitalist group. It is often difficult to
identify landed gentlemen from the information available in share registers. Particularly
by the mid-nineteenth century, an investor who would have once described himself as a
manufacturer or merchant tended to call himself a gentlemen or esquire even though he
might not have owned anything more than a villa in Edgbaston.9 Sons may have
aspired to the status of a gentleman, for example, Edmund Hatcher, junior, of Bristol
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who owned shares in the GWRI 835.10 His father, also Edmund, is denominated as a
currier, his son as a gentleman. In the present study, except where the address very
clearly indicates a landed estate 'gentlemen' or 'esquires' have been placed in the
Rentier category. Another deficiency of the Ward classification is the broad categories of
'Manufacturers' and 'Tradesmen'. This means that no distinction can be made between
investors who owned large businesses and the more humble artisan, butcher or baker.
The 15-category classification used in the current research seeks to overcome this by
splitting the Manufacturer category into three; namely Manufacturer, that is a man in a
substantial way of business; Food Processors such as brewers and millers and Artisans.
The 15-category classification also distinguishes Merchants, Shopkeepers and
individuals in the Service Industry, such as innkeepers and servants. A problem with all
schemes of classification is how to distinguish between an individual craftsman and a
substantial employer when the only information available is a single entry in a share
register. For example, John Gibbons is described as a japanner in the share register of
the Birmingham Canal Navigation in 1768.11 On this information alone, a M3 Artisan
classification would be appropriate. It is known from other sources 12 that Gibbons was a
partner in the firm of Gibbons & Gibbs, enamel manufacturers, thus requiring a Ml
Manufacturer classification. Since Gibbons' self-effacement is unusual in the aspirational
society of the eighteenth century, in cases of uncertainty, the lower socio-economic
classification was applied.
3.2 Geographical Classification
The addresses of the canal and railway investors were classified into twelve
areas as follows:
Bristol and Avon;
Bath and South West;
Birmingham;
West Midlands;
London;
Liverpool;
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Manchester;
North West;
South Wales;
Scotland and Ireland;
Other, and
Unknown.
3.3 Treatment of Unknowns
Where the information was not available, the socio-economic group or the
address of the investor was designated as Unknown. In some cases the only information
available, apart from the shareholder's name and shareholding was the investor's
gender. Where, rarely, initials only rather than forenames were recorded in the company
books, the shareholder has been assumed to be male. The proportion of investors for
whom occupations or addresses were Unknown varies substantially for each share
register, as can be seen from Table 5.
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Table 5: Unknown Socio-economic Groups and Addresses in CARD Database
Total	 Investors with Unknown	 Investors with Unknown
	
Investors	 Socio-economic Group
	
Address
	
Number	 Number	 %	 Number	 %
Canal
Companies
BCN1768	 89	 14	 16	 1	 1
BCNI79O	 46	 26	 57	 40	 87
BCNI800	 46	 25	 54	 38	 83
BCNI8IO	 33	 17	 52	 24	 73
BCNI84O	 536	 137	 26	 181	 34
BLC1826	 176	 87	 49	 149	 85
8LC1830	 24	 15	 63	 22	 92
BLCI84I	 46	 16	 35	 44	 96
CCC1768	 78	 52	 67	 66	 85
CCCI78O	 17	 8	 47	 14	 82
CCCI79O	 16	 9	 56	 12	 75
CCC1 800	 15	 6	 40	 10	 67
CCC18IO	 15	 4	 27	 4	 27
CCCI8I6	 72	 7	 10	 3	 4
CCCI82O	 11	 7	 64	 8	 73
DUD1776	 17	 0	 0	 0	 0
DUDI79I	 55	 39	 71	 3	 5
GBCI8I7	 30	 28	 93	 30	 100
GJC1793	 216	 152	 70	 182	 84
GJCI800	 134	 87	 65	 111	 83
SEC1837	 34	 0	 0	 0	 0
SN1776	 59	 7	 12	 14	 24
SN1809	 85	 7	 8	 4	 5
WBRCI794	 157	 104	 66	 126	 80
WCB1793	 137	 91	 66	 113	 82
WCB1798	 82	 61	 74	 76	 93
WCBI8O8	 98	 57	 58	 90	 92
WCBI82O	 110	 62	 56	 96	 87
WCBI84O	 249	 137	 55	 225	 90
WCB1849	 97	 55	 57	 86	 89
WOBCI79I	 200	 103	 52	 95	 48
Total Canals	 2,980	 1,420	 48	 1,867	 -63
Railway
Companies
BGR1836	 18	 18	 100	 18	 100
BGR1844	 60	 60	 100	 60	 100
BORI 847
	
95	 95	 100	 1	 1
CGWI 836	 84	 80	 95	 80	 95
GJR1845	 482	 10	 2	 3	 1
GWR1835	 1,429	 31	 2	 19	 1
MBR1838	 725	 532	 73	 21	 3
OWRI 845	 40	 5	 13	 33	 83
Total	 2,933	 831	 28	 235	 8
Railways
Source: CARD Database.
258
APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY
4. Multiple Shareholders
Table 6 gives the total number of investor entries for each company including
and excluding multiple shareholders.
Table 6: Investors Included in the CARD Database (Number)
Canal	 Rail
Company	 Total	 Investors Company	 Total	 Investors
and Date	 Investors	 Excluding	 and Date	 Investors	 Excluding
	
Multiple	 Multiple
	
Shareholders	 Shareholders
BCN1768	 103	 89 BGR1836	 18	 18
BCNI79O	 60	 46 BGR1844	 64	 60
BCNI800	 53	 46 B0R1847	 95	 95
BCNI8IO	 39	 33 CGW1836	 88	 84
BCNI84O	 588	 536 GJR1845	 492	 483
BLC1826	 213	 176 GWR1835	 1,446	 1,428
6LC1830	 28	 24 MBRIB3B	 745	 725
BLCI 841	 46	 46 OWRI 845	 40	 40
CCC1768	 86	 78 Total	 2,988	 2,933
CCCI78O	 18	 17
CCCI79O	 22	 16
CCCI800	 17	 15
CCCI8IO	 18	 15
CCCI8I6	 83	 72
CCCI82O	 12	 11
DUD1776	 20	 17
DUDI79I	 77	 55
GBCI 817
	 30	 30
GJC1793	 230	 216
GJCI800	 144	 134
SEC1837	 36	 34
SN1776	 72	 59
SN1809	 93	 85
WBRCI794	 259	 157
WCB1793	 235	 137
WCB1798	 112	 82	 -
WCBI8O8	 115	 98
WCBI82O	 126	 110
WCBI84O	 276	 249
WCB1849	 102	 97
WOBCI 791	 228	 200
Total	 3,540	 2,980
Source: CARD Database.
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5. Birmingham Database
Table 7: Institutions Included in the Birmingham Database
Date	 No. of Members
Abolition of Slavery	 1790	 8
Anacreontic Society	 1793	 105
Association against Republicans and Levellers
	 1792	 18
Bean Club
	 1761	 67
Birmingham Political Union	 1817	 48
Birmingham Political Union	 1829	 18
Birmingham Political Union
	
1830	 36
Churchwardens	 1790	 19
Commercial Committee 	 1790	 51
Conservative Association 	 1832	 12
Deaf and Dumb Institution 	 1812	 43
Eye Hospital	 1823	 17
Fever Hospital	 1825	 15
Friends Book Club	 1840-1	 24
General Dispensary	 1793	 16
General Dispensary	 1840	 15
General Hospital 	 1765	 117
General Hospital 	 1839	 61
Infant Schools	 1825	 20
Library	 1799	 159
Manufacturers Petition	 1775	 10
News Room	 1822	 9
Orthopaedic Hospital 	 1825	 26
Poor Relief	 1794	 41
Protestant Dissenting Schools 	 1761	 15
Society of Arts 	 1821	 43
Street Commissioners	 1769	 50
Suffrage Union	 1842	 37
Unitarian Brotherly Society 	 1796	 153
Water Works	 1808	 38
Total	 1,291
S ource: Details of the source documents for members of each of the
above institutions are given in Appendix Ill
6. Normalising Results of Risk Analysis
The propensity to take nsk by each social class group was determined by
examining the number of shareholders in each social class who owned shares in
companies that were determined to be either High, Medium or Low risk. The total
number of shareholders varied from social class to social class; the analysis recognised
this by normalising the data, i.e. dividing the actual number in each category, by the
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number that would have occurred, if the buying pattern had been random.
Table 8: Normaliseci Propensity of Canal Investors to Take Risk in Each Social
Group - Construction Period
Low Medium High Combined Risk Propensity
Clergy	 0.38	 1.47	 0.19	 3.89
Landed	 1.23	 1.08	 0.50	 4.87
Professional and Bankers 	 0.82	 1.11	 0.86	 5.61
Rentiers	 0.72	 1.11	 0.96	 5.81
Women	 1.30	 0.81	 1.28	 6.75
Manufacturers	 2.34	 0.45	 1.23	 6.93
Artisans and Shopkeepers
	
1.31	 0.50	 2.26	 9.07
Merchants	 2.19	 0.21	 2.18	 9.14
For example, in Table 8 the figure for 'Clergy' in the 'High' column means that the total
number of Clergy, who actually invested in High-risk companies divided by the number
of Clergy that would have invested in High-risk companies, had the distribution between
companies been random, was 0.19. Thus, the number of clergy who invested in this type
of share was only 19 per cent of the expected number.
To determine the combined risk propensity the distribution of each of the low,
medium and high scores was combined. This was done by allocating a score of 1, 2 and
3 to Low, Medium and High risk companies respectively, and computing the sum of each
of these scores with the relevant propensity to take risk. The choice of 1, 2 and 3 for the
risk scores is clearly arbitrary, but the results of the analysis were examined using a
variety of alternative plausible scoring systems, with no impact on the findings.
'J. R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Century England (Oxford,
1974), pp. 29 to 54.
2 c Hadfield, The Canals of the West Midlands. The Canals of the British Is/es: Vol. 5
(Newton Abbot, 1985), pp. 31 8-29 and C. Hadfield, The Canals of the East Midlands
Newton Abbot, 1966), pp. 268-76.
H. Scrivenor, The Railways of the United Kingdom Statistically Considered, in Relation
to their Extent, Capital, Amalgamation, Debentures, Financial Position, Acts of
Parliament by which they are Regulated, Creation and Appropriation of Shares, Calls,
Dividends, and Various Other Minor Particulars (London, 1849), Appendix taken from
Parliamentary Paper, No. 159, Session 1844 and No. 731, Session 1848 and No.7,
Session 1849.
4 ABI, Coventry Union Bank, Deed of Settlement and List of Shareholders, 1836,
Midland Bank Archive, London.
TI, Stourbridge & Kidderminster Bank, Deed of Settlement, 25 March 1834, Midland
Bank Archive, London.
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6 Ward The Finance of Canal Building, pp. 29-54, Hadfield, Canals of the East
Midlands, pp. 268-76 and Hadfield, Canals of the West Midlands, pp. 268-76.
Scrivenor, The Railways of the United Kingdom, Appendix taken from Parliamentary
Paper, No. 159, Session 1844 and No. 731, Session 1848 and No.7, Session 1849.
8 Ward, The Finance of Canal Building, p. 18 and M. R. Reed, Investment in Railways in
Britain, 1820- 1844 (Oxford, 1975), p. 109.
9PRO RAIL 810/182, BCN, List of Proprietors, 8 May 1840. George Eyre Lee was
described as 'esquire' and lived in Edgbaston.
10 PRO RAIL 251/1, GWR, Register of Proprietors, 29 October 1835.
PRO RAIL 810/1, BCN, Committee Minutes and Reports, Original Subscribers, 25
March 1768.
12 Sketchley and Adams, Tradesman's True Guide (Birmingham, 1770).
262
APPENDIX II: YIELD INDEX OF CANAL COMPANY SHARES
Table 1: Weighted Index of Canal Company Share Yield 1814-1846
Year %	 Year %
1814	 3.84	 1833 5.23
1815	 3.85	 1834 4.69
1816 4.28	 1835 4.72
1817	 5.90	 1836 4.82
1818	 3.12	 1837	 5.08
1819	 n.a.	 1838	 5.09
1820 na.	 1839 5.58
1821	 3.34	 1840 5.66
1822 4.40	 1841	 6.74
1823 3.95	 1842 7.37
1824 3.88	 1843 6.41
1825 3.49	 1844 5.50
1826 3.03	 1845 5.57
1827 4.28	 1846 5.54
1828 3.98	 1847 5.54
1829 4.28	 1848 5.54
1830 4.13	 1849 5.54
1831	 4.48	 1850 5.54
1832 4.95
Source: Monthly canal share price and annual dividend from Course of
the Exchange. Yields weighted by issued nominal share capital of
eleven companies as set out in Table 2.
The yields on the eleven shares making up the canal index were weighted in
accordance with the nominal issued share capital of the companies as set out in Table
2.
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Table 2: Weighting of Canal Companies by Issued Nominal Share Capital in 1834
£	 %
Birmingham Canal Navigation	 70,000	 2.33
Birmingham & Liverpool Canal	 400,000	 13.29
Coventry Canal	 50,000	 1.66
Dudley Canal	 206,000	 6.84
Grand Junction Canal	 1,150,000	 38.20
Staffordshire & Worcestershire Canal 	 98,000	 3.26
Stourbridge Canal	 43,500	 1.44
Stratford upon Avon Canal	 289,936	 963
Warwick & Birmingham Canal 	 125,000	 4.15
Warwick & Napton Canal 	 107,800	 3.58
Worcestershire & Birmingham Canal 	 470,400	 16.62
Total	 3,010,636	 100.00
Source: Course of the Exchange, 14 January 1834.
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BCN 1790
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BCNI8IO
BCNI84O
BLCI 826
BLCI 830
BLCI 841
CCCI 768
CCCI 780
CCCI 790
CCCI800
CCCI81O
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CCCI 820
DUD1776
DUDI 791
GBCI 817
GJC1 793
GJCI 800
SECI 837
SN1776
SNI 809
WBRCI 794
WCBI 793
APPENDIX Ill: DATABASE SOURCE DOCUMENTS
Canal Companies in CARD Database
Reference	 Type of Document
PRO RAIL 810/1
	 Committee Minutes and Reports, Original
Subscribers, 25 March 1768
PRO RAIL 81 0/43
	
General Assembly of Proprietors, 26 March
1790
PRO RAIL 81 0/43
	
General Assembly of Proprietors, 28 March
1800
PRO RAIL 810143
	
General Assembly of Proprietors, 28
September 1810
PRO RAIL 81 0/1 82
	
List of Proprietors, 8 May 1840
PRO RAIL 808/4 Part I General Minutes of Assembly of Proprietors,
First General Meeting, 22 July 1826
PRO RAIL 808/4 Part I Minutes of General Assembly of Proprietors,
16 January 1830
PRO RAIL 808/4 Part I Minutes of General Assembly of Proprietors, 5
March 1841
PRO RAIL 818/1
	
Minutes of First General Assembly, 19
February 1768
PRO RAIL 818/3
	
Minutes of General Assembly, 20 March 1780
PRO RAIL 818/4	 Minutes of General Assembly, 28 September
1790
PRO RAIL 818I4
	
Minutes of General Assembly, 25 March 1800
PRO RAIL 81 8/4	 Minutes of General Assembly, 27 March 1810
PRO RAIL 818/35	 Share Register ,6 May 1816
PRO RAIL 818/5	 Minutes of General Assembly, 28 March 1820
PRO RAIL 824/2
	
Minutes of General Assembly, Initial
Shareholders, 6 June 1776
PRO RAIL 824/19
	
Proprietors Ledger, 1 September 1791
PRO RAIL 829/1	 Minutes of Meeting of General Assembly, 17
September 1817
PRO RAIL 830/39
	
Minutes of General Assembly and Committee,
First General Assembly, 1 June 1793
PRO RAIL 830/40
	
General Meeting of Proprietors, 3 June 1800
PRO RAIL 873/17	 Subscribers to Parliamentary Bill,
19 January 1837
PRO RAIL 874/I	 First General Assembly, I June 1776
PRO RAIL 874/17	 Transfer Ledger, 2 January 1809
PRO RAIL 882/1	 Minutes of Annual General Meeting, 	 -
Proprietors Named in the Act, 27 May 1794
PRO RAIL 881/1	 Minutes of General Assembly, Proprietors
named in the Act, 27 May 1793
WCBI 798	 PRO RAIL 881/I	 Proprietors, 27 March 1798
WCBI 808	 PRO RAIL 881/1	 Proprietors, 29 March 1808
WCBI82O	 PRO RAIL 881/2	 Proprietors, 18 April 1820
WCBI 840	 PRO RAIL 881/3	 Proprietors, 21 April 1840
WCB1849	 PRO RAIL 88113	 Proprietors, 5 September 1849
WOBCI 791 PRO RAIL 886/1	 Minutes of General Assembly of Proprietors,
First General Meeting, 5 July 1791
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Rail Companies in the CARD Database
Reference	 Type of Document
BGRI 836	 PRO RAIL 37/1	 Minutes of General Meetings of Proprietors,
First Meeting, 19 September 1836
BGRI 844	 PRO RAIL 37/1
	
Minutes of General Meetings of Proprietors,
23 August 1844
BOR1847	 PRO RAIL 39/4	 Minutes of General Meetings of
Shareholders, Extraordinary Meeting, 13
March 1847
CGWI 836
	 PRO RAIL 109169	 List of Shareholders Agreeing to Hold
Shares until 10% Is Paid, 1836
GJRI 845	 PRO RAIL 220/12	 Register Book of Proprietors, 10 September
1845
GWRI 835	 PRO RAIL 251/1
	
Register of Proprietors, 29 October 1835
MBRI 838	 PRO RAIL 384/147	 Lists of Subscribers, 2 April 1838
OWRI 845	 PRO RAIL 558/4	 General Meetings of Proprietors, 22
February 1845
Joint Stock Banks in BARD Database
Reference_	 jyp Document
SKB1834	 TI, Midland Bank	 Deed of Settlement, 25 March 1834
Archive
CUB1836	 ABI, Midland bank	 Deed of Settlement and List of
Archive	 Shareholders, 1836
Birmingham Philanthropic, Political, Religious and Social
Institutions in Birmingham Database
Reference	 Type of Document
Abolition of	 Langford, Vol. 1, p. 434	 List of Individuals at a Meeting to Petition for the
Slavery 1790	 Abolition of the Slave Trade, November 1790
Anacreontic	 514093 HRI9,	 Register of Members 1793-1814
Society 1793	 Birmingham Reference
Library
Langford, Vol. 2, p.164 List of Members, 7 December 1792
345313 hR 12,	 List of Members made by John Wickens,
Birmingham Reference	 Secretary in 1761
Library
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 414 Members of Hampden Club, Meeting at New Hall,
22 January 1817
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 530
	
Signatories to Petition to Call a Meeting on the
Distressed State of the Country,
8 November 1829
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 534
	
Signatories to Declaration of the Union
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Langford, Vol. 2, p. 46	 List of Individuals Giving Relief to the Poor, 19
December 1794
Langford, Vol. 1, p. 95	 Meeting of Committee of Members of-the Old
and New Meeting Houses, 29 June 1761
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 411	 Proposers of Provisional Committee,
26 January 1821
Langford, Vol. 1, p. 190	 Commissioners of Act for Laying Open and
Widening Certain Ways and Passages, 8 May
1769
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Birmingham Philanthropic, Political, Religious and Social Institutions in
Birmingham Database, (continued)
Reference	 Type of Document
Commercial	 Langford, Vol. 1, p. 349	 Meeting 12 May 1790
Committee 1790
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 625 Meeting 17 December 1832Conservative
Association 1832
Deaf and Dumb
Institution 1812
Eye Hospital 1823
Fever Hospital
1825
Friends Book
Club 1840-1
General
Dispensary 1793
General
Dispensary 1840
General Hospital
1765
General Hospital
1839
Infant Schools
1825
Library 1799
Manufacturers
Petition 1775
News Room 1822
Orthopaedic
Hospital 1825
Poor Relief 1794
Protestant
Dissenting
Schools 1761
Society of Arts
1821
Street
Commissioners
1769
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 405
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 457-
8
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 462
MS 2160 1/2,
Birmingham Reference
Library
MSI 759, Birmingham
Reference Library
MSI 759, Birmingham
Reference Library
HC/GH 1/1/1,
Birmingham Reference
Library
HC/GH 1/1/1,
Birmingham Reference
Library
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 501
Parish, pp. 105-31
Langford, Vol. 1, p. 215
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 496
Langford, Vol. 2, p. 345
Private Meeting on 30 November 1812; Public
Meeting and Committee Members, 12
December 1812
Report of Meeting 24 November 1823 to
Establish Hospital
Report of Meeting to Form a Committee, 3
January 1825
Annual Meeting of Members, 25 March 1840
Minutes of Annual Meetings,
Subscribers Present, 27 December 1793
Minutes of Annual Meetings, Subscribers
Present, 19 February 1840
List of Benefactors, 21 November 1765
Minutes of Board of Governors
Present at General Meeting, 15 March 1839
Report 26 September 1825
List of Subscribers to the Tontine 1799
Petition 23 January 1775 re. American War
Committee meeting, 10 September 1822, to
establish a Commercial and News Room
Meeting of Subscribers, 24 June 1817
Suffrage Union	 129666 ZZ34,
	
First Weekly Meeting, 25 April 1842 and Council
1842	 Minute Book I
	
Meeting, 9 April 1842
Birmingham Reference
Library
Unitarian	 391175 IIR 28,	 Minutes of Society Meetings 1796-1882
Brotherly Society Birmingham Reference
1796	 Library
Water Works	 Langford, Vol. 2,	 Meeting of Committee to set up Water Works
1808	 pp. 231-2	 October 1808
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J. A. Lan gford, A Century of Birmingham Life or a Chronicle of Local Events 1741-1841,
Volumes I and 2 (Birmingham, 1868).
C. Parish, History of the Birmingham Library, (London 1966), Appendix F, pp. 105-31.
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Years were designated Trough, Peak and Neutral as set out in Table 1.
Table 1: Stages in the Economic Cycle 1790-1850
Year Economic Cycle Year Economic Cycle
1790	 T	 1821	 N
1791	 P	 1822	 N
1792	 P	 1823	 N
1793	 1	 1824	 N
1794	 1	 1825	 P
1795	 N	 1826	 1
1796	 P	 1827	 N
1797	 T	 1828	 P
1798	 N	 1829	 T
1799	 N	 1830	 N
1800	 P	 1831	 P
1801	 T	 1832	 T
1802	 P	 1833	 N
1803	 T	 1834	 N
1804	 N	 1835	 N
1805	 N	 1836	 P
1806	 P	 1837	 1
1807	 N	 1838	 N
1808	 1	 1839	 P
1809	 N	 1840	 N
1810	 P	 1841	 N
1811	 T	 1842	 T
1812	 N	 1843	 N
1813	 N	 1844	 N
1814	 N	 1845	 P
1815	 P	 1846	 N
1816	 1	 1847	 N
1817	 N	 1848	 T
1818	 P	 1849	 N
1819	 T	 1850	 N
1820	 N
Key: P=Peak, T=Trough, N=NeutraL
Source: Designation of Peak, Trough and Neutral after A. D. Gayer, W. W.
Rostow and A. J. Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuations of the British
Economy 1790-1850. An Historical, Statistical and Theoretical Study of
Britain's Economic Development (Oxford, 1953), VoL II, p. 888.
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APPENDIX VI: DEVELOPMENT OF THE MJDLAND tS CANAL AND RAILWAY
SYSTEM
The Duke of Bridgewaters canal from Worsley to Manchester, opened in 1761,
is generally regarded as the bellwether commercial canal in England. 1 It opened up the
Duke's coalfields to the markets of Manchester and was immediately successful in
simultaneously reducing the price of coal to consumers and increasing the profits to the
coal-owner.2 Other canal promoters quickly recognised the advantages of linking
navigable river systems by canals to produce an inland navigation network safe from
interruption by the weather or war. 3
 Josiah Wedgwood encouraged the development of
the Trent & Mersey canal, which reduced his transportation costs and operup wider
markets for his products. 4
 In 1766 Parliament approved the construction of the
Staffordshire & Worcestershire Canal which linked the Severn at Stourport with the Trent
& Mersey canal A canal to link these routes to the Thames was the next objective. The
first part of this plan was the Coventry canal, which was intended to carry coal mined
near Coventry to the Trent & Mersey canal. Although the Coventry canal gained
parliamentary approval in 1768 it failed to raise sufficient capital and only the portior
between Coventry and Atherstone was built. In the meantime, the second part of the
scheme to link the Midlands to London was initiated in 1769 with the approval of a canal
to link the Thames at Oxford to the Coventry canal at Longford.
Birmingham began to develop as a canal hub. The Birmingham canal linking the
Staffordshire & Worcestershire canal at Autherley to Birmingham was authorised in 1768
with the purpose of bringing coal to Birmingham and goods from the Staffordshire and
Worcestershire canal. John Freeth, 'the facetious bard of nature' 5 captured the mood of
elation in Birmingham as the first cheap coals reached Birmingham in 1769:
There never in war was victory won
A cause that deserved such respect from the Town;
Then revel in gladness, let harmony flow,
From the district of Bordesley to Paradise Row
For true feeling joy in each breast must be wrought,
When Coals under Five-pence per hundred are bought'
The line from Birmingham to the Staffordshire & Worcester Canal at Aldersley was
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completed in 1772. The Birmingham canal was later extended to Fazeley to join the
Coventry canal near Tamworth.
Completion of the Coventry canal and the Oxford canal between Banbury and
Oxford became even more critical in the link between the Midlands and London. In 1782,
the proprietors of the four interested companies, the Trent & Mersey, the Birmingham &
Fazeley, the Oxford and the Coventry canals agreed to co-operate to achieve this
objective. The Trent & Mersey and the Birmingham & Fazeley proprietors agreed to
construct the portion of the Coventry canal between Fradley and Fazeley. This was
completed in 1786. In 1786, the Coventry Canal Company finally raised sufficient capital
to complete its line, which was opened in 1790. The remainder of the Oxford canal was
completed in 1789, thus finally linking the Trent, Mersey, Severn and Thames.
Birmingham now had access to London markets via the Birmingham, Coventry and
Oxford canals.7
Meanwhile more and more feeders were being built to existing canals and more
towns were being linked by new projects. For example, the Stourbridge canal linked
Stourbridge to the Staffordshire & Worcestershire canal. The Dudley canal joined Dudley
to the Stourbridge canal. Canal promoters were constantly seeking to divert traffic
through their lines with the lure of lower tolls or faster routes. Investors had to take
considerable risks during the construction period. Estimates of the capital costs were
often wildly over optimistic and the ability to raise additional funds problematic, as in the
case of the Coventry canal. In addition there was no guarantee that the project would
continue to have an economic rational by the time it was built. The vested interests of
other canal companies or the subsequent approval of a competing scheme could
destroy the project's potential profitability. For example, the Dudley canal and the
Stourbridge canal competed with the Birmingham canal to take coal to the Severn.
Later, in 1785 the Dudley canal was permitted to connect with the Birmingham canal at
Tipton with the intention of bringing coal from Netherton to Birmingham. This gave a
shorter connection with the Severn to that via Aldersley. It was not completed before
Parliament approved a direct line between Birmingham and the Severn at Worcester.
This was opposed by both the Staffordshire & Worcester and Birmingham canal
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companies, which foresaw traffic would be diverted away from their lines. The Dudley
canal proprietors sort to exploit this situation and proposed a junction between their
canal and the Birmingham & Worcester canal at Selly Oak. This meant that traffic going
south could by-pass Birmingham altogether. In spite of competition from the Birmingham
Canal Company, the junction was approved by Parliament. In spite of opposition from
existing canal companies traffic levels were sufficient to sustain generally high levels of
profitability. 8
The success of some of the early canals led to speculation caused by financial
investors gambling on the potential success of new schemes. This reached a climax in
the years 1792 to 1793. Canals started at the beginning of the period of canal mania
were generally 'those, which had a solid base in the increasing prosperity of the times.'9
These included the Warwick & Birmingham and the Warwick & Napton canals, which
shortened the route to London. These were also the years of the development of the
very large projects, such as the Grand Junction canal, which cost close to a million•
pounds to comptete and never produced high returns to investors, as a consequence of
its high capital cost. 1 ° The speculative canals of the later years of the mania tended to
be in the south and west of the country and centred on Bristol. For example, the Bristol
to Gloucester canal or the line from Bristol to the Thames Severn canal at Thameshead.
The financial crisis of 1793, at the outbreak of the French Revolutionary war, put an end
to the boom in canal shares. Nevertheless, canal building continued albeit on a less
frenetic scale.
Between 1790 and 1800, £5 to £6 million was invested with a further, £12.5 to
£11.0 million between 1801 and 1835.11 Investment continued long after the
development of railways. At first the railways were seen as feeders to the waterways but
soon the canals were coming under increasing competition. Existing canals were
improved and services such as express boats and passenger services were introduced.
Competition with railways forced canal companies to reduce tolls but many canals
continued to exist and trade profitably until the I 840s.'2
At first, railways were conceived as toll companies with other carriers and even
canal companies running wagons over the rail company's track. 13 Railway companies
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began to acquire canal navigations. In 1845 five navigations came under railway control,
in 1846 a further seventeen and in 1847, six more, comprising a total 949 miles,
representing about 20 per cent of all the navigable waterways in Great Britain. They
included 160 miles of the Birmingham Canal Navigations and the 204 miles of the
Shropshire Union system' 4 Railways acquired canals for three reasons. Firstly, to reach
agreement with their opponents for the passage of their Parliamentary Bills; secondly,
the reduce competition, and finally in some cases to use the line of the canal to build the
track. 15 Canals which served manufacturing concerns usually managed to survive, whilst
canals serving agricultural districts succumbed most quickly to the railways.
The first railway to be constructed in England was the Stockton to Darlington
line, which gained parliamentary approval in 1820 and was completed five years later.
Like canals, railways were initially envisaged as freight carriers. Up to 1830 most of the
schemes which were authorised were relatively short and designed for mineral traffic,
such as the network round Glasgow to open up the Lanarkshire coaffleld and the
Lianelly Railway in South Wales. The main trunk routes serving Birmingham were
authorised in the I 830s. The London to Birmingham (L&B) and the Grand Junction
(GJR) were both authorised in 1833. The GJR linked Birmingham to Liverpool and
Manchester. It took a direct route, ignoring most of the towns on its route, particularly
Wolverhampton. As a consequence, it was cheap to build, costing less than a third per
mile of the L&B. The GJR never became an important passenger line since it only
served a small population of about 150,000. Nevertheless, low construction costs meant
it was amongst the most profitable of the early railway companies. 16 The L&B was
completed a year later in 1838. Although construction was more expensive than that of
the GJR it was also profitable. The Manchester to Birmingham railway (MBR),
authorised in 1838, was in direct competition with the GJR to serve the Northwest. The
Birmingham & Gloucester railway (BGR) was authorised in 1836 to link Birmingham with
the Southwest. The BGR had difficulties raising sufficient capital and construction
progress was slow although it was finally completed in 1841.
Unlike the canals, the railway companies began to amalgamate very early in
their development. Amalgamation was a strategy used by both the broad and narrow
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gauge companies to frustrate the rival system. For example, in 1846, in a pre-emptive
strike against the GWR, the Midland Railway, itself an amalgamation of three midland
railway companies, purchased the BGR and the Bristol & Gloucester railway. This
opened a narrow gauge system from Birmingham to BristoL 17 In the I 840s, the
Birmingham & Oxford (BOR) and the Oxford, Worcester & Wolverhampton (OWR)
railways were promoted by the GWR to compete with the L&B. 18 The MBR, the GJR and
the L&B were amalgamated into the London & North Western railway in 1847.19 The
GWR was conceived as a link between Bristol and London in 1835. It built an extensive
broad gauge network in the Southwest of England and attempted to expand into the
Midlands via the line to Cheltenham. It was later successful in taking over the BOR in
1848 and constructing a line from Banbury to Birmingham in 1852.20
J. Phillips, A General History of Inland Navigation, Foreign and Domestic; Containing a
Complete Account of the Canals Already Executed in England with Considerations on
those Projected (London, 5th edition 1805), p. vi and J. R. Ward, Finance of Canal
Building in Eighteenth-Century England (Oxford, 1974), p. 150.
2 Ward Finance of Canal Building, p. 127.
Phillips, General History of Inland Navigation, p. viii.
4 C. Hadfield, The Canals of the West Midlands. The Canals of the British Isles: Vol. 5
Newton Abbot, 1985), pp. 15-28.
Quote from the Gentleman's Magazine reported by C. Gill, History of Birmingham, Vol.
t Manor and Borough to 1865 (Birmingham, 1952), p. 138.
J. A. Langford, A Century of Birmingham Life or a Chronicle of Local Events 1741-
1841, Vol. 1 (Birmingham, 1868), p. 177.
Hadfield, Canals of the West Midlands, pp. 63-80.
8 C. Hadfield, British Canals (London, 1950), p. 87 and Hadfield, Canals of the West
Midlands, pp. 100-14.
Hadfield, British Canals, p. 98.
° C. Hadfield, Canals of the East Midlands ( Newton Abbot, 1966), pp.108-I 8.
' P. Deane, The First Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, 1979), p. 80.
12 S. R. Broadbridge, The Birmingham Canal Navigations. Vol. I 1768-1846 (Newton
Abbot, 1974), pp. 174-5.
13 Hadfield, British Canals, pp. 179-80.
14 Hadfield, British Canals, p. 184.
15 Hadfield, British Canals, p. 184.
16 R. Christiansen, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain. Volume 7. The
West Midlands (Trowbridge, 2nd edition, 1983), pp. 25-31.
17 Christiansen, Regional History of the Railways. The West Midlands, pp. 48-56.
18 Christiansen, Regional History of the Railways. The West Midlands, pp. 65-6.
19 Christiansen, Regional History of the Railways. The West Midlands, pp. 22 and 279.
20 Christiansen, Regional History of the Railways. The West Midlands, p. 272.
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